The Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures of Work

1968 SEPTEMBER 1968
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS COMMISSION

REPORT
ON
THE MACHINERY
OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
AND ITS
PROCEDURES OF WORK

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145 ARC—1
My dear Prime Minister,

I am presenting herewith the report of the Administrative Reforms Commission on the Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures of Work. The Commission appointed a Study Team on this subject with Shri S. G. Barve as Chairman. He completed the work on an interim report, but unfortunately passed away before presenting it to the Commission. We place on record our gratitude and appreciation of the good work he did for the Commission. After him, Dr. C. D. Deshmukh was appointed as Chairman. He gave the final report. Dr. C. D. Deshmukh and the members of the Study Team have worked hard and long and we thank them all. The reports of the Study Team and further discussions with some eminent persons who knew the working of the Government of India, have helped the Commission in formulating the recommendations made in this report.

2. The pivot of the administrative machinery of the Government of India is the Union Cabinet and it sets the pace for efficiency in the entire organisation. We have proposed a compact Cabinet of 16 Ministers to ensure homogeneity, speed and purposeful functioning. The selection of Cabinet Ministers should invariably be guided by their background in public life, stature in the country, and their special ability and aptitude for the portfolios concerned. To the extent extraneous considerations creep in, the worth of the Cabinet gets deteriorated. The Prime Minister being the leader of the team has undoubtedly the right of selecting the Cabinet Ministers. The recommendations we have made should be of assistance in the proper selection of Ministers and allocation of work to them.

3. While we envisage the continuance of the Ministers of State and Deputy Ministers, we welcome the discontinuance of the Parliamentary Secretaries. In order to fix responsibility as well as to bring a sense of satisfaction to the junior Ministers we have recommended that their powers and functions should be clearly specified in appropriate rules or orders of the Government. We have taken the view that the size of the Council of Ministers should be determined primarily by administrative needs. We have, therefore, recommended that the size of the Council should normally be forty and should in no case exceed forty-five.
4. We have recommended that as a matter of principle every Department in the Government of India should be with one Cabinet Minister or the other. The present practice of some departments being independently under a junior Minister is not conducive to overall policy formulation and decision making by the Cabinet. Even a small department and its working must fit into the overall picture of policies and decisions. To place it at a sub-Cabinet level would be invidious.

5. The Prime Minister is now the Chairman of the Planning Commission. We have recommended in our report on Economic Administration that the Prime Minister should keep herself informed about overall progress in the implementation of the plan with a view to ensuring that all the sections of the economy move forward in unison and to issue necessary directives. This in effect gives her the overall directions of economic affairs of the Government of India. The Prime Minister has the right to take any work or portfolio under her direct charge. But the overall view we take of the great responsibilities of the Prime Minister, compels us to recommend that she should not spend her precious time in ordinary administrative work. Most of her time should be available for guidance, direction, advice and coordination. In the international sphere the place of Prime Minister of India is high. She has to visit other countries. Foreign dignitaries visit India. She has often to undertake tours within the country. All this takes considerable time. It is, therefore, that we have recommended that normally she should not be in charge of a Ministry. Her role is essentially one of leadership and not of ordinary administration.

6. The work at present handled by the Central Government falls into three categories, namely, (a) work relating to the subjects which, under the Constitution, fall within the Central List of subjects; (b) work relating to those items in the concurrent List for which the Centre has assumed responsibility through Central legislation or otherwise; and (c) work concerning subjects within the State List. Government has hived off some of its work to statutory corporations and other autonomous bodies. As regards items (a) and (b), the present functions and responsibilities of the Central Ministries concerned, will have to continue. In the case of (c), over the last twenty years, the Ministries at the Centre have been encroaching upon the State sphere to quite an extent. These Ministries have to retrace their steps and confine themselves generally to coordination, research and such other matters as are agreed to between the States and the Centre. The autonomous corporations should be allowed by the Secretariat, and the Ministers to act in the true spirit of the Parliamentary enactments under which they have been brought into existence. If they do so, much of their administrative functions and personnel would get reduced. Adopting this approach, we have suggested reduction in the number of Ministries and proposed a rational combination of subjects into portfolios distributed among sixteen Cabinet Ministers.
7. We have examined the organisation of the work at the Ministry and supra-Ministry levels. Our recommendations with regard to the former seek (a) to confine within proper limits the work now done by the Central Government and its agencies with regard to matters falling within the States' sphere; (b) to coordinate the functions of the Secretariat and executive agencies and (c) to improve the Secretariat methods of work. One of our recommendations relating to the last item is the reduction of levels of decision in the Secretariat to two. This and the "desk—officer" system under which each officer will have to dispose of finally a substantial portion of the work coming to his 'desk' will, we hope, cut out annoying delays in Secretariat offices.

8. We have recommended that the Cabinet Secretary should have enhanced responsibilities. His role should be that of a general coordinator and principal staff adviser to the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and the Cabinet Committees. He should be associated in the determination of overall policies and actions concerning the selection and career development of all senior management personnel.

9. The work of administrative reforms is a serious and purposeful work, which the Government has undertaken, through the Administrative Reforms Commission. The recommendations of the Commission made in their various reports have to be processed with speed and implemented effectively. The Commission and its Study Teams will have examined and taken counsel with Secretaries and Ministers and experts. The processing of the recommendations of the Commission again by the Secretaries is unnecessary. We have, therefore, recommended a Cabinet Committee on Administration to deal with the implementation of our recommendations. The Cabinet Committee has to consist of the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and the Home Minister. We have recommended that the Deputy Prime Minister should be in charge of implementation of the reforms. Unless these high-level decision making and implementation methods are adopted the attempt at reforms will be attenuated by the processing at the secretariat level and by the interested resistance that naturally arises in sections of the administration adversely affected.

10. Any restructuring of the organisational set-up of Ministries and departments or the re-orientation of the methods of work cannot by itself generate efficiency in administration. It is the calibre and morale of personnel which finally set the tone of administration and determines its effectiveness. We have, therefore, devoted attention to the arrangements needed for providing a sound organisational base for the performance of the key personnel functions at a central point in the machinery of Government. We have recommended the setting up of a Department of Personnel, whose main functions would be formulation of personnel policies and review of their implementation, talent-hunting, development of personnel for "senior management" and processing of appointments to senior posts,
manpower planning, training and career development and research in personnel administration. The Department will not itself administer any service cadres the control over which would be with individual Ministries and Departments concerned. In view of its vital importance for one who has to exercise leadership over the administration as a whole, we have recommended that the Department should be in the charge of Prime Minister.

11. In this report, we have, to some extent, dealt with the procedures of work in Government of India, leaving the rest of the work to our report on Personnel Administration which we will be making in a few months' time.

12. One of the Members, Shri H. V. Kamath, has given a note of dissent which is enclosed. All the points raised by him were fully discussed at the meetings of the Commission.

Yours sincerely,

Sd/- K. HANUMANTHAIYA.

Shrimati Indira Gandhi,
Prime Minister,
New Delhi.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

"The machinery of the Government of India and its procedures of work" heads the list of subjects which in particular have been referred to the Commission for their examination. We, however, felt that our report on this subject should await the results of our examination of those aspects of the administration which are connected with planning and economic development of the country, because our recommendations on the Machinery of the Government of India and its procedures would be conditioned by our views on what the organisational set-up should be for ensuring the effective implementation of the national developmental programmes. We have now completed our examination of the subjects which have a bearing on planning and development and made recommendations on "Public Sector Undertakings", "Finance, Accounts and Audit", "Machinery for Planning" and "Economic Administration". This clears the ground for examination of the Machinery of Government of India and its Procedures of Work—the subject-matter of this report.

2. We have in this report confined our examination mainly to the central part of the machinery of Government of India. The Council of Ministers by virtue of its pivotal position naturally claims prior attention. We, therefore, commence our report with a review of the functions of the Council of Ministers, the role of the Prime Minister, and the secretarial assistance to the Cabinet. We then proceed to an examination of the relationship between Ministers, Civil Servants and Parliament. The next subject dealt with is the set-up and methods of work in Ministries and Departments. In this connection, the general principles underlying the manner and extent to which the Government of India should deal with subjects which fall under the State List come up for consideration. The set-up at the Centre should obviously include a suitable organisation for the formulation and implementation of administrative reform. A central personnel agency is also a vital limb of the administration at the highest level. These matters are, therefore, considered before we proceed to the grouping of subjects in the light of the conclusions reached in the earlier chapters.

3. In our assessment of the existing machinery of Government and formulation of the proposals for its reform, we have borne in mind the new role which is expected of the Administration under the present conditions of growing enlightenment and rising expectations of the people. It must answer to the needs of the people and secure public response and cooperation. It has, however, to operate within the framework of the
political system, of national goals as embodied in the Constitution and the public policies and programmes as approved by the elected representatives of the people.

4. The Administration is also conditioned by the stage of social, economic and political development of the country and affected by the attitudes and motivations of those who run it. Viewing the problem in this perspective, we have found it necessary to take a realistic view of things and strike a balance between the needs of continuity and those of change. We have suggested a radical change of the existing structures or methods of work only where they have become totally outmoded. In other cases, we have tried to improve upon them. Even such balanced proposals for reorganisation are likely to meet with resistance. Administrative practices and traditions which are no longer suited to new challenges of a fast developing country must be overhauled and even weeded out. We need shed no tears over them.

5. The Study Team* on the Machinery of Government of India and its procedures of work has submitted two reports—one interim and the other final. These reports cover most of the ground dealt with in this report. The Team was initially presided over by the late Shri S. G. Barve and he finalised its interim report before his demise in March 1967. Dr. C. D. Deshmukh later became the Chairman of the Team and he presented its final report. The Commission wish to record their grateful appreciation of the valuable assistance rendered by the Chairman and Members of the Study Team. The Commission have drawn upon the reports of some other Study Teams as indicated in the relevant context in the body of the report. Our thanks are due also to these Study Teams.

*The Study Team on "The Machinery of Government of India and its Procedures of Work" will be referred to in the rest of this report as "Study Team" only.
CHAPTER II

MACHINERY AT SUPRA-MINISTRY LEVELS

6. Administration is the executive organ for carrying out the policies and programmes of the Government as approved by Parliament. In a democratic set-up, such as ours, it is accountable to Parliament through Ministers enjoying its confidence. It functions within the framework of a set of constitutional provisions, laws, rules and conventions which have been developed over the years. Briefly, the main elements in this framework are:

(i) the supremacy of Parliament over the executive and the right of Parliament to seek, receive and appraise information about governmental actions with a view to reviewing the working of administrative machinery;

(ii) the pre-eminence of the position of the Prime Minister in the Council of Ministers and in Administration;

(iii) determination of major policies by the Cabinet and the collective responsibility of the Council of Ministers to Parliament;

(iv) the individual responsibility (as a part of the collective responsibility) of each Minister holding a portfolio for formulating departmental policies, to oversee their implementation and to ensure efficient working of the administrative machinery under his charge;

(v) the obligation of Ministers as well as of public servants to uphold the Constitution and the rule of law;

(vi) the obligation of every public servant to implement faithfully all policies and decisions of the Ministers even if these be contrary to the advice tendered by him;

(vii) the freedom to public servants to express themselves frankly in tendering advice to their superiors including Ministers; and

(viii) the observance by public servants of the principles of political neutrality, impartiality and anonymity.

7. In this chapter we shall make recommendations for the efficient functioning, within the above framework of, (a) the Cabinet and the Council of Ministers, (b) the Prime Minister, (c) Cabinet Committees and (d) the Cabinet Secretariat.
The Cabinet and the Council of Ministers

8. The Cabinet, which is in effect the inner core of the Council of Ministers, stands at the apex of the administrative hierarchy. It is responsible for the final determination of policies as well as the overall direction, coordination and supervision of the business of Government and its administrative organisation. The manner in which the Cabinet and other Ministers discharge their responsibilities has a great bearing on the efficient and effective functioning of all the other parts of the Government machinery. The quality of administration is largely conditioned by the leadership and direction provided by Ministers. Public confidence in the impartiality, competence and fair play of the administration is mainly a product of the public image projected by Ministers and the standards of integrity and efficiency set by them.

9. The effective functioning of the Council of Ministers is vital to the efficient working of the machinery of Government. It has been said that with a membership as large as 56, the Council of Ministers finds it difficult to achieve, in adequate measure, esprit de corps, cohesion and a common outlook. It is clear that decisions at the top must be arrived at after careful study but expeditiously. Consultations which precede the decisions should not be an excuse for delay. Further, the existence of a number of levels in the same ministerial set-up is apt to give rise to problems in the field of relationship between junior and senior Ministers. Reduction of levels of consideration is as much needed in the political as in the secretariat set-up.

10. All these essentials can best be secured if the Cabinet is of a reasonable size and functions methodically, the cases coming before it being adequately prepared and processed in advance, so as to facilitate effective deliberation and speedy decision. Thus, the size of the Cabinet is by no means an insignificant factor. Before the Third General Election, it ranged between 12 and 16. The number of Cabinet Ministers in the new Council of Ministers formed after the Fourth General Election was 19. It is sixteen to-day because of the three vacancies which have since arisen and which have not as yet been filled. The number of Ministers of State has, since the time this institution has taken root, varied between eleven and eighteen. There are seventeen Ministers of State to-day. After the Second General Election, the number of Deputy Ministers mostly ranged between nineteen and twenty-two and stands at twenty to-day. The size of the Council of Ministers between the Second and the Fourth General Elections was generally between 46 and 53. It was the highest at the end of November, 1967, viz., 56.**

11. While the present size of the Council of Ministers might not, at first sight, appear too large for a country like India, considerations of administra-

*Parliamentary Secretaries are not included in the Council as they have no executive responsibilities.

**Included one vacancy caused by the resignation of Shri M. C. Chagla.
tive efficiency, which we have listed above, point to the need for a reduction in the size both of the Council and the Cabinet. A small number of persons working as a well-knit body will, no doubt, be able to dispose of business with expedition and efficiency and will minimize the need for coordinating devices. On the other hand, the emergence of new functions requiring the undivided attention of a Minister, calls for an increase in their number. The solution which has been evolved for reconciling these conflicting requirements is to provide a large enough body as a Council of Ministers and to limit the membership of the Cabinet to a smaller group of members of the Council. This is a very useful device and deserves to be kept up. All that is necessary, therefore, is to set up suitable limits to the size of the larger body, viz., the Council of Ministers and the smaller one, viz., the Cabinet.

12. In this connection we have considered a proposal made by a committee recently appointed by the Home Minister that the number of Ministers should be fixed as a percentage of the number of Members of Parliament. We are not in favour of adopting a formula of this type which is not based on the actual needs of administration. Our approach to the question is that the size of the Council of Ministers and the Cabinet should be determined on a rational basis related to the needs of administration. Not often in the past has there been a splitting of the Ministries in order to accommodate interests unrelated to the needs of administration. We have recommended in a subsequent chapter a rational grouping of subjects into 16 Minister’s portfolios and 38 Departments (including Ministries which have no Departments). Once this is put into effect, it should not ordinarily be disturbed. Considering the various aspects of the matter, we feel that the size of the Council of Ministers should normally be forty. It should ordinarily be possible for the Prime Minister to run the Government with that number of members of the Council of Ministers. We would, however, like to provide room for adjustments and accordingly recommend that the number may be increased as required by the needs of the situation up to fortyfive. The number should in no case exceed fortyfive.

13. The Cabinet should consist of persons of vision and wisdom, capable of formulating realistic policies and programmes for the progress of the country. They should be men of political stature. They should be able to win people’s acceptance for their policies and to secure their cooperation in implementing them. Besides, they must have administrative ability of a high order. Such men cannot, in the nature of things, but be limited in number. Further, in order that the Cabinet may be able to provide united leadership and overall direction, take policy decisions with expedition, oversee in a consistent manner the implementation of policies and programmes and in general to guide the administration on effective lines, it will have to be small in size and homogeneous in composition. The Study Team has suggested, after taking into account the results of the latest research into the working
of groups exercising collegiate responsibility, that the membership of the Cabinet should be limited to twelve. This number may be suitable if we confine ourselves only to the needs of a collegiate body arriving at quick decisions. However, it will be inadequate if we take into account (a) the number of departments which a Cabinet Minister can look after efficiently and (b) the need in a federal set-up for providing representation in the Cabinet for each important State or region.

14. After carefully considering the various aspects of the problem we have come to the conclusion that the appropriate number of Cabinet Ministers (including the Prime Minister) would be sixteen. The allocation of portfolios among them should be so made that all departments have their representation in the Cabinet through a member thereof. We consider this very necessary for effective and coordinated functioning of the entire machinery of Government. In other words, we do not view with favour the practice of having Ministers of State in independent charge of a department or departments, without a Cabinet Minister being put in ultimate charge thereof. However, a Minister of State may be invited to attend a Cabinet meeting when an item with which he is concerned comes up for discussion.

15. As already stated, the size of the Council of Ministers should normally range between forty and fortyfive and the number of Cabinet Ministers should be sixteen. There may in all be fifteen to eighteen Ministers of State, the remaining being Deputy Ministers. The sixteen portfolios of the Cabinet Ministers may be as follows:

(1) Prime Minister.
(2) Minister of Home Affairs.
(3) Minister of Finance
(4) Minister of Defence
(5) Minister of External Affairs.
(6) Minister of Law and Justice.
(7) Minister of Commerce and Industry.
(8) Minister of Irrigation and Power.
(9) Minister of Railways.
(10) Minister of Transport and Tourism.
(11) Minister of Communications, Information and Broadcasting.
(12) Minister of Food and Rural Development.
(13) Minister of Metals, Chemicals and Oil.
(14) Minister of Education, Health & Social Welfare.
(15) Minister of Labour and Employment.
(16) Minister of Works, Housing & Supply.
Our detailed recommendations for the reorganisation of the Ministries and Departments are contained in Chapter VII.

16. Closely connected with the question of the size of the Cabinet and the Council of Ministers is that of the number of tiers of Ministers. We note that after the Fourth General Election, no Parliamentary Secretary has been appointed. There are, thus, today only three tiers—Cabinet Ministers, Ministers of State and Deputy Ministers. The institution of Parliamentary Secretaries had largely become superfluous. The parliamentary work which these functionaries used to handle has been taken over by Deputy Ministers. However, we understand that a good many Deputy Ministers feel frustrated as they have not been given a worthwhile role in the Government organisation. There does not exist today any guidelines for assigning responsible work to Deputy Ministers, nor for delegating to them suitable decision-making powers. Allocation of work and delegation of powers have largely become a matter of personal wishes of the senior Minister concerned. A study conducted at the instance of the Commission in July, 1967, showed that only about half of the Deputy Ministers had substantial work assignment. Further, two-fifths of them were working, more or less, as general assistants to senior Ministers. The senior Ministers concerned have at times been consulted in regard to the posting of a particular Deputy Minister. But this has not been the general practice.

17. It has been suggested that the institution of the Deputy Minister should be abolished on the ground that it has failed to make any worthwhile contribution beyond that of gaining political support. Considering, however, the need to develop talent in the ranks of political parties, we are convinced that the institution, if properly utilised, can serve a useful purpose. It will be a training ground to build party cadres for higher ministerial appointment. It has an edge over the post of a Parliamentary Secretary in that it provides opportunities for acquiring experience in executive work.

18. There have been several cases of Deputy Ministers remaining in their posts for long periods or being recruited after the age of 55 when the prospects of growing on the job are, as a rule, not bright. We are on the whole, in favour of retaining the institution of Deputy Ministers and we feel that ordinarily the age for their appointment should be below 40 years. A Deputy Ministership should not be regarded as a consolation prize but as a useful talent-spotting and training field for future Ministership. A Deputy Minister can be usefully employed to relieve the senior Minister of a part of his burden by being given the charge of (a) an important programme or overseeing the implementation of some policies and programmes, or (b) a wing or a department with powers to take minor policy decisions, and/or (c) of parliamentary work.

19. At present the Presidential Order concerning the allocation of the business of the Government of India among Ministers provides, among
others, that "in relation to the business allotted to a Minister, another Minister or Deputy Minister may be associated to perform such functions as may be assigned to him". In our view, it is essential that the type of work to be allotted to a Deputy Minister and the powers which he may exercise within a Department/or a Ministry should be clearly specified in appropriate rules or orders of the Government. This will help to remove the present vagueness which exists about their role and functions.

20. The institution of Minister of State has developed in India, as in the U.K., to give relief to senior Ministers in discharging their onerous duties. Another objective has been to keep the size of the Cabinet small by giving some experienced Ministers of State an independent charge of some portfolios. These Ministers with independent charges are invited to Cabinet meetings when the subjects of their Departments, or other topics in which they are interested, come up for discussion.

21. We find that the number of Ministers of State with independent charges has decreased during recent years from eight during the Shastri Ministry (1964-66) to two today. The subjects which have remained in independent charge of Ministers of State (a) for ten years or more have been Parliamentary Affairs, Information and Broadcasting, Community Development, Rehabilitation and Health, and (b) for four to five years: Works and Housing, Education, Scientific Research and Cultural Affairs. There have been about a dozen more subjects which have come, from time to time, under the independent charge of Ministers of State—half of them for a period of two years and the other half, for a period of one year or less.

22. We have already stated that we are not in favour of any Department or Ministry being placed in independent charge of a Minister of State, with no Cabinet Minister above him. This, however, does not mean that a Minister of State should work all the time playing a subordinate role. He should be able to take final decisions on most of the matters which go to him. There should, therefore, be a clear-cut allocation of responsibilities to him. He should refer a matter falling within his charge to the Cabinet Minister only when it raises issues of major importance. Such issues may be referred to the Cabinet Minister either on his own initiative or in pursuance of standing orders prescribing the types of cases which should be so referred by him. In fact, cases will arise when even the Cabinet Minister may not be in a position to take a final decision and he will have to refer it for the consideration of the Cabinet. The Ministers of State will belong to the second level of leadership. They should have adequate administrative ability to enable them efficiently to administer the Departments placed under their care.

23. For speedy decision-making at the ministerial level as well as in the interest of smooth and healthy relations with senior civil servants it is essential that there should not be, as observed by us earlier, more than two levels
of political executives in any Ministry for dealing with an item of work. Under our scheme of reorganising the Secretariat, there should be at least one Minister available for each Department. In Ministries consisting of two or more Departments, the Cabinet Minister in charge will obviously have to look after the work of at least one of the Departments himself.

**Recommendation 1**

We, therefore, recommend as follows:

1. (a) The number of Ministers in the Union Cabinet should be sixteen, including the Prime Minister.

   (b) Each Department/subject should be represented in the Cabinet by one or the other Cabinet Minister. The sixteen Cabinet portfolios may be as indicated in para 15 above.

   (c) The strength of the Council of Ministers should normally be forty. It may be increased in special circumstances but should in no case exceed fortyfive.

2. The three-tier system in the ministerial set-up, comprising Cabinet Ministers, Ministers of State and Deputy Ministers, may continue. The office of Parliamentary Secretary, which has now fallen into desuetude, need not be revived.

3. The functions and responsibilities of Ministers of State and Deputy Ministers and the powers which they may exercise within a Department or a Ministry should be clearly specified in appropriate rules or orders.

4. The Prime Minister should consult the Cabinet Minister concerned before assigning a particular Minister of State or Deputy Minister to his Ministry.

5. No more than two Ministers should be involved in the decision-making process in any Ministry.

**The Prime Minister**

24. The Constitution accords the Prime Minister a special position in the executive machinery of Government. He is not only the head of the Council of Ministers—*primum inter pares*—but also the President's principal adviser. The high position invests him with the special responsibility to see that the institution functions as a team, that the rule of collective responsibility is effectively enforced, that policies are made objectively and realistically after due study and deliberation and are motivated by the national interest, that they are implemented promptly and effectively, that the administration is responsive to the people's needs, that it is on the alert for the redress of their genuine grievances, and that the objectives enshrined in the Constitution are constantly kept in view.
25. The Prime Minister’s main role in regard to administrative management in Government would consist in identifying capabilities of and securing teamwork among his colleagues and senior officials, and stimulating improvement in organisation and methods. We would like to emphasise that the increased burdens which the Prime Minister has to shoulder in the present context require that he be given adequate institutional support as well as relief from routine tasks. The main institutional support needed is a Deputy Prime Minister, who, in addition to heading a Ministry, can help lighten the Prime Minister’s heavy burden of work. The office of the Deputy Prime Minister should be duly recognised in the Transaction of Business Rules.

26. The Prime Minister should continue to be associated with key appointments. He should keep himself well informed about the functioning of the entire machinery of the Government. In this connection, we would suggest that the Prime Minister should periodically, say, once a month, individually or in groups, meet Secretaries of important Departments.

27. We have drawn attention to the need for giving the Prime Minister relief in the discharge of his onerous duties. The Prime Minister should not, as a rule, burden himself with the administrative responsibilities of any Ministry or be in charge of any subject except where it has a direct bearing on his leadership role. Similarly, the Prime Minister should head a Cabinet Committee only when special circumstances require it.

Recommendation 2.

We, therefore, recommend that:

(1) The Prime Minister should be given institutional support, in the form of a Deputy Prime Minister, for ensuring efficient and effective functioning of the governmental machinery. The Deputy Prime Minister should have the charge, in addition to his own portfolio, of such subjects and ad hoc assignments as the Prime Minister considers appropriate. The office of the Deputy Prime Minister should be recognised in the Transaction of Business Rules.

(2) The Prime Minister should continue to be associated with key appointments. He should periodically, say, once a month, meet, individually or in groups, the Secretaries of important Departments.

(3) The Prime Minister should not ordinarily be in charge of a Ministry. His time should mostly be available for guidance, coordination and supervision.
The Cabinet Committees

28. One of the major tasks of the Cabinet is to ensure coordination of all important policies, programmes and decisions of Government. There exist at present nine Standing Committees of the Cabinet as follows:

- Internal Affairs;
- Foreign Affairs;
- Defence;
- Prices, Production and Exports;
- Family Planning;
- Food and Agriculture;
- Tourism and Transport;
- Parliamentary Affairs; and
- Appointments.

There were 13 such Committees when the Study Team submitted its Interim Report in March 1967. Some of the Committees have not met regularly. Several important subjects are not covered by these Committees. Further, they can take up a matter only if it is referred to them by the Minister concerned or by the Cabinet. It is necessary to remove these basic deficiencies in their working. They should cover between them all important areas of Government activity. It is also essential that each Cabinet Committee meets regularly so that sustained attention is given to complex problems and the progress of implementation of important policies and programmes is kept under constant review.

29. The Study Team had proposed last year the creation of 11 Standing Committees of the Cabinet which were to include within their purview several new subjects like Administration, Centre-State Relationships, Science and Technology, Public Information, Foreign Affairs, Commerce, Communications and Social Services. For each Committee, the Team also suggested which Ministries should be represented on it and which Minister should preside over its deliberations. Other Ministers could be added by the Prime Minister, keeping in view their aptitudes and capabilities. The membership of each Cabinet Committee as suggested by the Team was not to exceed eight. Subject to the modifications we suggest below, we generally support these proposals of the Study Team. According to the Study Team, there should be a combined Cabinet Committee on Defence and Foreign Affairs. However, in view of the contemporary importance of each of these subjects, we favour the existing arrangement of having two separate Committees. The Internal Affairs Committee deals mainly with internal security and it will be preferable to combine with it the proposed Committee on Centre-State Relationships. Similarly, the Cabinet Committee suggested for Science and
Technology may be combined with the Committee on Commerce and Industry. This will help to bring an element of realism into discussions on scientific and technological problems. The Study Team has itself noted that the Committee on Science and Technology proposed by it will have to work in close concert with the Commerce and Industry Committee. We, therefore, do not feel that there is need for two separate Committees on these subjects. There already exists a Committee on Science and Technology composed mostly of scientists, to advise the Cabinet on scientific policy and research. The Study Team has recommended that the Committee on Administration, proposed by it, should consist of Minister of Home Affairs (Chairman), Minister of Finance and Minister of Planning. In view of the urgency of administrative improvement and reform we would recommend that this Committee should have the Prime Minister as its Chairman. Its members should comprise the Deputy Prime Minister (if he holds a portfolio other than Finance), Finance Minister and Minister of Home Affairs. We further feel that the Appointments Committee should continue. In our view the Standing Committees of the Cabinet should be small and compact bodies. Their members should not, therefore, exceed six.

30. There should thus be eleven Standing Committees of the Cabinet, one for each of the following items:

1. Defence;
2. Foreign Affairs;
3. Economic Affairs;
4. Parliamentary Affairs and Public Relations;
5. Food and Rural Development;
6. Transport, Tourism and Communications;
7. Social Services (including Social Welfare and Family Planning);
8. Commerce, Industry and Science;
9. Internal Affairs (including Centre-State Relationships);
10. Administration; and
11. Appointments.

31. Each of the Cabinet Committees should, as suggested by the Study Team, be supported by a Secretaries' Committee in order to ensure that time and energy are not wasted in dealing with issues which can be settled at the Secretaries' level. There exist at present seven Secretaries' Committees, one each on 'Parliamentary Affairs; Transport, Tourism and Aviation; Public Sector Enterprises; Food and Agriculture; Economic Affairs; Foreign Affairs; and Internal Affairs'. The Secretaries' Committee on Administration should include among its members the Home Secretary and the Secretary of the new Department of Personnel proposed by us elsewhere.
32. As the Cabinet Secretary carries a heavy burden which is likely, under our recommendations, to become even heavier in the future he should be relieved of a part of his responsibility for presiding over and looking after the work of these Committees, by some of his senior colleagues.

33. Apart from the Standing Committees, there may be occasions which call for the setting up of *ad hoc* Committees of Ministers. These should, as suggested by the Study Team, merely inquire into particular issues and report back to the Cabinet or its appropriate Standing Committee as considered necessary.

**Recommendation 3.**

*We, therefore, recommend that:*

1. The existing Standing Cabinet Committees should be reconstituted as proposed in paras 29-30 above. The Committees should between them cover all important activities of Government. The membership of each Committee should not normally exceed six and should include all Ministers in charge of subjects covered by the Committee.

2. Every Standing Committee of Cabinet should be supported by a Committee of Secretaries which will consider in advance all matters to be taken up in the Cabinet Committee.

3. *Ad hoc* Committee of Ministers may be set up for investigating (but not deciding) particular issue and reporting to the Cabinet or the appropriate Cabinet Committee, as the case may be.

**The Cabinet Secretariat**

34. The Cabinet Secretariat at present consists of the Department of Cabinet Affairs and the Department of Statistics. In addition to providing secretarial assistance to the Cabinet and its Committees, the Department of Cabinet Affairs assists in coordinating the major administrative activities and policies of the Government of India and in resolving inter-ministry difficulties and delays. Another major function of the Department is to keep a watch on the implementation of all important Cabinet decisions and the progress of administrative measures which affect more than one Ministry. The Cabinet Secretariat is headed by the Cabinet Secretary who is generally the senior-most officer among those available.

35. Since the middle of 1954, the Department of Cabinet Affairs has evolved a special procedure for reporting every month the progress in implementation of the Cabinet decisions by the Ministries concerned. A special officer was appointed in the Cabinet Secretariat in March 1967 to ensure
quick implementation of decisions and to look into delays. Since September, 1967, a Joint Secretary has been in charge of this work. He takes up matters personally with the Ministry concerned whenever he notices that progress has not been satisfactory.

36. The Study Team has proposed the creation of eight special cells in the Cabinet Secretariat, each dealing with a group of Ministries with allied activities. This arrangement has been suggested with a view to improving the effectiveness of the Cabinet Secretariat in bringing about coordination of policy, ensuring timely and adequate implementation of Cabinet decisions and providing a continuing feeder-line of information to the Cabinet and the Prime Minister about what is happening in different parts of the Government machinery. The Study Team recognises that there is a risk of ministerial responsibilities being undermined by such an arrangement but feels that this risk is worth taking. We do not agree with the Study Team. It would be unwise to create within the Cabinet Secretariat a parallel organisation which would examine over again proposals coming from the Ministries to the Cabinet or its Committees. The dividing line between coordination and review when undertaken by such an organisation will be tenuous and the arrangements proposed may even affect adversely the individual responsibility of Ministers. In any case, an issue coming up before the Cabinet can, if so required, be referred to the appropriate Secretaries' Committee for further study. In fact, there is no reason why complicated questions or subjects should not be so cleared before they come up before the Cabinet. We, therefore, consider that the advantages which the Study Team has in mind can well be secured through the new role which we have proposed for the Cabinet Secretary and the more effective functioning of the Cabinet and the Secretaries' Committees.

37. It has been suggested that the Cabinet Secretary should have a role and position analogous to that of the Chief Secretary in a State Government. Considering, however, the vastness and complexity of the governmental functions at the Centre, we do not consider that such a role is physically feasible for any person, no matter how competent he may be.

38. The Study Team has recommended that the Cabinet Secretary be given a salary which brings out his pre-eminent position vis-a-vis other Secretaries to Government This is likely to affect the present cordial feeling among his colleagues that he is one of them. Incidentally, the Cabinet Secretary already draws a special entertainment allowance of Rs. 250/-. This allowance is not admissible to other Secretaries to Government. We do not, therefore, agree to the above recommendation of the Study Team.

39. The Cabinet Secretary is occasionally consulted by individual Ministers on particular problems. The Prime Minister also sends him cases
in which he has to take the initiative. This role of the Cabinet Secretary on important policy matters needs to be strengthened. It should be clearly recognised that the Cabinet Secretary is the principal staff adviser of the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and the Cabinet Committees on important policy matters. We would like to emphasise that the advice given by the Cabinet Secretary on policy matters should be tendered by him at his own level. It will be against the spirit of our recommendation if he passes this important work to his juniors in the Cabinet Secretariat. This implies that the role of the Cabinet Secretary in tendering advice on matters of policy would be restricted to a few very important cases with which he can deal personally.

40. The office of the Cabinet Secretary was created in 1950. The average tenure for the six persons who have so far occupied this post (excluding the present incumbent) has been two years and eight months. One held it only for ten months. In quite a few cases it was found necessary to give extensions. We consider that the Cabinet Secretary to be effective should stay in his job for a period of three to four years.

Recommendation 4.

We recommend that:

(1) The role of the Cabinet Secretary should not be limited to that of a coordinator. He should also act as the principal staff adviser of the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and the Cabinet Committees on important policy matters.

(2) The Cabinet Secretary should ordinarily have a tenure of three to four years.
CHAPTER III

RELATIONS BETWEEN MINISTERS, CIVIL SERVANTS AND PARLIAMENT

Shouldering of Responsibilities by Ministers

41. The responsibilities of a Minister are two-fold in nature—political and administrative. The political responsibilities primarily comprise: (a) helping the Cabinet to determine broad policies; (b) establishing departmental policies with the assistance of his officers; (c) securing legislative approval, where needed, to Government’s policies and for appropriation of funds; (d) accountability to Parliament; (e) interpreting public needs and attitudes to the Administration; and (f) leading and shaping public opinion in favour of Government policies and programmes. These responsibilities involve adjustment of various conflicting interests and public relations. They are closely connected with the policies and programmes of the party to which a Minister may belong and are, therefore, primarily political in their nature.

42. The administrative responsibilities of a Minister which follow from his political responsibilities to Parliament are in the main; (a) ensuring that policies are translated into operational plans; (b) keeping a general watch over implementation of policies and programmes; (c) help in resolving the difficulties encountered in carrying out policies and programmes; and (d) promoting efficient and clean administration within the Ministry. His administrative responsibilities are by no means less important than the political ones. Ultimately, it is not by enunciation of policies but by results that a Minister or the Government and the party to which he belongs would be judged by Parliament and the people and therefore it is not merely his Ministry in deliberation but his Ministry in action that will create the public impact.

43. There is a growing feeling among the public that many of the Ministers lack interest in ensuring efficient administration and do not possess the acumen needed for the purpose. Many arrive at ministerial office without adequate prior experience of administration or even political education. Exceptions apart, there is little serious effort made to acquire administrative efficiency during their tenure of office. Further, while some are keen on starting something new now and then, their enthusiasm wanes after some time and consequently administration follows its dull and dreary course. While we should not be taken to agree entirely with this criticism, it is necessary to take note of the fact that criticism has been made and to take...
steps to improve the administrative performance of Ministers. We are therefore, of the view that as a general rule, a periodical review of the working of Ministries be undertaken by the Prime Minister during formal discussions with Ministers. This should, while putting the Ministers on the \textit{qui vive}, also enable the Prime Minister to get a good picture of the way the Ministers are functioning.

\textbf{Recommendation 5:}

We recommend that the Prime Minister should meet all Ministers individually or in group every month to discuss progress in implementation of policies and programmes and measures for improving the administrative efficiency. This should help promote a more active interest on the part of individual Ministers in improving the implementation process and the management of their Ministries.

\textbf{Selection and placement of Ministers}

44. It is true that the process of selection of the members of the Council of Ministers by the Prime Minister is circumscribed by political considerations. Notwithstanding this limitation, it should be possible to select persons with a fair intellectual ability and capacity for administrative leadership. The factors which contribute to successful administrative leadership of Ministers are diverse and several combinations of these factors are possible. However, it is well recognised that a Minister must have the ability to grasp broad details of administration, wide knowledge of affairs, experience of having achieved or managed something substantial in some walk of life, capacity for sustained work and for taking quick decisions, and upholding high ethical standards and moral values. A Minister must have competence to go into the broad administrative implications of political decisions, ability to comprehend the inter-relationship of the administrative aspect with other aspects and capacity to oversee implementation and efficient management of the affairs of his Ministry. It is neither necessary nor useful for him to go into the details of administration. Broadly speaking, sufficient attention does not appear to have been paid to these qualities in quite a number of cases.

45. In selecting a Minister for a particular portfolio, his previous experience, aptitude and capabilities should be taken into account. A judgment must also be made of his adaptability to the requirements of the portfolio. There is a feeling, particularly among Ministers of State and Deputy Ministers, that the allocation of portfolios is many a time lopsided and does not give sufficient consideration to special aptitudes. Allocation of portfolios is not a game of putting pieces at random but the art of putting and moving them in their proper places with a view to achieving success.
46. In a parliamentary democracy, Ministers have necessarily to be chosen from among legislators. The calibre of Ministers is thus largely conditioned by the quality of legislators. It is, therefore, of basic importance that political parties select the right candidates for elections. Legislators should make a special effort to improve their knowledge of public affairs and administration.

47. There is need for providing Ministers an opportunity to improve their knowledge and understanding of economic and administrative developments in the country. For junior Ministers at least, it would be worthwhile to arrange short seminars and round table discussions which could also be attended by Members of Parliament, eminent scholars and senior administrators. There is at present no provision for holidays for a Minister. A Minister should take a holiday of at least two weeks every year, which he should be encouraged to devote to reading, reflection and relaxation.

Recommendation 6:

We accordingly recommend that:

(1) In selecting his colleagues, the Prime Minister should give special attention to considerations of political stature, personal integrity, intellectual ability and capacity for taking decisions and sustained application to work.

(2) In assigning a portfolio, due regard should be paid to the aptitude and capabilities of an incumbent.

(3) A Minister should take a holiday of at least two weeks in a year which he should devote to reading, reflection and relaxation.

Problem of Integrity

48. The public image of the integrity of some Ministers to-day is not as it should be. It will be useful in this connection to recall the following observations of the Santhanam Committee on Prevention of Corruption (March 1964):

"There is a large consensus of opinion that a new tradition of integrity can be established only if the example is set by those who have the ultimate responsibility for the governance of India, namely, the Ministers of the Central and State Governments".

"There is a widespread impression that failure of integrity is not uncommon among Ministers, and that some Ministers who held office during the last 16 years have enriched themselves
illegitimately, obtained good jobs for their sons and relations through nepotism, and have reaped other advantages inconsistent with any notion of purity in public life. The general belief about failure of integrity amongst Ministers is as damaging as actual failure....”

49. In pursuance of the recommendations of the Santhanan Committee, the Central Government placed in November 1964, on the table of both Houses of Parliament, a comprehensive Code of Conduct for Ministers. The Code provides, inter alia, for furnishing, to the Prime Minister/Chief Minister, at the time of initial appointment and subsequently every year by a Minister, of a declaration showing the details of the assets and liabilities and business interests of the Minister himself and of the Members of his family.

50. Before the Code of Conduct was adopted, there was a great demand in the country and in Parliament for providing institutional safeguards to ensure integrity among Ministers. Shri H. V. Kamath had moved a bill in December, 1963 to provide that statements of assets and liabilities of the Ministers should be laid before Parliament on their initial appointment and thereafter every twelve months. It was a private Member’s bill and was lost.

51. Laying the statements of assets and liabilities of Ministers annually before Parliament may be theoretically desirable. However, in the face of growing trends towards character assassination of Ministers, such a measure may create rancour and controversy. We, therefore, consider that the furnishing of such returns to an independent authority will be a better solution.

52. In our interim report on “Problems of Redress of Citizens’ Grievances” (October 1966), we recommended the creation of the institution of the Lokpal for dealing with complaints against both Ministers and Secretaries to Government at the Centre and in the States, including complaints of corruption except where the latter involve criminal charge of misconduct cognizable by a court. The Government of India have recently introduced in Parliament a Bill on Lokpal and Lokayukta. Under it, it is proposed to confine the jurisdiction of the Lokpal to complaints against Ministers and Secretaries to the Government at the Centre. If the proposed Lokpal is to perform his functions in the matter of complaints of corruption against Ministers effectively, we consider it necessary that the initial and annual statements of financial assets and liabilities of Ministers at the Centre prescribed in the Code of Conduct should be submitted to him when this new institution starts functioning, and not merely to the Prime Minister. The submission of these statements should be made compulsory. We are confident that such an arrangement
will not only act as a restraint on the temptation to indulge in corrupt practices but also help dispel public suspicions where these are baseless and unwarranted. It is not that we set store by rumours or whispering campaigns a large number of which are motivated otherwise than by public interest and eventually turn out to be absolutely without foundation. But we feel that Ministers as leaders of administration should set an example to those who serve the administration under them and thus establish a reputation for integrity not only of themselves but also of the Departments over which they preside.

Recommendation 7:

We, therefore, recommend that the initial and annual statements of their financial assets and liabilities to be furnished by the Ministers under the Code of Conduct should be made available to the Lokpal. If any Minister fails to furnish such a statement the fact should be mentioned by the Lokpal in his annual report to Parliament. Suitable provision to this effect may be made in the Lokpal Bill which is now before Parliament.

Ministers and Civil Servants

53. The present pattern of relationship between the Minister and Secretary is based on certain constitutional provisions and conventions regarding the working of parliamentary form of democratic government. We have already referred to them in detail in para 6 of the preceding chapter. Under the Constitution, all executive powers of the Union vest in the President. There are, however, to be exercised on his behalf by the Council of Ministers through officers subordinate to him. The Executive has supreme control and directing powers over the civil servants.

54. There is evidence of awareness of each other’s role by Ministers and Secretaries and a large measure of mutual adjustments and team spirit is visible in day-to-day work. But the desired emotional unison and unity of purpose is still to be realised. Ministers and Secretaries come to Government with different backgrounds and interests. Politics is the chief interest of a Minister’s life, while a Secretary with his long experience in administration is largely actuated by professional traditions and modes of administrative behaviour. Not unoften Ministers find that they cannot do much for the country because their civil service advisers take up a negative attitude. Secretaries on their part need to have more understanding of the fact that the Minister knows more about the needs and feelings of the people he represents, and has, therefore, not only legal but also a moral right to intervene in administrative decisions. He is bound to cut red-tape and find delay to be irksome. It is essential that the Secre-
tary and other senior officers should not try to thwart the implementation of legitimate decisions taken by their Minister on the plea of procedural or similar other difficulties. They must, in all sincerity, try to implement the decisions taken.

55. The Secretary is the principal adviser of the Minister on policy matters and his chief agent for ensuring the implementation of policies and programmes. From the point of view of effective performance of their individual roles, healthy and smooth relationship and accountability of administration to Parliament, it is necessary that the functional demarcation which exists in their respective responsibilities should be reflected in the decision-making process. Situations have arisen in the past where it was found difficult to fix clearly the responsibility for decisions with which both the Secretary and the Minister were concerned in one way or the other. (Of course, the Minister is always formally responsible to Parliament). Such situations, if they were to arise frequently, will seriously impair Minister-Secretary relationship and undermine mutual trust and confidence so vital to their efficient functioning at their respective levels. Normally, a Minister should not circumvent official procedure by issuing oral orders or instructions to the Secretary. A brief but precise written record must be kept of all important decisions, showing the reasons therefor. This is especially important in matters where the policy of Government is not very clear or where some important departure from the policy is involved or where a Secretary differs from his Minister on an important issue. In the last case, if the Minister does not personally record the decision the Secretary should do so, giving a brief resume of his discussions with the Minister and the final orders passed. Once a policy and the modus operandi of its execution have been decided by the Minister, the Secretary and other senior officers should implement it loyally without further reference to the Minister. If at a subsequent point of time the Minister revised the policy or directs that it should be implemented in a different manner, such decision should be reduced to writing.

56. Differences in approach and manner of work have also at times been the cause of strain between the Minister and the Secretary. In administration, no single method or approach is sacrosanct. The Minister and the Secretary therefore must meet together as often as possible for frank and uninhibited exchange of views on problems concerning the Ministry/Department. There is a disinclination among quite a number of Ministers to welcome frank and impartial advice from the Secretary or his aids and an inclination to judge him by his willingness to do what they wish him to do. Instances are not wanting of Ministers preferring a convenient subordinate to a strong one and thereby making the latter not only ineffective but a sullen and unwilling worker. This has also bred a tendency on the part of an increasing number of civil servants to attempt
to anticipate the Minister's wishes and proffer their advice accordingly. A further development of this unhealthy trend is the emergence of personal affiliations leading to an element of 'politicalisation' among the civil servants. All these cut at the root of the healthy relationship we have referred to above. The Prime Minister should take special interest to curb tendency, with the assistance of the Cabinet Secretary and the central personnel agency. The Code of Ethics for the Ministers should include a provision that a Minister should not encourage the formation of unhealthy loyalties among civil servants around him on regional, caste or other considerations. There is the need equally for a reorientation of the attitude of the Ministers in terms of perceiving the advantages of frank, fearless and impartial advice by the Secretary and of their encouraging such advice.

57. Some of the citizens' genuine complaints may call for an overhauling of procedures or revision of policy. In such circumstances, the grievance should be redressed by revising the policy or procedures and not by making an exception to the rule in an individual case. The responsibilities which a Minister has for ensuring implementation of policies and programmes should not be utilised for interference in the day-to-day administration carried on by executive authorities within the field delegated to them. Complaints have been made before us at many a place about the interference of Ministers even in such matters as grant of licences, transfers and postings. Such interference in the day-to-day administration subverts standards of administrative integrity and discipline and finally leads to a cynical contempt towards Government and its methods. The administration then suffers not on account of any defects in the 'machinery' but because of misuse of their position by 'men' who run it.

58. The Secretary should consider it as one of his duties to help the Minister retain and improve his image in Parliament and in public. Civil servants need to show both greater sensitivity to and a better appreciation of the Minister's difficulties. They must discriminate between minor adjustments on the one hand, and acts of political accommodation which will compromise basic principles or have lasting adverse effect on the efficiency and morale of the civil services on the other. The dividing line between the two types of accommodation must be drawn clearly. The key to adjustment lies in knowing where the one ends and the other begins. The civil servants must appreciate that public interest cannot be determined by a Minister in an idealistic vacuum. Balancing of pressures from competing groups is necessarily in the public interest, though the outcome may be somewhat different from the ideal solution.

59. We have already emphasised that the senior officers should develop a positive attitude of helping the Minister to give concrete shape to his original ideas and legitimate proposals for the benefit of the people and get things done with speed. It is no less necessary for a Minister who-
wishes to be effective to have a spirit of tolerance and learn to live with the complexity of administration through which he has to get his work done. Everyone is apt to find himself in a rut of some sort out of which it becomes difficult to move and consequently what is a passing phase of habit becomes ingrained as a system. When this happens, time and patience are required to change it. Impatience and haste are likely to create cells of resistance, obstinacy and intransigence which make matters even worse than before. It is the task of statesmanship to avoid such situations.

60. Strains also arise in the personal relationship of Minister and Secretary, though not frequently. We have been told of instances when discourteous and derogatory remarks about Secretaries have been made by Ministers in the presence of other officials. We have also been told that the Secretaries denigrate the Ministers before the officials behind the back of the Ministers. The undisputed superiority of the Minister over the civil servant need not result in discourtesy being shown to the Secretary. The Secretary should not say or do anything which is derogatory to the Minister. The Secretary should be loyal to the Minister and the Minister should have confidence in the Secretary. Loyalty and confidence are the two sides of the same coin, namely, good relationship. The attitude of those who run the machinery of Government must be correct and cordial. It needs to be emphasised that the two great inhibitions to sound administration are ministerial ‘interference’ in day-to-day administration and the ‘tensions’ developed in personal relationship.

Recommendation 8:

We, therefore, recommend that:

(1) All major decisions, with reasons therefor, should be briefly reduced to writing, particularly where the policy of Government is not clear or where some important departure from the policy is involved or where the Minister differs from the Secretary on an important issue.

(2) Ministers should try to develop a climate of fearlessness and fair play among the senior officers and encourage them to give frank and impartial advice. They should give the Secretaries the necessary guidance in carrying out their policies and orders.

(3) The Prime Minister should, with the assistance of Cabinet Secretary and the central personnel agency take special interest to arrest the growth of unhealthy personal affiliations to individual Ministers among civil servants.
(4) Ministers should not intervene in the day-to-day administration except in cases of grave injustice, serious default or mal-administration on the part of civil servants. Where a citizen's request or complaint calls for a revision of a rule, procedure or policy, it should be met by effecting such a revision, and not by relaxing the rules to accommodate an individual case.

(5) Secretaries and other civil servants need to show greater sensitivity to and a better appreciation of the Minister's difficulties, and to discriminate between minor adjustments on the one hand, and acts of political and other forms of accommodation compromising basic principles or likely to have substantial or lasting repercussions on efficiency and morale of the services, on the other.

(6) The official relationship of the Secretary to the Minister should be one of loyalty and that of the Minister to the Secretary one of confidence.

Accountability to Parliament

61. Constitutionally, the Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to Parliament for every policy of Government and every act of the civil servants, whether carried out under specific instructions or by delegation, express or implied. However, as the business of Government is distributed among individual Ministers according to the rules made by the President, each Minister bears an individual responsibility in regard to the Department/Ministry allotted to him. Although there is no provision in the Constitution about the individual responsibility of a Minister with regard to his Department/Ministry, this responsibility is now well established by convention. The Cabinet will take responsibility for overall policies set out by it and for such departmental policies or actions as have its express or implicit approval. In all policy cases where the matter has not received or does not require Cabinet approval or where it is not implied in a broad policy already approved by the Cabinet, the responsibility would obviously rest with the individual Minister. The responsibility for implementation of a policy or programme falling within the purview of a Department/Ministry is largely of the individual Minister concerned. It is for this reason that when things go wrong so as to invite censure or legitimate criticism and a Minister is found unequal to his responsibility, it is the Minister and not the Cabinet that quits.

62. While a Minister is responsible for the acts of civil servants under him, the enormous increase in the scale and scope of activities of Government obviously makes it impossible for him to know everything that is happening in his Department/Ministry. The insistence in some quarters
that the Minister must invariably resign for any failure on the part of a civil servant is thus unreasonable. It also fails to take into account the nature and magnitude of the mistake. It is, therefore, essential to lay down clear guidelines on the one hand about the type of cases in which the Ministers should be held accountable and on the other about the circumstances which need not in practice attract the doctrine of individual responsibility.

63. As proposed by the Study Team, a Minister should be held accountable (a) when he fails to formulate policy in respect of a major problem or when the policy formulated is found to suffer from major weaknesses; (b) when he neglects to pay personal attention to an important issue other than that of policy where such attention is expected of him or he wrongly handles such an issue; and (c) when there is a general or major mismanagement or maladministration in his Department/Ministry. Also when the Minister's own actions are found to be blameworthy, as, for instance, when he is known to have been corrupt or to have abused his power, it is clear that he should step out of office.

64. A Minister need not resign when a civil servant under him expressly violates a directive or order issued by the Minister, or acts in violation of a prohibition implicit in policies approved by the Minister or acts in a malafide way. Obviously, the responsibility for failure does not attach to the Minister where the relevant executive powers have been delegated to some independent authority.

65. The doctrine of collective responsibility is the key-stone of the Cabinet system in a parliamentary democracy. It has generally worked well. There have recently been some cases where public utterances of Ministers have not been quite in accord with Government's policy. It might sometimes be that such things happen because the issues concerned were not discussed in the whole Cabinet. For projecting a good image of itself as well as for its effective team work, it is essential that the Cabinet should be agreed on fundamentals. All important issues should be discussed and settled by the whole Cabinet. It is also important that a Minister should not announce a new basic policy or a major departure from current policy without the approval of the Cabinet. Some Ministers are known to have spoken on matters not falling within their jurisdiction. If that circumstances require that a Minister has to speak on a matter falling outside his jurisdiction, he should make it a point to get himself briefed by the Minister concerned.

66. The more detailed review by Parliament of the working of the administration is done by its three important Standing Committees, namely
the Public Accounts Committee, the Estimates Committee and the Committee on Public Undertakings. The Study Team has in this connection recommended the establishment of a set of new Standing Committees for certain broad sectors of administration, namely, Social Services, Economic Administration, Defence and Foreign Affairs, Food and Agriculture, and Transport. It is proposed that these Committees should function mostly on the lines of the present Committee on Public Undertakings but without taking over the functions of the Public Accounts Committee. Apart from broadening and intensifying parliamentary review of governmental operations, these Committees will enable the Members of Parliament to specialise in broad areas. The Study Team has suggested that the move for setting up these committees should be a gradual one and that a beginning may be made with only two of these committees. We agree with this proposal with the modification that 'Food and Agriculture' may be substituted by 'Food and Rural Development'. As the Estimates Committee is now doing for each Department the type of review which is proposed for the sectoral committees, it will be necessary to remove from the purview of the Estimates Committee the Departments which fall within the jurisdiction of a sectoral committee. It also follows that where a Parliamentary Committee for a Department exists, it would not be necessary to have an Informal Consultative Committee.

67. Relationships between Members of Parliament and civil servants are largely governed by certain well-recognised principles and conventions developed over the years. Realising the importance of codifying these conventions in one place, the Ministry of Home Affairs has prepared a draft Code to regulate the relationship between Members of Parliament and of State Legislatures and the Administration. This Code enjoins upon every civil servant the duty to help all Members of Legislatures to the extent possible in the discharge of their important functions under the Constitution. Civil servants should give priority to Members of Legislatures when they come to see them except where a visitor has come by previous appointment and a Member of Legislature has come without any appointment. All letters received from Members of Legislatures should receive careful and prompt attention. All communications addressed to a Minister should be replied to by the Minister himself. Where, however, this is not convenient or practicable or the reply called for is of a routine nature, the reply may be sent under the signature of a senior officer, preferably the Secretary. The Code reiterates the provision in the Government Servants Conduct Rules that Government servants are not expected to bring any political pressure or outside influence to bear upon any superior authority to further their individual interests.

68. The Code places certain obligations on Members of Legislatures too. Members should ask for information only about matters of public
interest or national interest and should abstain from taking up individual cases concerning grant of permits and licences, recruitment, promotion, transfer or disciplinary action. They should not seek information to further private interests or for use in court litigation or for giving other undue advantages to certain individuals against others. It is pointed out that "... if Government continue to take action on cases of individuals sponsored by Members of Legislatures, they may be adopting a discriminatory course placing others who may not be fortunate enough to have such support in a position of disadvantage." The Code concedes that a number of public issues or grievances do arise and Members of Legislatures are undoubtedly entitled to see that there is no mal-administration or abuse of power or discretion. But in such cases, Members of Legislatures should normally approach the Minister concerned rather than the local officers. They ought not to press or even ask for a particular decision. Written communication in all routine matters may be addressed by Members to the Secretary of the Department/Ministry concerned, but not to any other officer. For more important matters, Members may address the Minister or the Deputy Minister concerned. In regard to matters pertaining to fraud, corruption, bribery, mal-administration, nepotism, etc., in administration communications should be addressed only to the Ministers or Deputy Ministers and copies endorsed to the Minister for Parliamentary Affairs.

69. The above draft Code was placed on the table of Lok Sabha on 21st March, 1967. The All-India Whips conference adopted this Code at its sixth session held in Simla in October 1967. The Conference also recommended that a regular record should be maintained of all communications received by Ministers from legislators with a view to ensuring that the reply is promptly and duly sent. We consider that the draft Code contains salutary provisions for promoting healthy and smooth relations between the Legislators and civil servants. We lend full support to the Code.

70. While the convention of civil service anonymity has been generally observed, there have been quite a few instances in the recent past where officers were mentioned by name in Parliament in contravention of the rules framed in that behalf. There appears to be among Members of Parliament a general distrust of civil servants and a feeling that the Government machinery is invariably inefficient. Such an attitude tends to demoralise civil servants. In the reviews of the working of Government departments, a disproportionate attention to stray cases of administrative shortcomings without viewing them against the background of the positive achievements is apt to give a distorted picture of the functioning of the administration.
Recommendation 9:

We accordingly recommend that:

(1) A Minister should be held accountable—(a) when he fails to formulate policy in respect of a major problem or when the policy formulated is found erroneous or suffers from major weaknesses; (b) when he neglects to pay personal attention on important issues other than that of policy where such attention is expected of him or wrongly handles such issues; (c) when there is a general or major mismanagement or mal-administration in his Department/Ministry; and (d) when he commits some act of impropriety.

(2) A Minister should not be held accountable for an act of a civil servant which is (a) in express violation of a directive or order issued by him; or (b) by implication prohibited by policies already approved by him; or (c) is malafide.

(3) For reinforcing the principle of collective responsibility, it is essential that (a) the Cabinet should be agreed on fundamentals and all important issues are discussed and settled by the Cabinet; (b) a Minister does not announce a new policy or a major departure from current policy without the approval of the Cabinet; and (c) a Minister should not ordinarily speak or make announcements on matters not within his portfolio. However, if the circumstances so require of him, he must get himself properly briefed by the Minister concerned.

(4) Standing Committees of Parliament may be set up for reviewing the work of Departments grouped in five sectors, namely, Social Services, Economic Administration, Defence and Foreign Affairs, Food and Rural Development and Transport. These Committees should function on the lines of the Committee on Public Undertakings and without taking over the functions of the Public Accounts Committee. To begin with only two of the Committees need be set up. As the Estimates Committee is now doing for each Department the type of review which is proposed for the sectoral committees, it will be necessary to remove from the purview of the Estimates Committee the Departments which fall within the jurisdiction of the sectoral committee. Where a Parliamentary Committee for a Department exists, it should not be necessary to have an Informal Consultative Committee.

(5) A balanced view should be taken of the working of a Government Department. Stray cases of bonafide default or shortcomings should be viewed against the background of overall achievements.
CHAPTER IV
MINISTRIES AND DEPARTMENTS

71. There has been a phenomenal growth in the size of the machinery of the Central Government since Independence. There are today 40 secretariat departments,* as against 18 in 1947 and 25 in 1957. The number of non-secretariat organisations having the attributes of headquarters units is as large as 569. Total employment (both regular and temporary) in the establishment of the Central Government increased by over 51 per cent during 1956-66. There has been one and a half times increase in the number of persons employed in the Central Secretariat, from over 6,000** in 1948 to over 15,000*** today. The number of Secretaries, Additional Secretaries, Special Secretaries and Joint Secretaries rose to over three times during 1948-67 (from 64 to 209***), of Deputy Secretaries, to about three and half times (from 89 to 303***) and of Under Secretaries to more than twice (from 214 to 457***). The strength of Section Officers went up to over six and a half times (from 442 to 2943) during the period 1948-65.

The Secretariat

72. The Central Secretariat occupies a key position in the administrative hierarchy. Its main role naturally is to help the Government in the formulation of policies, to translate these policies into a series of connected activities or programmes and to ensure their efficient execution. Where the implementation of a policy or a programme involves field activities on the part of the Central Government, they are entrusted to separate agencies or offices which work under the control of an administrative Department or Ministry or to semi-government institutions or autonomous public sector undertakings. The executive agencies or offices are generally located outside the Secretariat though there are exceptions as, for example, the Directorate of Exhibitions which runs exhibitions and is yet a part of the-

* including Ministries which have no administrative departments, two departments of the Cabinet Secretariat, four departments which are not part of any Ministry and the Planning Commission. If a Ministry has one or more administrative departments but also has a substantial portion of its secretariat not constituted as a department, the latter has been counted as one administrative department.

** The figure excludes Class IV staff.

*** As on 1st September, 1967. The Class IV staff and the personnel employed in the Ministry of Railways are excluded.

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Ministry of Commerce. The secretariat functions of the different Ministries or administrative Departments with regard to their respective areas of activity may be described broadly as under:

(1) Assisting the Minister in policy-making and in modifying policies from time to time, as and when necessary.

(2) Framing legislation and rules and regulations.

(3) Sectoral planning and programme formulation.

(4) (a) Budgeting and control of expenditure in respect of activities of the Ministry/Department; and

(b) According or securing administrative and financial approval to operational programmes and plans and their subsequent modifications.

(5) Supervision and control over the execution of policies and programmes by the executive departments or semi-autonomous field agencies, and evaluation of the results.

(6) Coordination and interpretation of policies, assisting other branches of Government and maintaining contact with State Administrations.

(7) Initiating measures to develop greater personnel and organisational competence both in the Ministry/Department and its executive agencies.

(8) Assisting the Minister in the discharge of his parliamentary responsibilities.

73. The secretariat system of work, with all its deficiencies, to which we shall refer presently, has lent balance, consistency and continuity to the administration, and served as a nucleus for the total machinery of a Ministry. It has facilitated inter-Ministry co-ordination and accountability to Parliament at the ministerial level. As an institutionalised system it is indispensable for the proper functioning of Government. What is needed, however, is that the system fully answers to the changed and changing circumstances, keeping in view the fact that the mind and needs of the people are changing faster than before under the impact of education, enlightenment and the modern concept of Welfare State.

74. The increase in the personnel and the number of administrative units in the secretariat is attributable to the expansion of the responsibilities undertaken by the Government, particularly in the spheres of welfare and development. However, not an insignificant portion of the growth in
the Secretariat is due to its taking over numerous executive functions and multifarious unimportant tasks which do not properly belong to it. The Centre has come to assume several functions which legitimately fall within the jurisdiction of the State Governments and in the process a measure of duplication of effort has resulted. Some expansion is also due to the tendency of the bureaucracy to proliferate in any situation. The Secretariat at the Centre is thus today encumbered with non-essential work and has for a large part become an unwieldy and over-staffed organisation. This leads to occasional blurring of responsibilities, and choking of the administrative machinery, which thus finds excuse for dilatoriness and delay. Further, the overgrowth of personnel has resulted in deterioration in quality. This has inevitably meant increased burden for officers at the higher levels.

75. The senior officers in charge of substantive work in areas where there are no non-secretariat organisations do not generally have compact and rational charges. Responsibility is, by and large, not matched by authority. In areas of work where non-secretariat organisations do function, the Secretariat's role is largely confined to carrying out itemised checks. It seldom engages in worthwhile evaluation of programmes and activities. There is a dominance of 'file-disposal' approach and little attention is devoted to the overall managerial role. Secretariat personnel are, for the most part, generalists while the heads of non-secretariat organisations are often specialists while the heads of non-secretariat organisations are often specialists or technical experts. With the large increase in the volume and complexity of governmental activity of a technical or scientific character and the emergence of specialised areas of administrative activity, scrutiny by generalists alone is bound to be inadequate.

76. The heads of non-secretariat organisations covering a substantive area of departmental activity generally feel that the Secretariat contributes little but delay. They often find the secretariat control frustrating. To them, the Secretariat largely acts as a drag on the execution of schemes and programmes by delaying sanctions and insisting on meticulous observance of rules and procedures. Unfamiliarity with the field conditions, particularly among the assistants concerned with the initial scrutiny of and noting on their proposals adds to discontent. The heads of technical organisations complain of being treated unfairly in that they have to serve under generalist administrators who hardly understand their points of view and their difficulties. There is an attitude of resentment against invidious service distinctions and the unwillingness of the secretariat 'overlords' to delegate authority. The secretariat officers, on the other hand, often complain of lack of responsibility and insufficient regard for rules and procedures on the part of the heads of non-secretariat organisations. There is also a feeling that specialists and technicians are apt to ignore the realities of the situation and pay inadequate attention to the needs of financial prudence and economy.
Recent Attempts at Reform

77. There has been a growing recognition in recent years that the present distinction between the secretariat and the non-secretariat organisations is outmoded and should be abolished. Such a distinction, we understand, does not exist in many advanced countries of the world today.

78. There have been several attempts in the recent past at reorganising the secretariat system and removing its deficiencies. These have been mainly of three kinds: (a) improvement of methods of work and reduction of levels of processing and consideration (e.g. the experiments with pilot sections, attaches and officer-oriented pattern); (b) measures to enlarge the internal autonomy of a Ministry or Department (e.g. delegation of financial powers, and decentralisation of the Central Secretariat Service); and (c) bridging the gulf between secretariat and non-secretariat organisations through devices, such as giving of ex-officio status to the heads of non-secretariat organisations, introduction of the single file system and placement of non-secretariat organisations with executive duties functionally in the Secretariat without giving them any secretariat status. Typical examples of non-secretariat organisations located functionally in the Ministries are the Commissioner of Family Planning in the Ministry of Health and Family Planning and the Director of Exhibitions in the Ministry of Commerce. The Director General of Border Security Forces and Director General of Civil Defence in the Ministry of Home Affairs function practically as a part of the Ministry.

79. Again, the heads of several non-secretariat organisations enjoy ex-officio secretariat status. These include the following:

- Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (Director General, Secretary; and Secretary of the Council, ex-officio Joint Secretary).
- Director General, Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ex-officio Additional Secretary).
- Director General, State Farms (ex-officio Additional Secretary).
- Director General, Food (ex-officio Joint Secretary).
- Chief Administrator, Dandakaranya Development Authority (ex-officio Joint Secretary).
- Director General, Statistical Organisation (ex-officio Joint Secretary).
- Director General, Tourism (ex-officio Joint Secretary).
- Controller, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (ex-officio Joint Secretary).
- Inspector General of Forests (ex-officio Joint Secretary).
Commissioner for Indus Waters (ex-officio Joint Secretary).
Commissioner, Ganga Basin Organisation (ex-officio Joint Secretary).
Director, Drainage and Ground Water Scheme (ex-officio Joint Secretary).
Director General, Backward Classes Welfare (ex-officio Joint Secretary).
Director of Estates (ex-officio Deputy Secretary).

80. There has also been induction of specialists in the Secretariat mostly to fill advisory positions. Specialist cadres like the "Indian Economic Service, the Indian Statistical Service and the Central Information Service, etc., have come up in recent years. In the Department of Agriculture, technical officers have been assigned responsibility for planning, implementation and supervision of programmes in addition to their advisory functions. Many of the divisions of the Department are headed by senior technical officers.

81. Most of these reforms, however, were conceived and installed on ad hoc basis and on individual rather than collective initiative and not as part of an overall, integrated scheme of reforming the secretariat system. They have helped to remove only a few specific defects, leaving out major shortcomings untouched.

82. We now proceed to deal with reforms necessary for (a) confining within proper limits the work now done by the Central Government and its agencies in matters falling within the sphere of States; (b) coordinating the functions of the Secretariat and executive agencies; and (c) improvement of secretariat method of working.

Role of the Central Government in respect of matters falling within the State sphere

83. A noteworthy feature of relationships between the Centre and the States is the progressive growth, over the years, of the influence of the Centre. Several factors have contributed to the emergence of this situation. Economic planning on a national scale, in its initial period, inevitably required of the Centre that it should take an active part in the formulation and overseeing of the execution of development programmes falling in the State List of subjects. The uninterrupted rule by a single party at the Centre and in the States facilitated the assumption of such a role by the Centre. Today, the danger of foreign aggression and the development of fissiparous tendencies, which are a menace to national unity, underline the need for the strengthening of the Centre. Nevertheless, we have arrived at a stage when it is necessary in the interest of economic development itself to rearrange the Centre-State relationships in a manner that will
enable the Centre to manage more efficiently the tasks which clearly fall within its jurisdiction and encourage the States to take over from it progressively the responsibilities in areas which undoubtedly belong to them.

84. Consistent with the above approach, we are of the view that the role of the Centre in areas which are covered by the State List of subjects in the Constitution should be largely that of a pioneer, guide, disseminator of information, overall planner and evaluator. The Centre, of course, cannot give up its general responsibility of overseeing that the broad national objectives embodied in the Constitution are achieved by the States. But that does not mean that the Central Government should take upon itself tasks and responsibilities which properly belong to the States or duplicate their functions. Except in the most essential areas, and that too for a limited duration, the Centre should not take upon itself functions and responsibilities which are legitimately those of the States.

85. The Study Team on Centre-State Relationships has suggested the following functions for the Central Ministries dealing with subjects falling within the sphere of the States:

"1. Providing initiative and leadership to the States, and in particular serving as a clearing house of information intimating details and data about good programmes and methods adopted in one part of the country to the rest of the country.

2. Undertaking the responsibility for drawing up the national plan for the development sector in question in close collaboration with the States, and developing for this purpose well-manned planning and statistical units.

3. Undertaking research at a national level, confining attention to matters which are beyond the research resources of States.

4. Undertaking training programmes of a foundational nature, e.g., training of planners and administrators and training of trainers.

5. Taking the initiative in evaluation of programmes with the object of checking progress, locating bottlenecks, taking remedial measures, making adjustments and so on.

6. Providing a forum and a meeting ground for State representatives for the exchange of ideas on different subjects and for the evolution of guidelines.

7. Attending to functions of the nature of coordination which can only be handled at the Centre.

8. Maintaining relations with foreign and international organisations."
86. We have recommended earlier in our report on the Machinery for Planning that the Centrally-sponsored schemes should be kept to the minimum. We also proposed in that report that only certain portion of the amount available as grant assistance to the States should be tied to schemes or groups of schemes of basic national importance, the remainder being distributed pro rata over other schemes eligible for Central assistance. The Study Team on Centre-State Relationships has examined in detail the role and functions of seven Central agencies in regard to matters falling within the State and Concurrent Lists. It has enumerated several Central and Centrally sponsored schemes which, properly speaking, should not be handled by the Centre. Some examples of the functions, which according to that Team, should be transferred to the State Governments, are as follows:

(1) (a) Grading of ghee, butter, vegetable oil and honey;
     (b) non-foundational training courses of three to five months duration for grders (inspectors) and marketing secretaries; and
     (c) inspection and licensing of cold storage and small scale manufacture of food products.

(These tasks are at present being performed by the organisation of the Agricultural Marketing Adviser, Department of Agriculture).

(2) Small Industries Service Institutes and their extension centres at present administered by the Development Commissioner (Small Scale Industries).

(3) National Fitness Corps Scheme in the field of physical education administered by the Ministry of Education.

(4) Grants to voluntary organisations situated in States and engaged in activities of a local character.

(5) A large number of the current schemes of animal husbandry and dairying operated by the Indian Council of Agricultural Research and the Central administered poultry and sheep farms.

87. We are in general agreement with the approach suggested above by the above Study Team. We have no doubt that if this approach is accepted and translated into action a good deal of work in the Ministries, such as, Education, Health, Social Welfare, Irrigation, Food and Agriculture would cease to be handled by the Centre. Where any State is deficient in the means to do justice to such work, it would be better for the Central to help the States to equip themselves for effective discharge of
those responsibilities than handle them itself. Such help, for instance, could take the form of loan of technical or administrative personnel and loan of equipment. Measures need also be devised to secure better co-ordination between the States and the Centre and to ensure that States make progress in the right direction.

Recommendation 10:

We, therefore, recommend that the role of the Central Ministries and Departments in subjects falling within the State List should be confined to matters listed in para 85. An analysis should be made in the light of these criteria of the items of work now handled by the Central agencies and such items as do not fulfil the criteria should be transferred to the States.

Coordination of the Functions of Secretariat and Executive Agencies

88. The work at present handled by the Secretariat is broadly of three types: (A) Substantive work in areas where there are no non-secretariat organisations; (B) Substantive work where non-secretariat organisations exist; and (C) Servicing work. It has been estimated by the Study Team that the type 'A' work forms 44%, type 'B' 30%, and type 'C' 26% of the total work in non-staff Ministries. An illustration of type 'A' work is that relating to international trade, and of type 'B' work, the one concerning jute and textiles in the Ministry of Commerce. The latter is handled below the secretariat level by the Jute Commissioner and Textile Commissioner. Type 'C' work comprises matters like establishment, office management and financial control. At present, Joint Secretaries dealing with type 'A' work often share assisting officers and staff with other Joint Secretaries and do not have distinct allocations of the budget. Nor do many of them have homogeneous work assignments. The organisation of type 'B' work presents problems of parallel hierarchy, review of the proposals coming from non-secretariat organisations by lower levels in the Secretariat, difficulty of communication between specialists in non-secretariat organisations and generalists in the secretariat and inadequate shouldering of responsibility by Joint Secretaries with type 'B' work as compared to those handling type 'A' work.

89. The Study Team has dealt at length with the problem of remodelling the Secretariat, having in view particularly its relationship with the executive organisations. It has proposed the following scheme:

“(a) At the apex should continue to be the secretary of the ministry. Under him ranged along the same horizontal level should be “administrative offices” for handling three kinds of work: staff, substantive and special.
Administrative offices for staff work should be expertly manned.

We visualise three such offices in each ministry: an office of planning and policy, under a senior chief of rank equivalent to additional or joint secretary; a chief personnel office, under an officer of joint secretary's rank; and a chief finance office also under an officer of that rank. We also visualise a unit for public relations.

Administrative offices for substantive work should be formed out of two sources. First, type 'A' work should be grouped into compact and rational charges. Each such group should be large enough to need being looked after by at least a full-time officer of rank equivalent to joint secretary and should constitute an administrative office. Small groups may be combined to form viable charges. Second, for type 'B' work the headquarters offices of the present non-secretariat organisations should be converted into administrative offices.

Administrative offices, expertly manned, may be found necessary in some ministries for looking after special items of work such as that relating to public enterprises, projects, research and evaluation.

Linking the whole arrangement at the top should be a policy advisory committee headed by the secretary. Its members should be the chiefs of the three staff offices and selected chiefs of the other administrative offices.

(b) The office of planning and policy should be responsible for overall planning tasks of the ministry as a whole, and should also function as the unit for formulating policy in the ministry in the strategic field. In addition, it should have a cell for servicing the policy advisory committee.

(c) The chief personnel officer and his staff should provide leadership within the ministry in the field of personnel administration, and to be able to do so they should be experts in the subject. They should, on the one hand, keep in touch with the nodal agency for personnel administration (the proposed Department of Personnel) and should be able to coordinate the work of intra-administrative office personnel units. The chief personnel office should be the repository of the powers of the ministry in regard to personnel administration other than those delegated to the administrative offices.

(d) Much the same should be the case for the chief finance officer and his staff in the field of financial management. Additional tasks for this office that we visualise are overall office manage-
ment for the ministry, intra-ministry O & M services and miscellaneous items of administrative coordination, including coordination of parliamentary work.

(c) the chiefs of the non-staff administrative offices should be responsible for policy, subject to what is stated in clause (f) below, as well as administration in their respective sectors and should be given powers to match their responsibilities. This should mean three things. First, the method of budgeting should be so adapted that there is a separate budget head for each non-staff administrative office; the chief of each such office should then be held responsible for his budget area, in the formulation of budget proposals as well as in the efficient management of the budget allocation made to him. Second, adequate administrative and financial powers should be delegated to the chiefs of such offices. They should have expert advice available to them in both fields, through internal personnel and finance units where such units are justified from the work-load angle and, where that is not so, through the chief personnel and finance offices of the ministry. Third, the chiefs of these offices should be able to deal directly with the secretary and the minister, on the one hand, and the three staff offices of the ministry on the other. Disagreements with the chiefs of personnel or of finance on issues where the powers of the ministry are not delegated to the chiefs of non-staff administrative offices should be settled by the secretary.

(f) The policy advisory committee should function as an amplification of the office of the secretary to make sure that the policy advice tendered to the minister takes all aspects into account. It should meet regularly, say once a week, and consider all policy issues which require to go above the level of chiefs of administrative offices. The minister should receive advice on policy matters only after it has been formulated in this committee. However, matters which cannot wait for the next meeting of the committee or are trivial should be cleared by the secretary in his capacity as chairman, the matter being brought to the notice of the committee at the next available opportunity.

(g) The functions of the secretary of the ministry would, in this arrangement, undergo some change. Instead of being the chief adviser to the minister for both policy and administration, he would be chairman of the policy advisory committee and the administrative head of the ministry. In the sphere of administration, thus, no change is contemplated in the present powers and responsibilities of secretaries.”
90. A basic recommendation of the Study Team which underlies its scheme of reorganisation is that the distinction between the Secretariat as the policy-making body and the non-secretariat organisations as executing agencies will be abolished. The headquarters of all important non-secretariat organisations are to be integrated with the substantive-work administrative offices. The idea is to provide for adequate inter-action between the policy-making and implementing agencies of Government and remove the invidious distinction between the Secretariat and non-secretariat parts of the administration.

91. In making any assessment of the Study Team’s proposals, it will be useful to start with an analysis of the functions at present performed by non-secretariat organisations. The need for and the degree of involvement of particular non-secretariat organisation in the policy-making process in the Secretariat can be determined only on the basis of such an analysis. In attempting such a determination it will also be necessary to keep in view in each case whether the Central Government has a direct responsibility for execution or whether its role is purely one of coordination. Another important relevant factor is whether the functions of an executive agency are of a regulatory or developmental character. The degree of specialised knowledge needed in the policy-making process at the secretariat level needs also to be kept in view.

92. A broad analysis of the work of non-secretariat organisations (both Attached and Subordinate offices) of the Government of India shows that their work is mainly of the following types:

I. Regulatory and allied activities: (Regulatory functions are here conceived as involving the regulation of the activities of the individual in a wide sense and include collection of taxes by (Government agencies) e.g., the work done by the Drug Controller of India; Control Passport and Emigration Organisation; Controller of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks; Directorate of Enforcement—(Foreign Exchange Regulations); Central Bureau of Investigation; Chief Inspector of Mines; Directorate of Marketing and Inspection (Department of Agriculture).

II. Activities directed at promoting developmental effort: e.g., the work done by the National Savings Commissioner; All—India Handicrafts Board.

III. Education and training for Government employment; professions or specialities: e.g., the work done by the National Academy of Administration; National Police Academy; All-India Institute of Hygiene and Public Health, Calcutta; Indian School of Mines, Dhanbad.

IV. Survey and research: e.g., the work done by the Directorate General, Commercial Intelligence and Statistics; Forest Research Institute and College, Dehra Dun; Central Research Institute, Kasauli; Archaeological Survey; and Survey of India.
V. Provision of a service or production or and supply of a commodity:

- e.g., the work done by the All India Radio
- Directorate of Field Publicity; Song and Drama Division; Photo Division (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting); India Government Mints; Delhi Milk Scheme; Central Public Works Department; Controller of Printing and Stationery.

VI. Carrying out of one or more developmental programmes covering a substantial area of the activities of the Ministry including planning, coordination and review as well as rendering of advice and exercising also the connected regulatory functions, if any:

- e.g., the work done by the Directorate General of Health Services; Directorate General of Technical Development; Development Commissioner (Small Scale Industries), Indian Mines Bureau; Jute Commissioner; Textile Commissioner; Directorate General of Shipping; Directorate General of Civil Aviation; Directorate General of Employment and Training.

93. Broadly speaking, non-secretariat organisations of type (I) having functions and responsibilities of a regulatory character, conceived in the broadcast sense, may continue to function as pure executive agencies, under the present system of differentiation between the policy-making and executive agencies. This is necessary in order to insulate the regulatory process from interference by Government. It is equally essential for allowing them the necessary operational autonomy for effective enforcement of a regulatory policy. Obviously, it would make for efficiency and public interest to separate, in this sphere, the executive from the policy-making functions. Here, we would like to make an exception in the case of the Central Board of Direct Taxes and the Central Board of Excise and Customs. These organisations have a distinctive character of their own and combine policy-making with executive functions to the advantage of both.

94. Considerations similar to those applicable to regulatory agencies are valid in the case of executive agencies having promotional functions of type (II), and the present system therefore is satisfactory enough in their case. In regard to statutory bodies like the Tea Board, Coffee Board, Khadi and Village Industries Commission, etc., which are entrusted with promotional work, the Study Team states: "For efficient performance of their functions, near-complete autonomy needs to be conferred on them".

95. Training and educational institutions (type III), survey, and research organisations (type IV) and executive agencies concerned primarily with the provision of services of production of goods (type V), need adequate operational freedom for their effective functioning. It is now more or less an accepted proposition universally that the state activity in the field of industrial production and supply of services can be advantageously carried out through semi-government autonomous bodies. They may, therefore, continue to function under the existing system. However, organisations like the Railway Board and the P. & T. Board which fall in this category need to be treated as a class apart in view of historical reasons and their being
managed departmentally. Where survey and research organisations, falling under category (IV), operate a sizeable programme and are also involved in its planning coordination and review on behalf of the Ministry, they would more properly belong to category (VI).

96. Our analysis of the functions and role of non-secretariat organisations leaves us only with agencies of category (VI) for being considered for amalgamation with the Secretariat in the manner recommended by the Study Team. An executive organisation to be shifted to the Secretariat level should, in our view, fulfil the following conditions:

(a) The work of the executive organisation is primarily of a developmental character and constitutes a substantial portion of the activities of the Administrative Department or Ministry.

(b) It is actively involved in planning, co-ordination and review of developmental programme and advises the Ministry/Administrative Department on these matters.

(c) Its activities relate to an area in which the policies have to be altered or modified frequently to meet the requirements of changes in situation (i.e. where continuous feedback of field experience is essential for effective policy-making).

97. Subject to the fulfilment of the abovementioned conditions, the need for integrating the executive and policy-making functions is most essential in case of developmental activities of scientific and technical character, a bit less so in areas calling for functional specialisation and much less so in activities concerned with general administration. Many of the developmental programmes today contain an element of regulation which aims at directing the scarce resources into that particular developmental activity. Thus, we find that in several cases developmental and connected regulatory functions are combined in the same executive agency. Judged by the criteria we have enunciated above, important instances of non-secretariat organisations of this type which may be included in the Secretariat are: the Directorate General of Health Services; Directorate General, Civil Aviation; Directorate General of Technical Development; Directorate General of Shipping and Indian Mines Bureau. As will be seen, these are mostly engaged in scientific or technical fields. We have already recommended in our report on Economic Administration that the proposed multi-member Textile and Coal Development Boards (which will combine executive and policy-making responsibilities) should also function as the offices in the proposed Ministry of Commerce and Industry. By way of example of non-secretariat organisations with activities exclusively of developmental character we may mention the office of the Development Commissioner (Small Scale Industries).
98. The heads of non-secretariat organisations of the above type when integrated with the Secretariat should function as the principal advisers to the Government in their respective areas. In the light of the approach underlying this scheme of reorganisation, we are not in favour of conferring formal *ex-officio* secretariat status for heads of executive agencies. We understand that the Government also does not favour such a system. The heads of non-secretariat organisations, which are amalgamated with the Secretariat, should, however, enjoy a status adequate to the nature of their duties and responsibilities. They should, of course, retain their present designations which indicate the nature of their functions. In any case it would fall to the Secretary of the Department to ensure coordination between the “non-secretariat organisations part” and the traditional part of the Secretariat.

99. Survey or research organisations whose primary function is to collect, analyse and collate information specifically for policy formulation may be made an integral part of the Secretariat, possibly of the planning and policy office, which is being proposed by us for each Ministry or major administrative Department. We would like to mention, by way of example, the Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Ministry of Food and Agriculture. This Directorate advises the Ministry on current issues of agro-economic policies. It carries out detailed examination and analysis from the economic angle of the policy issues coming before the Ministry. The Directorate undertakes most of the work concerning the formulation and coordination of Plan programmes of agricultural development and makes a continuous assessment of their progress. Obviously, the Directorate already contains the nucleus of the proposed planning and policy office.

100. As already mentioned, the involvement in the policy-making process of developmental non-secretariat agencies and those with combined regulatory and developmental functions, covering a sizeable area of departmental activity, is particularly significant in case of those Ministries which deal with activities of technical or scientific character or with activities calling for a high degree of functional specialisation. We have already mentioned some of such agencies in para 97 above. The policy positions in administrative Departments and Ministries dealing with scientific and technical matters, or with functions of a highly specialised character, should include persons having relevant specialised experience or expertise.

101. Wherever executive functions are at present being discharged by the Secretariat and these do not fall under category VI, they should be transferred to an appropriate existing non-secretariat agency or a new agency, provided the volume of work involved justifies its creation. We do visualise that in certain situations, e.g., when a totally new programme unconnected with any of its other functions is taken up by a Ministry/Department, it may be advantageous for the Ministry/Department to handle
directly the executive work involved. We, however, consider such situations as an exception to the scheme of reorganisation recommended by us. Wherever such a necessity arises the duration of the take-over should be kept at the minimum necessary.

102. It goes without saying that there should be no duplication of functions between its secretariat organisation and the executive agencies of a Ministry or Department. As reported by our Study Team on Personnel Administration, the Farm Advisory Unit of the Extension Directorate in the Department of Agriculture is a typical instance of duplication of functions with the extension organisation of the Indian Council of Agricultural Research. This is an important matter which should receive attention of the Government.

103. The three basic considerations which underlie the overall reorganisation proposals of the Study Team are: (a) involvement of non-secretariat organisations in the policy-making process; (b) induction of the specialists in the Secretariat to help in policy-making and in more meaningful control and supervision of the field organisations, and (c) giving the non-secretariat organisations the needed freedom in regard to operational policies and from the frustrating financial and administrative controls of the Secretariat. We believe that all the three objectives can be achieved without doing away with the present distinction between the secretariat and non-secretariat organisations. This distinction is really one of functional specialisation for effective attainment of results. The desirability of such specialisation is implicitly conceded by the Study Team when it suggests that the Directorate General of Health Services should confine itself to central executive functions only. It is equally essential to assure executive agencies of a regulatory character a measure of autonomy in day-to-day functioning and protecting them against “pressure”.

104. While we generally accept the other proposals contained in the Study Team’s scheme of remodelling the secretariat system, we are definitely opposed to a general abolition of the distinction between the Secretariat and the executive agencies. The Team’s latter recommendation does not automatically flow from the deficiencies of the secretariat system pointed out by it. Nor is it essentially connected with the other proposals made by the Study Team. The Team itself does not contemplate a total merging of policy-making and executive functions and has, therefore, suggested that long range or strategic policy should be kept separate and taken care of by a special administrative office of policy, which will also deal with planning. It says, “Strategic policy-making must be kept separate from executive functioning, though evolved in consultation with those responsible for the latter; tactical policy-making cannot and ordinarily should not be.
105. Our proposals have the advantage that without disturbing the present character of the Secretariat and involving the elaborate reorganisation suggested by the Study Team, they will bring into it the experience of the specialists and experts of the more important non-secretariat organisations, wherever such experience is important to policy-making, both tactical and strategic. As these specialists will also advise on policy matters, the policy branches which are at present manned mostly by generalists will become superfluous. To that extent, there will obviously be a considerable saving on staff.

Recommendation 11:

We, therefore, recommend as follows:

(1) Non-secretariat organisations engaged primarily in planning, implementation, co-ordination and review of a single development programme or several allied programmes, covering a substantial area of the activities of the Ministry and having a direct bearing on policy-making should be integrated with the Secretariat of the concerned Ministry. Such amalgamation, subject to criteria laid down in para 96 above, is especially significant in the case of activities of scientific and technical character and activities which call for a high degree of functional specialisation.

(2) The heads of non-secretariat organisations which are integrated with the Secretariat should function as Principal Advisers to the Government in their respective areas and should enjoy a status adequate to the nature of their duties and responsibilities. They may retain their present designations. It is not necessary to confer on them a formal ex-officio secretariat status.

(3) In all other cases the present distinction between policy-making and executive organisations may be continued. Such distinction is vital for protecting the operational autonomy of the regulatory executive agencies and such developmental-executive organisations as are mostly engaged in promotional activities, provision of a service or production and supply of a commodity.

(4) Executive functions at present performed by an administrative Ministry or Department which do not have a close bearing on policy-making (in terms of the criteria enunciated in para 96 above) should be transferred to an appropriate, existing non-secretariat agency or to a new executive organisation especially created for the purpose, provided that the volume of the work justifies its creation.

(5) Policy position in Departments and Ministries dealing with scientific and technical matters or with functions of highly
specialised character should include persons having relevant
specialised experience or expertise.

**Staff Offices**

106. The study Team has, as mentioned earlier, suggested the creation,
apart from administrative offices for substantive work, of the following,
“staff” administrative offices:

(i) an office of planning and policy;
(ii) a chief personnel office; and
(iii) a chief finance office.

We have recommended earlier in our report on the Machinery for Planning
the creation, where it does not already exist, of a planning cell in each
Ministry concerned with development programmes. We added that this
cell should function under the overall supervision of the Secretary of the
Ministry and be manned by technical and professional personnel and
headed by a senior technical officer or a Joint Secretary, as may be
appropriate. We would like to amplify this recommendation and suggest
that such a planning cell should form a part of a larger planning and policy
office, as proposed by the Study Team. The Departments without any
development programmes will also need a planning cell for administrative
planning of their activities. The policy cell in the planning and policy
office should mainly be concerned with major policy problems which cut
across substantive work divisions of the Ministry. It should engage in
policy studies and evolve a series of well-articulated policy statements on
the major aspects of the work of the Ministry. We agree with the Study
Team that a single planning and policy office may suffice in a multi-
Department Ministry if the subjects assigned to the different Departments
have close affinity. However, an administrative Department with a heavy
charge may have a separate office of planning and policy.

107. We have already, in our report on Finance, Accounts and Audit,
made recommendations for the appointment of a whole-time internal
Financial Adviser of adequate seniority and rank to be in charge of the
finance and budget cells of the Ministry and for the strengthening of these
cells. The Study Team has suggested that, in addition to performing purely
financial functions, the chief finance office should look after office manage-
ment, O & M, general coordination and parliamentary work. We do not
agree to this proposal. We have, in our report on Finance, Accounts and
audit, also urged that the internal Financial Adviser should not be
entrusted with personnel work or office management. Such items of work
should, in our view, be handled in the chief personnel office. As regards
parliamentary work, a good deal of information needed for Parliament is
likely to be already available in the planning and policy office which will
therefore obviously be the suitable place for dealing with the work. The existing arrangements within the individual Ministries for dealing with parliamentary work do not make for speed and a coordinated approach. The handling of parliamentary work by the planning and policy office will help improve the quality and depth of information to be furnished to Parliament or the Minister for explaining or defending Government’s policies and programmes in Parliament.

108. We agree with the Study Team that there is need for having a separate chief personnel office in each Ministry, under the charge of a full-time officer. There does not exist today any focal point in a Ministry or Department for coordination of personnel policies covering the secretariat and non-secretariat organisations as a whole. The existing part-time arrangements are hardly adequate for the purpose of locating talent, promoting personnel development, fixing responsibility for results and enforcing standards of conduct and discipline. We are recommending separately the creation of a separate Department of Personnel which will function as the central personnel agency.

109. The Study Team has indicated seven areas of specialisation in staff functions, namely, personnel administration, financial management, planning, O & M, economic analysis, statistics and public relations. We support the Study Team’s proposal that the staff offices of planning and policy, finance and personnel should be manned by specialists according to their respective needs.

110. As suggested by the Study Team, the heads of the various “substantive work” wings of a Department or a Ministry should deal directly with the chiefs of the three “staff” offices. We have recommended in our report on Economic Administration that the Chairman of the Development Boards should be able to deal directly both with the Secretary and the Minister concerned on matters of tactical or operational policy. We would recommend a similar arrangement for the heads of all “substantive work” wings. They should, however, in matters of long-term policy, process their proposals ordinarily through the planning and policy office.

111. Our above proposals for creation of staff offices are meant primarily for Ministries dealing with development programmes and having also the normal secretariat set-up. They are not intended for “staff” Ministries (for example, Finance and Law), nor for Ministries/Departments which have board-type of top management, e.g., Ministry of Railways, Department of Communications, Department of Revenue and Expenditure (Revenue Wing), etc.

112. In the skeleton reorganisation exercises carried out by the Study Team in four non-staff Ministries it has suggested a single public relations
office even for Ministries which have two departments. It has also proposed that such an office in each “programme” Ministry should be manned by a full-time public relations office who will be under the administrative control of the Ministry. He should be at least of the rank of the Deputy Secretary and drawn from a professional cadre. In view of the special importance of public relations today as a channel for maintaining mutual understanding between the Government and the people, we agree with the Study Team that each Ministry should have a separate public relations office. As regards its functions, composition, etc. we propose to make our recommendations in a separate report.

Recommendation 12:

We, therefore, recommend that:

(1) In non-staff Ministries other than those with board-type of top-management, there should be set up three “staff” offices, namely, (i) an office of planning and policy; (ii) a chief personnel office; and (iii) a chief finance office. An administrative Department with a heavy charge or with functions which have no close affinity with the work of other department(s) may have a separate planning and policy office.

(2) The office of planning and policy should include the planning cell recommended in the ARC report on Machinery for Planning. This office should continuously be engaged in formulating long-term policies, carrying out policy studies and evolving a series of well-articulated policy statements. It should also deal with the parliamentary work of the Department/Ministry.

(3) The chief personnel office in a Ministry should serve as a focal point for the formulation and coordination of overall personnel policies, initiating measures for promoting personnel development and matters concerning discipline, appeals, memorials and service rules of cadres administered by the Ministry. It may also look after office management, O & M and general administration.

(4) Each of the three “staff” offices should be manned by staff having specialised knowledge and experience. The head of each “staff” office should generally be of the rank of a Joint Secretary though in some cases he may even be a Deputy Secretary or an Additional Secretary depending on the quantum of work.
In addition to the three staff offices, each Ministry should have a public relations office or unit.

The heads of the "substantive work" wings may deal directly with the chiefs of the three "staff" offices, as also with the Secretary and Minister on matters of operational policy. Proposals having a bearing on long-term policy should, however, be processed through planning and policy office.

The Study Team has also proposed the creation of (a) an office of public enterprises in every Ministry having public sector undertakings under its charge; (b) an office of projects, where necessary, to deal with project formulation, project scrutiny and progressing of project work; (c) an office of research for sectoral research of significant importance; and (d) an office of evaluation in Ministries or Departments with heavy development programmes like Health and Family Planning, Agriculture, etc. We have already suggested in our report on Public Sector Undertakings the constitution of a small technical cell to be set up in each Ministry concerned with public undertakings to assist in the scrutiny and evaluation of feasibility studies and detailed project reports and for the analysis and utilisation of progress reports and returns received from public undertakings. We have also recommended that such a cell need not be large in view of the proposed strengthening of the Bureau of Public Enterprises and the building up of the technical organisations in the sector corporations.

As regards keeping a watch on the overall progress or internal evaluation of development programmes we have already assigned, in our report on Machinery for Planning, this function to the Planning Cells to be constituted in various Ministries and Departments. We have also recommended in that report the creation of a separate Evaluation Wing in the Planning Commission to study continuously the more important Plan programmes and schemes in the Central Sector, undertake sample studies of programmes in the State sector and guide evaluation work in States. We do not think that any further elaboration of the proposals we have made in this regard is necessary. They should normally serve the purpose which the Study Team has in view.

Reorganisation of the Secretariat Wings

The division of work within a Ministry or a Department as between different wings (whether dealing with type 'A' or type 'B' work) as well as between the different divisions within a wing needs to be organised on a rational functional basis with due regard to manageability of charge. These considerations equally apply to the headquarters offices of those non-secretariat organisations particularly those which are selected for
integration with the Secretariat under our proposed scheme of overall reorganisation.

116. A secretariat wing is today normally headed by a Joint Secretary and comprises 2–4 divisions, each of which is under the charge of a Deputy Secretary. Under the Study Team's proposals, each wing should have a homogeneous charge, unity of command and separate identity. The responsibility for administrative efficiency should rest on the head of the wing who should have greater say in its personnel administration concerning his wing than at present. He should invariably be consulted in the selection of personnel to be posted to his wing and no person working under him should be transferred out without his consent. The head should have the powers to impose minor penalties, to fill short-term leave vacancies on an officiating basis and to create posts within the wing (subject to budget provision and any general orders in the matter), to sponsor officials for training and to grant honoraria. The wing should be housed compactly and it should have a distinct budget allocation.

117. We support these proposals of the Study Team inasmuch as they will help promote smooth and efficient working within each wing, match responsibilities with powers, and help in clear demarcation of functions and fixation of responsibility. We do not consider that showing the budget of the wing as a distinct unit in the budget of the secretariat of the Ministry should create any insuperable difficulty even when performance budgeting is introduced. If the grouping of subjects as between different wings in a Ministry/Department is done on a rational basis, the entire budget for a programme may fall within one wing. Even if it comes under more than one wing, a distinct allocation for each wing can be shown separately under the total budget of a programme.

118. The Study Team has carried out skeleton internal reorganisation exercises in respect of International Trade Wing of Ministry of Commerce, Internal Finance Wing of Department of Economic Affairs, Animal Husbandry Division of Department of Agriculture and Directorate General of Health Services (which is to be amalgamated with Secretariat under the proposals both of the Study Team and ours). We generally agree with the approach adopted in this regard by the Team. But we do not favour in the case of the Directorate General of Health Services the segregation of the functions concerning medical education and research into a separate secretariat wing (to be headed by a person of the status of a Director General). Medical education and research are at present closely tied with medical care dispensed at Central hospitals and institutes. Accordingly, medical education, research and care should remain together in one place even when the Directorate General of Health Services is integrated with the Secretariat.

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Recommendation 13:

We, therefore, recommend that:

(1) Distribution of work between the wings of a Ministry/Administrative Department and within the divisions of a secretariat wing should be based on considerations of rationality, manageability of charge and unity of command.

(2) Each secretariat wing should have its separate identity and its budget should appear as a distinct unit in the budget of the Ministry. Its head should enjoy adequate administrative and financial powers.

(3) The head of the wing should have the primary responsibility for good administration within the wing, effective supervision and control of staff and maintenance of high standards of discipline and conduct.

(4) The head of the wing should have considerable say in formulation of the wing budget, creation of posts subject to budget provision, spending of budgeted funds and appointment of personnel to the wing and their transfer therefrom. He should also have the necessary powers for effective day-to-day personnel management in the wing, e.g., powers to sponsor penalties and to fill short-term leave vacancies.

Levels and Method of Work

119. The Study Team has recommended that there should be only three levels in a wing, namely, Chief, Directors and Executives. These new designations have been proposed to facilitate a complete break from the past tradition of the secretariat—executive dichotomy. The Study Team has further suggested varying pay scales for each of the three levels. It has proposed two pay scales for the Chief of the Wing, namely, (a) Rs. 2500—125/2—2750 (equivalent to the present pay scale of non-ICS Joint Secretaries) and (b) Rs. 3000 (equivalent to the existing scale of ICS Joint Secretaries and non-ICS Additional Secretaries). Three pay scales for the Director's level have been recommended, namely, (a) Rs. 1100—50—1300—60—1600—100—1800 (equivalent to the present scale of CSS and other Deputy Secretaries), (b) Rs. 1800—100—2000 (equivalent to the pay scale of Industrial Adviser; Director, Central Water and Power Commission; and a similar scale for CSS officers); and (c) Rs. 2000—125—2250 (equivalent to the present scale of Director General of Archaeological Survey, Textile Commissioner, etc.). For the third level, that of Executives, the Study Team has proposed five pay scales, equiva-
lent to those of Assistant (Rs. 210—10—270—15—300—EB—15—450—EB—20—530), Research Assistant (Rs. 325—15—475—20—575), Section Officer (Rs. 350—prob.—400—25—500—30—590—EB—30—800—EB—30—830—35—900), Senior Analyst (Rs. 700—50—1250) and Assistant Economic Adviser (Rs. 1100—50—1400).

120. The Study Team has also suggested an increase in the span of control of the Joint Secretaries from two divisions as at present to three divisions plus a cell for planning and policy, a registry and a unit of office management. Further, each division being headed by a Director should, according to the Study Team, have five to twelve Executives under the Director, depending upon the actual needs. A typical wing pattern would be two divisions of a medium size, with eight Executives each and one large division with twelve Executives. There may, in the latter case, be a Deputy Director. It is estimated that, broadly speaking, one Executive will be required for every two dealing hands under the existing, traditional system. The divisional pattern of staffing proposed is not to be taken as rigid.

121. We generally agree with the Study Team’s suggestion for enlarging the charge of the Joint Secretary and for reducing the levels of consideration in the Secretariat. But we do not favour the scheme of varying pay scales recommended by the Study Team for each of the three levels. It will be seen that the top-most pay scale proposed for each level is higher than what it is today and this will add to the salary bill. Again, the new pattern of staffing recommended by the Study Team is likely to create considerable disturbance and even dissatisfaction. Our own basic approach, therefore, is to re-model the existing structure by utilising the existing types of functionaries rather than create new categories of personnel.

122. The present dilatoriness in the functioning of the Secretariat is to a large extent due to too many levels through which a case has to pass till a final decision is taken. There are, at present, as many as six levels of processing and decision-making, namely, the dealing hand, Section Officer, Under Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Joint Secretary/Secretary and Minister. Broadly speaking, at least four or five levels are generally involved in the disposal of any substantive case.

123. A serious defect which has developed in the system during the last two decades concerns the rise in the level of final decision-making. There has been a marked tendency to send up cases for decision to higher levels even though these can be decided at a lower one. As a result, the senior officers have often too heavy a burden to bear in the area of decision-making. We are convinced that the present system under which each paper has to travel down to dealing Assistant and then travel back
through a number of levels till the final decision is taken is highly unsatisfactory. It leads to excessive noting, causes delay and diffuses responsibility. Above all, it undermines initiative and sense of responsibility at senior levels. Every paper has to be first noted upon by the office. This excessive dependence on the office promotes a “file-dealing” approach. As a result, many of the senior officers do not perceive it as their role to initiate action or reflect upon the complex problems on their own.

124. It has been pointed out to us that it is not feasible to define in detail the duties and responsibilities for each level in the Secretariat, particularly for the senior posts. Again, the nature and content of work at the same level differ considerably from Ministry to Ministry. We are, however, not convinced by this reasoning. Even under the present system of staffing, middle and senior level secretariat posts are manned by officers drawn from certain generalist services with specified qualifying periods of service. In posting them to secretariat jobs, some attention is also paid to their experience and background. We are strongly of the view that organisation of the work within each administrative Department or Ministry should be rationalised by applying certain basic principles. First of all, the duties and requirements of each job should be defined clearly and in detail on the basis of a scientific analysis of work content. In the second place, the arrangement of various jobs or positions, within an administrative organisation, or for purposes of staffing by a particular grade or service, may be determined primarily by the nature and content of administrative tasks and functions to be performed. Thirdly, the administrative structure may be so re-cast as to provide adequate opportunities for self-development and self-fulfilment of each Government official. Thus, the type of cases to be decided at each level should be determined by a detailed analysis of contents of work coming to a secretariat wing. The distribution of the work between different wings should also follow considerations of rationality and manageability.

125. The Study Team has recommended a total elimination of the present system of noting below the level of the Chief of the wing. We would, however, like to take a cautious approach in the matter. Recording of decisions and the reasons therefor is important in certain types of situations, such as, relaxation of rules, decisions involving a sizeable amount of public funds, establishment matters like promotion and discipline, etc. We would, therefore, recommend that noting should be confined to the more essential matters.

126. There is, however, another aspect of the problem which merits special attention. We have already pointed out how damaging is the present system of noting by the dealing assistant to expeditious disposal of public business and effective shouldering responsibility at the higher levels. We would strongly urge the scrapping of the present procedure.
However, officers at the decision-making and consideration levels would, to some extent, need staff assistance. Here, we would suggest that the existing functionaries known as Assistants and Section Officers may be suitably utilised for this purpose. These aides will collect data and other relevant material, maintain files, draft replies to receipts of simple or routine nature. They should, however, be forbidden to note on the files.

127. Following the overall approach outlined in para 124 above, it is our considered view that there should be only two levels of consideration and decision below the Minister. In other words, a case should not pass through more than two levels. At the lower level of consideration it may be handled by an Under Secretary or a Deputy Secretary depending upon the nature and complexity of its contents, and at the higher level by Joint Secretary/Additional Secretary/Secretary. Under our scheme of reorganisation, we visualise the Secretary’s role primarily as one of coordinator, policy guide, reviewer and evaluator. The two levels of decision proposed by us should, in our view, be organised on the line of “desk-officer” system. Under this system, each executive is allotted a defined area of functioning and is expected to acquire specialised experience in it.

128. Underlying our above recommendations is the idea of introducing for a large part of the work in the Secretariat an improved pattern of what has come to be known as “officer-oriented” system. The latter is in vogue in the Works Division of the Ministry of Works, Housing and Supply. Modified forms of officer-oriented system are in operation in the Ministry of External Affairs (known as ‘Attache System’), the Department of Tourism, Department of Iron and Steel, Directorate General of Posts and Telegraphs (sections dealing with discipline, complaints and investigations), office of the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Development Section) and Ministry of Defence.

129. The main features of the “officer-oriented” system as introduced in the Works Division of the Ministry of Works, Housing and Supply are: delegation of enhanced financial powers to the Attached Office (i.e., the Central Public Works Department), simplification of procedures for sanctioning of schemes, use of the single file system (except for certain specified items) and a functional file-index, and introduction of officer-oriented staffing pattern. We are told that this new system is not working as satisfactorily as it was originally intended. The main drawbacks which have come to notice are: inadequacy of the stenographic aid, difficulty in tracing precedents and lack of any leave reserve to ensure that work is not interrupted by the unanticipated, sudden absence of the dealing officers.

130. All these defects, however, are remediable. In fact, they seem to have arisen from the failure to work the new system properly. The
present dissatisfaction among the senior officers involved in this new experiment appears to be partly due to new demands the system makes on them. The officers at the junior level do not like the system because their colleagues, drawing the same emoluments in other wings and departments, are not required to put in equally onerous work.

131. We are convinced that if the Secretariat is effectively to cope with the new demands made upon it on account of the enhanced developmental responsibilities of the Government, the traditional methods of work must be basically re-modelled on the pattern of the “desk-officer” system. As already observed by us, the deficiencies in the present experiment with the “officer-oriented” system in the Department of Works are mostly due to the half-hearted approach to the new system of work. There is no reason why a “leave reserve” should not be created or the necessary stenographic aid not be provided. The dealing hand under the conventional system serves as the repository of the knowledge and wisdom of the Ministry. It is he who collects the previous precedents and history of the case. Under the “desk-officer” system recommended by us, there will be need for improving the existing methods of information retrieval. The Study Team has suggested the use of functional file index, to be maintained by the Wing Registry. We endorse these proposals. The preparation of ‘guard files’, or a card index which will contain all important precedents, can further help resolve the problem of precedents. We do visualise the introduction of modern techniques of data processing in the long run and the installation of a card system will obviously help in that direction. Further, if there are well-articulated policy statements and these are revised from time to time the need for digging up old precedents will obviously be reduced. The Study Team has laid great emphasis on the preparation of such statements and we agree with them.

132. Under the scheme we have in view it will be necessary to modify the existing officer-oriented system in the Works Division on a few essential points. The work flowing into the wing will be so distributed that each officer is required and empowered to dispose of a substantial amount of work on his own, taking guidance from his senior officers where necessary. Such consultations will mostly be oral though a brief record of the discussion on all important matters will be kept. All cases of a simple nature will be disposed of within a fixed time period, say five days. The primary responsibility for the efficient and satisfactory disposal of the work assigned to a “desk-officer” will rest on him. While no case will pass through more than two hands for reaching a final decision, the staffing pattern within the wing will be flexible enough to facilitate the employment of officers of various grades. In suitable cases a wing may be headed by an Additional Secretary or Secretary himself, the Deputy Secretaries submitting their cases directly to the former.
133. In a typical section (which is the basic work unit in a wing today) there are on the average about four Assistants and an Upper Division Clerk. There are also one or two Lower Division Clerks to handle work relating to receipts and despatch, movement and maintenance of files and typing. Under the officer-oriented pattern in the Works Division, each officer is assisted by a Steno. Recently, each of them has been given an Assistant to help on routine matters. But there are no Upper Division Clerks and Lower Division Clerks. The Division has a separate registry, consisting of a Supervisor, two Upper Division Clerks and three Lower Division Clerks. The Study Team has proposed such a wing registry as a part of the “desk-officer” system. The registry will contain a receipt-and-issue office, a typing pool and a records office. The wing registry will provide a balanced arrangement as between full centralisation (treating the entire Department or Ministry as one unit) and total decentralisation on a section-wise basis. A wing registry may be headed by a Section Officer and have the necessary complement of clerical staff (a few Upper Division Clerks and a number of Lower Division Clerks). In addition, the head of the wing may need a ministerial aide for internal office management of the wing.

134. For long-term policy formulation and operational problem solving, we would recommend the device of the Policy Advisory Committee suggested by the Study Team. Policy-making today calls for the enmeshing of several strands of thinking and expertise and the device of the Policy Advisory Committee will make this possible. It will, further, promote group thinking in resolving different and complex problems. Latest researches on working of small groups indicate that the group approach is more conducive to problem solving than the individual approach. This will involve preparation of self-contained papers or memoranda setting out the problem, the various alternatives, the merits and demerits of each alternative, etc. The recommendations and decisions arrived at in the Policy Advisory Committee should be duly recorded in the form of minutes.

135. As suggested by the Study Team, the Policy Advisory Committee should include among its members chiefs of offices of planning and policy, finance and personnel as well as the heads of the various substantive work wings (including heads of non-secretariat organisations integrated with the Secretariat under the reorganisation scheme recommended by us). In the skeleton reorganisation schemes of four Ministries, the Study Team has suggested that the Director-General of Medical Research and Education (the head of a new wing proposed by the Team) in the Department of Health and the head of the new office of Educational Research in the Ministry of Education should be the members of the governing bodies of important research and training institutions outside the Government. The
Study Team has also proposed that for particular items of interest to them
the heads of important boards and corporations should be co-opted as
members of the Policy Advisory Committees set up in the Ministry of
Commerce, Department of Iron and Steel and Department of Mines and
Metals. On a balance of considerations, we would recommend the second
approach. The first method is likely to detract the attention of the heads
of the substantive work wings from their normal duties. It may also cut
across the autonomy of the non-secretariat organisations and outside pro-
fessional bodies.

136. Another major defect in the present methods of work is that
reference to other Ministries and Departments are too many and too
frequent. These not only involve waste of time and effort but also hold
up action. In many cases, they reveal lack of knowledge about develop-
ments in other Ministries. Written references to other Ministries should
be confined to the minimum. Consultations on ordinary matters should
be carried out orally or over the phone and a resume of the discussions
recorded on the file.

Recommendation 14:

We, therefore, recommend that:

(1) (a) There should be only two levels of consideration and
decision below the Minister, namely, (i) Under Secretary/Deputy Secretary,
and (ii) Joint Secretary/Additional Secretary/Secretary. Work should be assigned to
each of these two levels on the lines of “desk-officer”
system. Each level should be required and empowered
to dispose of a substantial amount of work on its own,
and be given the necessary staff assistance.

(b) The staffing pattern within a wing may be flexible to
facilitate the employment of officers of various grades.

(c) The duties and requirements of various jobs in the Secre-
tariat at each of the two levels should be defined clearly
and in detail on the basis of scientific analysis of work
content.

(2) For smooth and effective working of the proposed “desk-
officer” system, the following measures will be necessary:

(a) introduction of a functional file index;

(b) maintenance of guard files or card indices which will
contain all important precedents;
(c) adequate provision for “leave” reserve;

(d) adequate stenographic and clerical aids.

(3) (a) There should be set up in each Ministry or major administrative Department a Policy Advisory Committee to consider all important issues of long-term policy and to inject thinking inputs from different areas of specialisation into problem solving. The Committee should be headed by the Secretary of the Ministry and should include the heads of the three staff offices (of planning and policy, finance and personnel) and heads of important substantive work wings (including those of the non-secretariat organisations integrated with the Ministry/Administrative Department). As and when necessary, the heads of the governing bodies of important research and training institutions and boards and corporations outside the Government may be co-opted as members of the Policy Advisory Committee for such items of work as are of interest to them.

(b) Self-contained papers or memoranda setting out problems, their various alternative solutions, merits and demerits of each alternative, etc. should be prepared for consideration by the Committee, and the decisions arrived at should be duly recorded in minutes.
CHAPTER V

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS—FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION

137. The general scheme of reorganisation of Ministries/Departments given in the preceding chapter will have to be modified suitably when applied to a Ministry/Department whose functions fall into the category of what is known in common parlance as "staff" matters. The organisation of each of such Ministry/Department will, therefore, have to be examined separately with a view to deciding on the changes needed in its structure and methods of work. In this chapter we deal with one of the staff departments whose activities have a vital bearing on the continuing improvement of administrative efficiency, viz., the Department of Administrative Reforms. We also propose to make recommendations on the machinery and procedure for implementing the reforms recommended by us. The consideration of such machinery and procedure will be a natural sequel to the consideration of the set-up of the Department of Administrative Reforms.

138. The creation of a central agency charged with the task of promoting administrative improvements and reorganisation in the entire machinery of the Government of India dates back to the year 1954. During the years following Independence, Government was mostly pre-occupied with problems created by the depletion of the British element in the services and administrative integration of the princely States and with the problems of rehabilitation caused by the influx of large masses of displaced persons. However, the adoption of the Constitution establishing a parliamentary democracy based on adult franchise and the acceptance of planning as the means of achieving social and economic development brought in their wake a growing realisation of the need for reorienting the administrative machinery towards development and social welfare.

139. In March 1954 a Central O & M Division was set up in the Cabinet Secretariat. It was meant to serve as a focal point from which action could be taken for improving the speed and quality of disposal of Government business and streamlining procedures. Simultaneously, the setting up of a professional Institute of Public Administration was sponsored by Government as an agency for promoting research in public administration. The creation of the Central O&M Division was followed by the establishment of O&M units in different Ministries and Departments. A Special
Reorganisation Unit, which had been constituted in 1952 for securing economy in staff, was reorganised in 1956 to lay special emphasis on the use of work study techniques for determining norms of work and fixing the staff complements. A Committee on Plan Projects was set up by the Planning Commission in the same year with the object of evolving suitable organisational norms, work methods and techniques for achieving maximum economy and efficiency in the execution of Plan projects. In 1964, a Management and Development Administration Division was constituted as the “main limb” of this Committee to help promote the use of modern tools of management and undertake studies on problems peculiar to development administration at the district level. The Government had constituted earlier in August 1961 a high-powered Secretaries’ Committee on Administration to provide leadership in administrative improvement, to facilitate action for removing administrative deficiencies and to oversee the implementation of decisions already taken for raising standards of efficiency. (This Committee was serviced initially by the Central O&M Division and later by the Department of Administrative Reforms which was set up in 1964). The Committee provided a forum for stimulating some new thinking on reforms at the level of Secretaries and its recommendations, in the form of statements, were placed on the Table of Parliament from time to time. The Committee was abolished in August, 1967 and its erstwhile functions are at present being looked after by the Secretaries’ Committee on Internal Affairs.

140. These different organisations functioned, however, within a restricted area of specified problems. Attention was mostly confined to improving a particular aspect of the working of a Government department or agency. Not much headway was made in suggesting changes in the basic structure and methods. The responsibility for suggesting administrative improvements was diffused over several agencies of Government. The Government therefore created in March 1964 a Department of Administrative Reforms, as a part of the Central Ministry of Home Affairs, to attend to administrative reforms in “broader sense”, covering “a large range of varied and complex problems of administration”. A major function of the Department so far has been to carry out detailed studies, largely of a composite character (covering all aspects such as organisation, methods, personnel, etc.) and suggest schemes of administrative reform. It has to date completed seven such studies, apart from several short reviews and surveys. The Department’s approach in this regard is that “all fundamental and far-reaching reform in any field of administration must be preceded by a process of painstaking analysis of the entire administrative situation in that field”. The Department has more recently serviced the ARC Study Teams on “The Machinery of Government of India and its Procedures of Work” and “Centre-State Relationships”.
141. The Study Team has, in its final report, made certain detailed proposals for the reorganisation of the Department of Administrative Reforms. It has suggested that the reorganised Department of Administrative Reforms should eventually consist of—

(i) A Central Organisation and Methods Wing which will undertake inter-ministerial studies as well as special O&M studies for such Departments or Ministries as do not have any or adequate arrangements of their own for the purpose. The Wing should have a number of divisions specialising in different aspects of O&M like organisational analysis, mechanisation and information systems, operation research, etc.

(ii) A Training and Administrative Wing which will, among other things, look after training courses in modern tools of administration as well as undertake research on important problems and generally coordinate O&M activities at the Centre and maintain close liaison with the O&M organisation in the States.

(iii) An Administrative Reforms Wing to deal with the implementation of the reports of the Administrative Reforms Commission. This Wing should have a special division on "perspective reforms".

142. The Study Team favours the idea that studies in work measurement should continue to be handled by the Staff Inspection Unit (earlier known as Staff Reorganisation Unit) of the Ministry of Finance. It is further proposed that in the long run but not immediately each of the three proposed wings of the Department should be headed by an officer of the status of Joint Secretary so that he is able to pull his weight with his colleagues in other Departments. An implied recommendation is that the head of the Department of Administrative Reforms should be of a rank higher than Joint Secretary.

143. Apart from organising O&M training, the Department has at present mainly three types of functions: (a) to conduct selected studies in areas which it considers important for bringing about improvements; (b) to prescribe standards and guidelines in regard to administrative procedures or practices, which must be followed by all Ministries and Departments; and (c) to carry out ad hoc studies and give advice on special request by Government agencies.

144. In considering what should be the proper role and functions of the Department of Administrative Reforms, we have to bear in mind that public administration is both an art and a science of managing a
complex human institution. Its human characteristics, the behavioural aspects of its working and the public character of its goals need to be specially emphasised. In our opinion, a reforms agency composed entirely of officials can be only of limited utility. To begin with such an agency may initially exhibit enthusiasm but it is soon likely to get into the rut of bureaucratic methods and lose its dynamism and sense of purpose. The past experience in this regard at the Centre bears it out. We concede the need for a central point in Government organisation for promoting administrative reforms and improvements. But, in our view, its role should be limited to administrative reforms of a foundational character, building up O&M expertise and promoting the use of modern techniques of management within individual Ministries and Departments.

145. We, accordingly, feel that the central reforms agency should concentrate mainly on studies of problems of basic importance, common to all or several Ministries and Departments or to the entire system of administration. It should not fritter away its energy on miscellaneous administrative reviews and surveys unrelated to basic reforms. For selecting the various problems for study and reform, it is necessary that the reforms agency should develop a total picture of the strong and weak points of administration, its capacity to meet the present demands and future challenges and the foundational reforms needed including the process of arresting excessive administrative growth. Following our general approach to keep the organisation small, we would recommend the creation of a cell on “perspective reforms” and not a division as proposed by the Study Team. The cell should consist of experts of standing. In its methods of work as well as staffing and organisational structure, the reforms agency must be “research-oriented”. We, therefore, do not favour the formation of a number of wings, each staffed up to the level of the Joint Secretary on the traditional secretariat pattern. Efforts should increasingly be directed to the creation and maintenance of a professional as distinguished from a secretariat set-up. Further, we support the emphasis laid by the Study Team on the development of expertise among the personnel of the Department of Administrative Reforms.

146. It goes without saying that the day-to-day responsibility for keeping the internal organisation of a Ministry/Administrative Department efficient and suited to the tasks to be performed should rest primarily with its administrative head, i.e., the Secretary. The existing O&M units in different Ministries and Departments, therefore, need to be reactivated. It should be one of the main functions of the central reforms organisation to provide these units with the needed technical guidance and advice. In this connection, we support the proposal made by the Study Team for building up a corps of O&M officers. It is equally important to set up similar O&M units in all sizeable non-secretariat organisations.
147. The Study Team has recommended that this organisation should be under the direct charge of the Prime Minister. Though the work envisaged above for the Department of Administrative Reforms would justify its location at a point high enough in the Government hierarchy, we do not think that the Prime Minister should be burdened with continuous attention to matters of administrative detail. We, therefore, recommend that the Department be placed in the charge of the Deputy Prime Minister.

148. The machinery of the Government of India is too vast and no central organisation for administrative reforms can cover the entire area. As the pace of development quickens there would be new demands on the administration. The administrative machinery would, therefore, have to be continuously adapted to the requirements of new challenges (of course, within a broad, stable administrative framework). We, therefore, attach great importance to the creation of the necessary institutional arrangements for promoting new, original thinking about administrative reforms. A central reforms agency which is part and parcel of the government machinery, as we have already observed, can play only a limited role in this regard.

149. Administrative changes in India need to be properly related to the stage of political, social and economic development of the country. Transplantation of foreign practices is not necessarily the panacea for its various ills. We have to find our own solutions to our administrative problems in consonance with our national genius. New indigenous solutions and conceptual models in administration can, in our opinion, develop and grow only through close inter-action between scholars, practitioners of public administration and the people's representatives. This function can be effectively performed by autonomous professional institutions. Professional organisations generally have fewer inhibitions and have no personal interest in maintaining the status quo. Taking into account also the vast and diverse range of administrative reforms needed, external professional organisations are more favourably placed than internal O&M agencies for undertaking studies and investigations of the following types:

(a) Streamlining the procedure and practices at points where private trade and industry and ordinary citizens come into contact with administration.

(b) Improvement of the machinery for redress of public grievances and for public relations.

(c) Studies in areas wherein it is important to inspire the confidence of the public in the objectivity of the findings.

(d) Studies on improvement of morale, motivation and attitude of public officials.

(e) Problems of inter-action between the political and administrative processes which have an impact on the tone of the administration.

(f) Studies on the applicability of foreign administrative techniques and systems to local conditions in India.

(g) Problems of administrative
reorganisation and improvement in semi-government organisations and autonomous public sector undertakings.

150. These types of studies call not only for an inter-disciplinary approach but also close participation between the people's representatives, administrators and scholars in an atmosphere which is free from bureaucratic inhibitions. We, therefore, attach great importance to the proper development of autonomous professional institutions which can successfully undertake this function. Among the institutions which may be mentioned in this connection are the Indian Institute of Public Administration, Institute of Applied Manpower Research, Institutes of Management at Ahmedabad and Calcutta, and Administrative Staff College (Hyderabad). The Indian Institute of Public Administration has more recently undertaken some studies on contemporary problems of administration. It has serviced the Commission's Study Team on the Machinery for Planning and provided the Commission with background material on several problems of administration, prepared on the basis of special studies undertaken by it for the purpose. We are, however, not satisfied with the present limited role of the Institute in the field of administrative reforms and improvements. The Institute needs to develop specialised competence of a high order in various fields and tools of public administration. For development of such competence it would obviously need adequate support from Government. The Institute of Applied Manpower Research has undertaken several studies in forecasting requirements of manpower of various categories and in utilisation of personnel. It should be able to undertake appropriate investigations on manpower needs of various Ministries and Departments and utilisation of scarce manpower resources.

151. As the research competence of the professional institutions develops, it should be possible for the Ministries and Departments to remit their administrative problems to these institutions for suggesting administrative improvements. The central reforms agency should also allocate studies on administrative reforms to these institutions as a part of its overall programme of work.

152. It would be desirable to set up an advisory council on administrative reforms, which will coordinate the activities of the professional institutions engaged in research on problems of public administration and management, help induct fresh thinking into the working of the central reforms agency and ensure that its programme is properly conceived, planned and carried out. This body may consist of about eight members, drawn from the Members of Parliament, experienced civil servants and eminent scholars interested in public administration. It may be presided over by the Deputy Prime Minister who will hold the portfolio of Administrative Reforms and will be serviced by the secretariat of the central reforms organisation.
We recommended in our final report on the Machinery for Planning that the work concerning construction economies, which was being done by the Committee on Plan Projects, should be transferred to the appropriate administrative agencies. We understand that the Planning Commission has since discontinued this work. In our report on Public Sector Undertakings we suggested that management studies concerning public sector industrial enterprises handled by the Management and Development Administration Division of the Planning Commission should be transferred to the Bureau of Public Enterprises. The work of this Division in regard to performance budgeting has already been transferred to the Department of Economic Affairs. We suggest elsewhere in this report that its work concerning development administration should henceforth be handled by the Department of Administrative Reforms.

Recommendation 15:

We, therefore, recommend that:

(1) The Department of Administrative Reforms should confine itself mainly to: (a) studies on administrative reforms of a foundational character, (b) building up O&M expertise in Ministries/Departments and training the personnel of their O&M units in modern techniques of management, and (c) advice and guidance to these O&M units in effecting administrative improvements and reforms.

(2) The existing O&M units in different Ministries/Departments should be reactivised.

(3) A special cell on ‘perspective reforms’ should be set up in the central reforms agency.

(4) In its methods of work, staffing pattern and organisational structure the central reforms agency should be ‘research-oriented’.

(5) The Department of Administrative Reforms should be placed directly under the Deputy Prime Minister.

(6) It is necessary to develop strong, autonomous professional institutions which will promote original thinking on administrative reforms and innovations. Studies on administrative reforms and improvements of the types mentioned in para 149 can, with advantage, be entrusted to autonomous professional institutions like the Indian Institute of Public Administration, Institute of Applied Manpower Research, Administrative Staff College
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(Hyderabad), Institutes of Management at Calcutta and Ahmedabad, and selected universities.

(7) There should be set up a council on administrative reforms to advise the central reforms agency on the planning of its programme of work, to review progress, to help induct fresh thinking into its working, and to coordinate the activities of the different professional organisations engaged in research on problems of public management. The Council should consist of eight members, drawn from Members of Parliament, experienced administrators and eminent scholars interested in public administration. It may be presided over by the Deputy Prime Minister.

154. The course of administrative reforms has to pass through two stages: (a) acceptance of the proposed reform by Government and (b) its actual implementation.

155. We are happy to note that the Government has accepted the need for basic changes in administrative structure and practices. In his first broadcast to the nation on assuming office as Prime Minister, the late Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri said: "... there is a widespread feeling—which I share—that extensive reform of the administration is essential if the tasks of economic development and social reconstruction are to be accomplished. . . . The administrative organisation and its methods and processes must be modernised if it is to become an effective instrument of economic change." Similarly, in her first broadcast to the nation as Prime Minister on 26th January, 1966, Shrimati Indira Gandhi said: "In economic development, as in other fields of national activity, there is a disconcerting gap between intention and action. To bridge this gap we should boldly adopt whatever far-reaching changes in administration may be found necessary. We must introduce new organisational patterns and modern tools and techniques of management and administration. We shall instil into Government machinery greater efficiency and a sense of urgency and make it more responsive to the needs of the people". The same year in reply to the debate on President's address, Shrimati Indira Gandhi added that what was needed was an administrative revolution.

156. Having accepted the need for administrative reforms of a far-reaching character, the Government will undoubtedly make an earnest attempt to implement the recommendations of this Commission. However, the acceptance and implementation of the reforms recommended may not proceed for enough or at the desired pace unless the routine methods of dealing with reforms proposed are themselves reformed.

157. The Government have recently decided that the Department of Administrative Reforms should hereafter coordinate the processing of the
reports of this Commission. It has been laid down that on receipt of a report, that Department should, after consulting the Cabinet Secretary, intimate to the Ministry concerned the procedure to be followed for its processing. Each report will be considered in the first instance by an appropriately constituted Committee of Secretaries. The Department of Administrative Reforms will obtain the orders of the Cabinet Secretary in particular in regard to: (a) the Ministry that will be responsible for processing the report and preparing papers for consideration; (b) the composition of the Committee of Secretaries to consider these papers; (c) the procedures for inter-departmental consultation where required; and (d) the time schedule to be observed. The coordinating role of the Department of Administrative Reforms will also extend to watching the implementation of the decisions taken.

158. In considering the machinery for implementation of reforms, we need to recognise that reforms in any sphere are normally not accepted without some resistance by those likely to be affected. When the reforms are of a radical nature, resistance to change builds up with corresponding intensity. Such resistance may lead to the watering down of the spirit and the content of the reforms proposed. Again, the Cabinet, being always otherwise busy, may not be in a position to bestow adequate, sustained attention on the recommendations for reform. They may not, therefore, receive the needed consideration in depth.

159. We do appreciate that the Government would need the advice of senior civil servants on complicated administrative issues posed by the reforms. However, it must, all the same, be ensured that the bureaucracy does not whittle down the recommended reforms or adopts a posture which may lead to their rejection by the Cabinet. Keeping all these considerations in mind we recommend the following procedure for implementation.

160. In the first place, responsibility for piloting the reforms proposed by us should rest with a senior Cabinet Minister enjoying high political prestige and possessing wide administrative experience. We have already recommended that the Department of Administrative Reforms should be under the direct charge of the Deputy Prime Minister. The Commission feels that it should be his special responsibility to oversee the implementation of the proposed reforms.

161. We have suggested in Chapter II the constitution of a Cabinet Committee on Administration. The Cabinet Minister most concerned with a particular report of the Commission or a set of separately identifiable recommendations may be coopted as a member of this Committee when considering that report or those recommendations.

162. These seems to be some apprehension in the public mind that senior executives of the Government are, by and large, averse to change
and disposed to maintain the status quo. It is not, therefore, desirable to refer, as a matter of course, the recommendations of the Commission to Committees of Secretaries.

163. In view of the special nature of the Commission's recommendations and the need for quick decisions by the Government thereon, we would recommend that coordination of the processing of our reports should be handled by a special cell created in the Cabinet Secretariat for the purpose. This cell should function under the general supervision of the Cabinet Secretary. As a general coordinator of Government policies, he is obviously the best person to ensure that the processing of ARCs reports is completed with speed and all the departments concerned have been duly consulted. Wherever necessary, he will consult the Deputy Prime Minister, who, under our proposals, will have the responsibility for implementation of our recommendations.

164. The special cell, to be set up in the Cabinet Secretariat, should compile and collate the views of the different Ministries concerned with a particular ARC report. The necessary papers for consideration by the Cabinet Committee on Administration may thereafter be prepared in the cell under the supervision of the Cabinet Secretary.

165. It is also imperative that speedy action is taken by Government on the different reports of the Commission. The recommendations in each report will fall into two types, (a) the basic ones and (b) the others. We feel that the Government should place before each House of Parliament within three months of their receiving a report from the Commission, a White Paper indicating their decisions on the basic recommendations.

166. It is also important to have an all-party Parliamentary Committee entrusted with the duty of watching the implementation of the accepted recommendations. The members of the Committee may be nominated by the Speaker and the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha, having regard to their general knowledge, aptitude and/or administrative experience. The Committee will see that the accepted recommendations are implemented expeditiously. The Parliamentary Committee should meet at least once in three months to review the progress of implementation.

Recommendation 16:

We, therefore, recommend as follows:

(1) The responsibility for overseeing the implementation of the recommendations of the Administrative Reforms Commission should rest with the Deputy Prime Minister.
(2) Before the Cabinet takes up a report of the Commission, it should be considered by the Cabinet Committee on Administration.

(3) A Special Cell should be set up in the Cabinet Secretariat under the overall charge of the Deputy Prime Minister and the general supervision of the Cabinet Secretary, to process the Commission’s reports. It should also assist the Deputy Prime Minister in overseeing the implementation of the accepted recommendations.

(b) After the Ministry/Ministries have communicated their views, the Special Cell in the Cabinet Secretariat should, under the direction of the Deputy Prime Minister, prepare the necessary papers for the Cabinet Committee on Administration.

(c) Within a Ministry/Department the Commission’s recommendations should be dealt with at a high level.

(4) Within three months of the receipt of a report of the Commission, Government should place before Parliament a White Paper indicating their decisions on the basic recommendations contained in that report.

(5) There should be set up an all-party Parliamentary Committee of both Houses whose function will be to see that the recommendations accepted by the Government are implemented expeditiously.
CHAPTER VI

A CENTRAL PERSONNEL AGENCY

167. Any restructuring of the organisational set-up of Ministries and Departments or the re-orientation of the methods of work cannot by itself generate efficiency in administration. It is the calibre and morale of the personnel which finally sets the tone of administration and determine its effectiveness. It is, therefore, important to provide special institutional arrangements for good personnel management. We shall deal in detail in a subsequent report with the improvements needed in the field of personnel administration. Here, we propose to consider the arrangements needed for providing a sound organisational base for the performance of the key personnel functions at a central point in the machinery of Government.

168. The dissatisfaction among the employees (including senior civil servants) with the personnel policies of the Government has increased considerably in recent years. Standards of discipline too have considerably deteriorated. The growth of unhealthy trade unionism and wrong notions held by Government employees of their rights are to an extent responsible for the unsatisfactory functioning of the administrative machinery today. One of the main reasons for the rising discontent and indiscipline undoubtedly is that little worthwhile attention has been paid to more progressive aspects of personnel administration like talent hunting, in-service training, career development, matching responsibility with authority and provision of opportunities for self-fulfilment in work. The technique hitherto has been to administer through a system of rules and regulations, which are taken to be an end in themselves and not a means to an end. In our view, the present system of personnel administration is considerably out of tune with the requirements of the new situation. The Services Wing in the Ministry of Home Affairs, even though it is said to have “functioned creditably over many years” is not suitably organised to provide a dynamic and progressive leadership on personnel matters. A hide-bound, routine-ridden outlook and a sanctimonious adherence to precedents dominate the administration which tend to repel any attempt at reform.

169. The Estimates Committee which examined the functions and working of the Ministry of Home Affairs in regard to public service recommended in April 1966 that “the ever expanding role of the Government, in a welfare State with its natural concomitant of a large civil service, calls for effective personnel control through a single agency.” The Study Team has also made a similar recommendation. The Team points out that “the fashioning of an
effective central personnel agency and the allocation to it of all functions of an overall character in the field of personnel administration is one of the most important reforms required in the machinery of the Government of India". It adds that in a large and complex organisation such as the Government of India, the decentralisation of a large number of personnel functions to the individual Ministries and Departments is unavoidable. The central personnel agency should, therefore, confine itself to key problems and tasks. The management of departmental services or cadres, interpretation and application of personnel policies, rules and regulations and other matters of day-to-day management should be the responsibility of individual Ministries and Departments. We have already recommended the creation of chief personnel offices in all Ministries and administrative departments with heavy charges to look after operational personnel responsibilities.

170. The Study Team set up a working group to go into the broad details of the internal organisation of a new Department of Personnel. On the basis of the proposals made by the working group, the Study Team has recommended that this Department should consist of four wings as follows:

1. A Policy Wing to deal with formulation of overall personnel policies (in matters like recruitment, training, career-development, promotion, morale, discipline, staff welfare and machinery for redress of staff grievances, etc.); to review and evaluate the working of the policies and to keep contact with the UPSC, Bureau of Public Enterprises, State Governments, professional institutions etc.

2. A Career Systems Wing which will be concerned with key appointments, prospecting for talent, management of the Indian Administrative Service and centralised aspects of Central Secretariat Service, and foreign assistance programme (including training abroad).

3. A Development Wing for planning of personnel programmes (including manpower planning), organising, promoting and coordinating training and executive development programmes, undertaking and promoting research in personnel administration (including grants to universities and professional institution for such research), evolving a suitable system of job grading and classification to facilitate specialisation, and serving as a clearing house of information on personnel matters.

4. An Inspection & House-keeping Wing which will oversee the implementation of personnel policies and regulations.

171. The Study Team has also proposed that in its method of work the new Department should be "research oriented, not only in the development
wing but also at the policy formulation stage”. Accordingly, specialists will be needed for diverse work which the Department will have to handle. The Working Group (set up by the Study Team) has observed: “The selection of the Secretary, Department of Personnel should be done with great care since a cynic heading the Department without either ideas or a flair for realistic innovation can reduce its activities to meaningless ritual. The different wings will be presided over by an officer of the rank of Joint Secretary. They should be chosen carefully after an assessment of their capacities both in the realm of ideas and action. That is to say, not only should they be intellectually gifted, they should also have a capacity for innovation and a passion to get their ideas implemented. These officers may be drawn from a variety of services with a view to presenting effectively a progressive image of the new department”.

172. We generally agree that it is necessary to set up a central personnel agency with functions, composition and staffing pattern, as suggested above. A central agency with overall responsibility in all important matters and manned largely by specialists will obviously be able to devote concerted attention to formulation of new policies, set new standards and raise the quality of administration.

173. The Study Team has recommended that the new Department of Personnel should be located in the Ministry of Home Affairs. It should take over the relevant functions from the Services Wing. This Wing is at present headed by a Secretary who deals directly with the Home Minister. It mostly functions as a Department though it is not formally so designated. The Study Team has proposed that the central Department of Personnel should also deal with the following additional matters.

(a) Talent hunting,

(b) Career development,

(c) Research in Personnel Administration,

(d) Inspection and review of implementation of personnel policies by individual Ministries and Department, and

(e) Services Rules (like Fundamental Rules, Supplementary Rules, Civil Services Regulations).

174. The first two subjects are not entirely new. Some work in these two areas is being already done on a modest scale by the Establishment Officer and the Joint Secretary in charge of the Central Secretariat Service. We think that ‘talent hunting’ and ‘career development’ need to be developed on a systematic and continuing basis in the light of clear-cut policies.
175. As regards research in personnel matters it is virtually non-existent at present. This function is of great importance for a realistic formulation of personnel policies and a fruitful appraisal of their working. Inspection and review of implementation of personnel policies is a new function recommended by the Study Team. The present role of the Services Wing in this regard is limited to pointing out the deviations made by the Ministries from set personnel policies and procedures, as and when these come to the notice of the Home Ministry. The Study Team, on the other hand, has recommended an organised system of inspection of individual cases on a random sampling basis.

176. As regards Service Rules with financial content, these are at present dealt with by the Ministry of Finance (Establishment Division, Department of Expenditure). The Study Team has proposed that the new Department of Personnel should take over this item of work in so far as it concerns individual cases on questions like fixation of pay, deviations from financial rules. The transfer of all such work of the Establishment Division to the new Department of Personnel is considered essential by the Study Team for unification of personnel functions in a central agency. We do not, however, agree with the Study Team because matters, such as these, which are essentially of a financial nature are best dealt with by the Finance Ministry. Therefore, we recommend that the existing powers of the Finance Ministry with regard to such matters should continue; but they should be exercised only in consultation with the central personnel agency.

177. The Study Team has also recommended that the administration of different services should rest with individual Ministries/departments concerned. The central personnel agency should normally have no operational responsibilities for the management of any cadre. At the same time, the Team has proposed that the centralised aspects of the Central Secretariat Service and the IAS may be administered by the new Department of Personnel. It is not easy to reconcile the two positions. If we accept, as we do, the Team's primary recommendation that the administration of different services should rest with individual Ministries/departments, it follows quite clearly that the administration of the IAS and the centralised aspects of the C.S.S. should be with the Ministry of Home Affairs proper and not with the Department of Personnel to be newly constituted. Following this approach, the management of the Indian Economic Service and the Indian Statistical Service should be transferred to the Department of Economic Affairs. The Services Wing at present also administers the Industrial Management Pool. We have already recommended in our Report on Public Sector Undertakings the transfer of this work to the Bureau of Public Enterprises.

178. The new Department of Personnel will, however, deal with common personnel problems concerning service conditions and rules of all
Central and All-India Services, as also with the development of personnel for “senior management” and processing of appointments to senior posts.

179. The Study Team has further proposed that the Cabinet Secretary should be regarded by convention as the Secretary-General of the Department of Personnel and should have the overall responsibility for administration of senior management personnel (of the level of Joint Secretary and above). There should be a special cell of an appropriate strength in the new Department of Personnel to give whole-time attention to problems of senior management.

180. The Cabinet Secretary is at present the Chairman of the Central Establishment Board which processes all appointments up to and including Joint Secretaries. He also proposes names of qualified officials for the appointment of Secretaries, Special Secretaries and Additional Secretaries. He further assists the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet which deals broadly with all appointments in the secretariat at the level of Deputy Secretary and above. This Committee also approves of appointments to posts in public enterprises with an ultimate salary of Rs. 2,250/- p.m. or above. Only two types of personnel matters go to the full Cabinet, namely, creation of posts carrying pay higher than Rs. 3,000 p.m. and re-employment of retired personnel where the pay (including pension proposed to be given) exceeds Rs. 3,000 p.m.

181. We agree with the Study Team that the Cabinet Secretary should be actively involved in determination of overall policies and actions concerning selection and career development of all “senior management” personnel. He should not ordinarily deal with appointments below senior management levels. Further, the Secretary of the Department of Personnel and not the Cabinet Secretary should head the Establishment Board which should no longer deal with senior management.

182. The new Department of Personnel will have necessarily to handle the work of selection of personnel for senior management posts, their training and career development, preparation of rosters for appointment to key posts and the like. The Study Team has proposed that the new Department should operate positive programmes of developing the middle level personnel for senior management posts. We shall deal with this proposal in detail in our report on Personnel Administration. It has further been suggested that the Department should be responsible for the staffing of secretariat posts below the level of Joint Secretary and above that of Section Officer. This will necessitate the location of the Establishment Board in the Department of Personnel whose Secretary will be the head of the Board, as already stated.
183. As to the Ministry in which the Department of Personnel should be located, the Study Team is of the view that its proper location would be the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Team is also of the opinion that the Department should be under the overall supervision and guidance of the Cabinet Secretary. We have recommended earlier that the Cabinet Secretary should be responsible for development and administration of "senior management". In this view, it would not be quite consistent to locate the Department of Personnel in the Ministry of Home Affairs when the Cabinet Secretary is not under that Ministry. Further, we feel that a nodal agency like the Department of Personnel should not be located in any particular Ministry. In some countries the tradition as well as recent practice has been to place the central personnel department directly under the Prime Minister. In the United Kingdom, the central management of the Civil Service has for long been under that wing of the Treasury which is under the Prime Minister. The British Government has decided recently to set up a separate Department of Personnel which will directly be in the Prime Minister's charge. In France, the post-1945 reforms saw the creation of a Civil Service Division (direction generale dela fonction Publique) and its placement directly under the Prime Minister. In the U.S.A., too, the Civil Service Commission which functions as the central personnel agency, comes directly under the Chief Executive, i.e. the President.

184. On a careful consideration we feel that the new Department of Personnel should be placed directly under the Prime Minister. Such an arrangement is necessary in our view to give the highest support to the proposed department for taking up new responsibilities concerning progressive aspects of personnel management.

185. The creation of a standing advisory council on personnel administration has also been suggested by the Study Team. It should consist of about 15 members—official as well as non-official—who are experts in different aspects of personnel management drawn from all over the country. The Study Team feels that such an advisory body will help induct continuously fresh thinking into the working of the central personnel agency. The Team has also proposed the creation of an advisory board on personnel administration to enable the Home Minister to get a real 'feel' of fresh ideas and expert thinking on basic issues involved in different personnel policies. Neither the Study Team nor its Working Group has made any definite proposal about the composition of the board. It is, however, implied that the board should be composed along the line of the advisory council. The creation of the Board in addition to the proposed Council will undoubtedly add to the multiplicity of advisory bodies. We, however, attach greatest importance to the overriding need for promoting a creative outlook on personnel administration in the machinery of Government. We therefore, support the establishment of only the advisory council on personnel administration.
Recommendation 17:

We, therefore, recommend:

(1) A separate Department of Personnel should be set up, with a full Secretary in charge who should work under the general guidance of the Cabinet Secretary.

(2) This Department should have the following functions and responsibilities:

(a) formulation of personnel policies on all matters common to the Central and All-India Services, and inspection and review of their implementation;

(b) talent hunting, development of personnel for “senior management” and processing of appointment to senior posts;

(c) manpower planning, training and career development;

(d) foreign assistance programme in personnel administration;

(e) research in personnel administration;

(f) discipline and welfare of staff and machinery for redress of their grievances;

(g) liaison with the Union Public Service Commission, State Governments, professional institutions, etc.; and

(h) staffing of the middle-level positions in the Central Secretariat (of Under Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries) with the assistance of and on the advice of the Establishment Board.

(3) (a) The Department of Personnel should not itself administer any service cadre. The administrative control of different service cadres should vest with individual Ministries and Departments concerned.

(b) The administration of the IAS, IPS and the centralised aspects of the Central Secretariat Service should be the responsibility of the Ministry of Home Affairs.

(c) The management of the Indian Economic Service and of the Indian Statistical Service should be transferred to the Department of Economic Affairs.

(4) The Cabinet Secretary should by convention be regarded as Secretary-General of the new Department of Personnel, without being formally so designated. He should be actively involved in the development of and selection for “senior management” but not in appointments below that level.
(5) The new Department of Personnel should be placed directly under the Prime Minister.

(6) An Advisory Council on Personnel Administration may be set up to act as a feeder line of new ideas and thinking a personnel administration. It should be composed of official and non-official experts in different aspects of personnel management drawn from all over the country.

(7) The Establishment Board should be located in the new Department of Personnel and the Secretary of this Department should be its Chairman. The Board should deal with appointments only up to and including Deputy Secretaries.
CHAPTER VII

GROUPING OF SUBJECTS

186. Under Article 77 of the Constitution the President is required to make rules for allocation of business of Government to Ministers. The administrative organisation which assists the Minister to deal with subject/subjects allotted to him is known as a Ministry. Where the charge of a Minister is heavy, the Ministry may consist of a number of departments or may have a part of its work allotted to one or more departments. The nomenclature “department” is generally used to indicate a Secretary’s charge.

187. In the past, Ministries and Departments have been split often to suit particular political exigencies. This has naturally affected adversely the efficient working of the government machinery and created fresh problems of coordination. It is true that under a parliamentary form of government, the stage of political development, the relative strength of the political party in power, the number of constituent units in the federal system, regional and cultural variations in the country and similar other considerations have an important bearing on the determination of the number of Ministers with independent charges and the distribution of subjects among them. But, as already emphasised by us, political considerations should not be allowed to weaken the stability of the administrative structure.

188. The number of Ministries and departments and the allocation of work to them should be determined on the basis of a scientific analysis of the various functions and tasks to be performed by the Centre—in other words, on considerations of rationality and efficient manageability of the charges, tempered with the need for economy. The principle of rationality does not necessarily mean homogeneity of items of work. It implies affinity of subjects and tasks in terms of the operational inputs to attain a particular programme goal or policy objective. Applying these basic principles, the Study Team recommended in its interim report in March 1967 a re-grouping of subjects into twenty-one Ministers’ portfolios and forty-one departments (as against twenty-three Ministers’ portfolios and forty-two departments including the Planning Commission and Ministries without any department at that time).

189. Government have already effected certain changes in some Ministries and Departments on the basis of suggestions made by the Study
Team in the interim report. These include abolition of the Department of Coordination (in Ministry of Finance) and of the Ministry of Supply, Technical Development and Materials Planning transfer of the subjects of “technical development” and “materials planning” to the Department of Industrial Development and those of “supply” to the Ministry of Works & Housing; transfer of “urban development” from the Ministry of Works & Housing to the Department of Health & Family Planning; of “prohibition” from the Ministry of Home Affairs to the Department of Social Welfare, of “child welfare” from Department of Social Welfare to the Department of Family Planning, of “government hotels” from the Ministry of Works, Housing & Supply to the Ministry of Tourism & Civil Aviation; and amalgamation of the Ministry of Mines & Metals and the Ministry of Iron & Steel into a single Ministry of Steel, Mines & Metals.

190. We have given careful consideration to the recommendations made by the Study Team and found it necessary to make certain modifications in its scheme. We are opposed to the creation of any new Department unless it is absolutely necessary. We have also kept in view the basic consideration that the Central involvement in subjects falling within the State List should be restricted to matters enumerated in para 85 of Chapter IV of this report. We have confined ourselves in this chapter primarily to the grouping of subjects as between different Departments and Ministries and have not gone into internal organisational arrangements for dealing with them. Under our proposals there should normally be 16 Ministers’ portfolios and thirty-eight* departments (including Ministries without any department) as against nineteen** Ministers’ portfolios and forty* departments today.

191. Stability in the basic administrative structure is very important for future administrative growth on balanced and healthy lines. At the same time political exigencies requiring some increase in the number of Ministers’ portfolios cannot altogether be ruled out. Such increase should be brought about by a regrouping of departments and not by splitting them or realigning their subjects. We are decidedly of the view that the basic scheme of grouping of subjects into departments should normally remain unchanged until there is strong justification for making a change. Even then changes should be made only after a thorough study of the administrative implications. We do realise that certain functions allotted to a particular department may over the years grow in dimension. There may thus be the need for setting up a new department in that area. But mostly this should not affect the effectiveness of the organisational arrangements to handle that work. The new department will obviously be built on the nucleus already

*Including the Planning Commission and the Cabinet Secretariat.

**Including three unfilled vacancies.
contained in an existing department. In the context of our basic approach, any new functions should as far as possible be assigned to one of the existing organisations in the government machinery.

The Overall Scheme of Ministries and Departments

192. Under our scheme of reorganisation, the different Ministries and Departments in the Government of India will be as follows:

A. Ministries without Departments

1. Home Affairs
2. External Affairs
3. Irrigation and Power
4. Railways
5. Labour and Employment.

B. Ministries with Departments.

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<th>Ministries</th>
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<td>(2) Defence Production.</td>
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<td>(3) Defence Supply.</td>
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<td>7. Finance</td>
<td>(1) Economic Affairs (including Statistics and Insurance)</td>
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<td>(2) Revenue &amp; Expenditure.</td>
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<td>(3) Company Affairs.</td>
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<td>(2) Supply.</td>
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<td>(2) Industrial Development.</td>
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<td>(2) Mines &amp; Metals.</td>
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<td>(3) Petroleum.</td>
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<td>(4) Chemicals.</td>
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<td>11. Transport &amp; Tourism</td>
<td>(1) Transport &amp; Shipping.</td>
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<td>(2) Tourism &amp; Civil Aviation.</td>
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<td>(2) Information &amp; Broadcasting.</td>
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<td>(2) Agriculture.</td>
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<td>(3) Community Development &amp; Cooperation.</td>
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<td>(2) Health &amp; Urban Development.</td>
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<td>(3) Family Planning.</td>
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<td>(4) Social Welfare (including Rehabilitation).</td>
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<td>15. Law &amp; Justice</td>
<td>(1) Legal Affairs &amp; Justice.</td>
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<td>(2) Legislative Department.</td>
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<td>C. Others</td>
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<td>16. Prime Minister</td>
<td>(1) Department of Personnel.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(2) Department of Atomic Energy, Planning as a Portfolio (without any department).</td>
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The Cabinet Minister who is also the Deputy Department of Administrative Reforms. Prime Minister.

Leader of the House (Lok Sabha) Department of Parliamentary Affairs.

Cabinet Affairs.
193. We agree with the Study Team that the Cabinet Secretariat should not be regarded as a Department of Government, as its primary function is to provide secretariat assistance to the Cabinet and its Committees.

194. We shall now deal with the recommendations of the Study Team regarding reorganisation of departments and Ministries. As will be seen, we do not agree with the Study Team in several cases. The Team has also made recommendations concerning transfer of subjects from one Ministry/department to another. Here, we generally agree with the Study Team except for the changes indicated in discussion that follows or in our earlier reports.

**Home Affairs, Defence and External Affairs**

195. We have already explained our reasons for locating the new Department of Personnel under the direct charge of the Prime Minister. The Ministry of Home Affairs will thus be divested of certain personnel functions currently handled by it.

At present the work concerning Union Territories is under the charge of an Additional Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs, though during 1964—67 a Secretary was looking after it. A view is taken in certain quarters that those parts of the Home Ministry which deal with work concerning Union Territories should be constituted into a full-fledged department. This, it is said, will facilitate the taking of an integrated view of their administrative problems and help ensure that the work of Union Territories in other Ministries receives prompt and adequate attention from them. The Estimates Committee (2nd Lok Sabha) in its 58th Report had recommended in 1959 the creation of a special Ministry for Union Territories. The Government did not agree to this proposal on the ground that it would involve unnecessary duplication. The new Ministry would not be able to take over any of the functions of the Ministry of Home Affairs or any other Ministry. It could play a coordinating role only. On the whole, we consider that the disadvantages of setting up of a separate Department outweigh the advantages. The Political Wing of the Home Ministry has a special responsibility for maintenance of peace and tranquillity in Union Territories. It also looks after matters of internal security in the country in general. The creation of separate department will bifurcate this responsibility. Incidentally, it will take the Home Secretary out of the picture.

196. The political and administrative problems of Nagaland even after it became a full State in December 1963, continue to be handled by the Ministry of External Affairs. The appropriate organisation for this subject obviously is the Ministry of Home Affairs. The latter arrangement should not come in the way of the Prime Minister by virtue of his position, handling certain sensitive issues in this area.
197. The Study Team has recommended the abolition of Department of Defence Supply and the transfer of this subject to the Ministry of Works, Housing & Supply. Another Study Team of our Commission, which has specifically gone into the organisation of the Defence Ministry and its relationship with the Service Headquarters, however, feels that the work of “defence supplies” is of a specialised character requiring the adaptation of the existing and potential capacity of civil industry for the particular needs of defence which involves security and secrecy. It is one of the important functions of the Department of Defence Supply today to plan for the substitution of import requirements for defence purposes. This Study Team, therefore, recommends the continuation of “defence supplies” in the Ministry of Defence. As functions of production and supply are inter-related, the Study Team favours the combination of both in the same Department. The Defence Supply Department was created in 1965 with a view to utilising and developing for defence purposes the capacity of civil industry. Till 1st July, 1967 the Department was headed by a Secretary. Since then a Joint Secretary has been looking after this work, directly under the Defence Minister. Recently in view of the amount of the work involved in import substitution of a wide range of equipment and the complexity of the attendant problems it has been decided to put the Department under a Special Secretary. In the face of continuing threat of aggression by some of our neighbouring countries, defence will continue to be one of the major responsibilities of Government for several years to come. The need for strengthening the defence apparatus is paramount. We are, therefore, opposed to the transfer of “defence supplies” from the Ministry of Defence.

198. The defence needs for import substitution of a wide and specialised range in diverse areas, the technical problems connected with modernisation and sophistication of defence equipment and the volume and quality of scientific and technical research needed for the purpose call for concerted attention from a central point. This, in our view, amply justifies a separate Department of Defence Supply. We, therefore, do not agree that the Departments of Supply & Production should be combined together.

199. The Defence Research & Development Organisation is at present located in the Department of Defence Production. Its main function is research on the development and improvement of equipment required by the Armed Forces. It has twenty-nine development establishments/laboratories situated in different parts of the country. Senior scientists of the Organisation are attached to the three Service Headquarters and to the Army Commands for advising on day-to-day scientific matters. The overall direction of the research programme of the Organisation rests with a Defence Research & Development Council, which has the Defence Minister as its chairman and the three Service Chiefs as members. The research developed by the Organisation has to be harnessed to practical use not only by the Services but also by the private and the public sectors for producing defence.
equipment and supplies. The activities of the Defence Research and Development Organisation are thus of an inter-service and inter-departmental character. In our view, this Organisation should, therefore, be placed in the main Ministry of Defence and not in one of its Departments. Such a location will also help to associate scientists and technologists with the planning of defence strategy.

200. The Military Wing of the Department of Cabinet Affairs in the Cabinet Secretariat is mostly engaged in providing secretarial service to the Cabinet Committee on Defence, the National Defence Council, the Defence Minister's Committees, Chiefs of Staff Committee and its sub-committees and similar other committees on defence. Several of them are really a part of the Defence Ministry and it will therefore be logical to shift the work of this Wing to that Ministry.

Finance

201. The Department of Statistics, at present located in the Cabinet Secretariat, has the overall responsibility for effecting coordination between various statistical agencies of the Government and of advising them on standards, norms and methods of collection and compilation of statistics. Statistics today mostly relate to economic activities and have a close bearing on policy-making in economic matters. The proper location for the work of this Department would, therefore be the Economic Affairs Department.

202. The Department of Economic Affairs has progressively relinquished its primary responsibility of economic coordination. As the report of our Study Team on Economic Administration observes, it has come to concentrate mostly on problems connected with the management of foreign exchange (including its detailed allocation) and the compilation of the budget. In our view, this department should have the key responsibility for coordinating all the policies of the Government in the economic field.

203. We have recommended in our report on Economic Administration the setting up of a Commission on Prices, Cost & Tariff. The department of the Government to which this Commission is to be administratively related is now to be considered. The Working Group on Developmental, Control & Regulatory Organisations has recommended that the Department of Economic Affairs as the most appropriate location for a Commission of this type because that Department would be concerned with the determination of broad directions of national effort towards economic development. We agree with the Working Group and recommend that the Commission on Prices, Cost & Tariff should be administratively attached to the Department of Economic Affairs in the Ministry of Finance. Though administratively connected with the Department of Economic Affairs, the Commission will be an autonomous body and its services will be available to all the concerned Ministries as well as the Planning Commission.
204. A special study, carried out by the Commission of the working of the gold mines, underlines the importance of their more efficient management as industrial enterprises. It will, therefore, be more appropriate to locate them under the administrative control of the Department of Mines & Metals. We have accordingly proposed their transfer from the Ministry of Finance.

205. As ‘revenue’ and ‘expenditure’ are closely connected, we support the Study Team’s proposals to combine them under one department. Insurance has greater relevance to ‘economic affairs’ than ‘revenue’. This subject was with this Department from 1950 to 1964 and should return to it.

206. The Company Law Administration has been moved from one Ministry to another several times during the last few years. It was in the Finance Ministry a few years ago when it was shifted to the Ministry of Commerce & Industry and then to the Ministry of Law. It is now located in the Ministry of Industrial Development & Company Affairs. The operation of the company law has a significant impact on the economy of the country whose health is the primary concern of the Finance Ministry. Further, many of the malpractices which gave rise to various amendments of company law have a bearing on the taxation of companies. It will therefore be appropriate that the Company Law Administration is placed back in the Ministry of Finance where it was once located. Incidentally, the combination of Commerce and Industry into one Ministry and the transfer of the Council for Scientific & Industrial Research to that Ministry, which has been proposed by us, is likely to throw such a heavy burden on it that it would be necessary to move the Department of Company Affairs out of the combined Ministry.

207. Publicity abroad is at present handled by the External Publicity Division of the Ministry of External Affairs. This Division also briefs the foreign correspondents stationed in New Delhi on matters concerning the country’s foreign policy. The bulk of the Press Attaches in Indian Missions abroad belong to IFS(B). The Study Team has suggested the transfer of “external publicity” to the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.

208. There is a growing feeling that India’s publicity abroad is singularly inadequate and ineffective. The ARC’s Study Team on Relations between the Press and Administration has pointed out: “Indians travelling abroad have been greatly disappointed with the performance of the Information Officers attached to the Embassies who belong to the Foreign Service. . . . It cannot be expected of officers belonging to the Foreign Service with their notions of diplomatic status and reticence to deal with the problems of publicity which require ability and outlook of a different character”. This Study Team recommends that the external publicity officers of the External Affairs Ministry should be drawn from the Central Information Service and
there should be mutual interchange at periodic intervals between them and other Information Officers. The Chanda Committee on mass communication media has, in its fifth report, recommended the transfer of overseas publicity to the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting. The overseas publicity division in the Information & Broadcasting Ministry will, however, be headed by a Foreign Service Officer.

209. The interest in India of the educated classes in foreign countries is not confined exclusively or even mainly to India's foreign policy. For projecting properly and effectively India's image abroad as also her foreign policy it is necessary that foreign publicity is handled by professionally qualified persons. For publicity abroad on matters other than foreign policy the External Publicity Division mostly relies on the publicity material released by the Press Information Bureau, Publication and other publicity media units. Again, in regard to matters other than foreign policy the foreign correspondents stationed in India are at present serviced by different information media units of the Information & Broadcasting Ministry. We consider that it would be of definite advantage to bring external publicity in close proximity to other types of publicity by transferring it to the Department of Information & Broadcasting in the proposed Ministry of Communications, Information & Broadcasting.

**Commerce and Industry**

210. Taking the view that export promotion needs special attention, the Study Team has suggested the creation of a separate Department of Export Industries in the present Ministry of Commerce. This Ministry already handles export industries like textiles, jute, plantation and sericulture. It will be necessary to add rubber, mica and leather products. The rest of the work of the Ministry as presently constituted should, the Study Team recommends, be handled by a Department of Trade and Consumer Protection.

211. We agree with the Study Team that there should be separate organisational arrangements for "export industries" and "trade and consumer protection". We have recommended in our report on Economic Administration the constitution of a combined Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Viewing the problem in this perspective, we do not favour the creation of two separate Departments for "export industries" and "trade and consumer protection". Both these subjects, being inter-connected, should be dealt with by separate wings under a single Department of Commerce. The wing on "trade and consumer protection" should also deal with the several problems of civil supplies, price stabilisation of consumer goods, quality control in trade but not with consumers cooperatives as proposed by the Study Team. The latter should continue to remain with the Department of Co-operation.
212. Consequent on the formation of a single Ministry of Commerce and Industry, we proposed in our report on Economic Administration that the administrative control over such public sector industrial undertakings as are now dealt with by the Ministry of Industrial Development and Company Affairs should be transferred to other appropriate Ministries. Industrial undertakings in the public sector under the administrative control of the Ministry of Industrial Development and Company Affairs today are as follows:

(a) 1. Cement Corporation of India Ltd.
(b) 2. Hindustan Photofilms Manufacturing Co. Ltd.
4. Hindustan Salts Ltd. including Sambhar Salts Ltd.
(c) 5. Heavy Electricals (India) Ltd.
6. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd.
(d) 7. Heavy Engineering Corporation Ltd.
8. Mining & Allied Machinery Corporation Ltd.
9. Triveni Structural Ltd.
11. Bharat Heavy Plates & Vessels Ltd.
12. Machine Tools Corporation of India Ltd.
13. Tungabhadra Steel Products Ltd.
14. Hindustan Cables Ltd.
15. Instrumentation Ltd.

213. One of our basic recommendations in our report on Public Sector Undertakings related to the establishment of sectoral corporations in eleven areas of public sector activities. The main idea underlying this recommendation is to avoid the fragmentation of the industrial effort in the public sector, to achieve economies of large-scale operations and to promote coordinated and integrated development of each sector. Under our scheme of sectoral corporations, the cement enterprise under category (a) will become a part of the Mining Corporation at the sector level, and those in category (b) (No. 2—4), of the sectoral Chemicals and Drugs Corporation. The undertakings in category (c) (Nos. 5-6) will come under the Electricals Corporation; and those in category (d) (Nos. 7—16), under the Engineering Corporation.

214. We would, therefore, recommend that the Cement Corporation of India may be transferred to the Department of Mines and Metals to become a part of the sectoral Mining Corporation. Similarly, the enterprises
mentioned in category (b) may be transferred to the Department of Chemicals, to be incorporated into the sectoral Chemicals and Drugs Corporation. As regards the remaining enterprises (Nos. 7—16) these may temporarily remain with the new Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and included in the sectoral corporations on “Engineering” and “Electricals” when they are set up. These sectoral corporations will take over most of the work of the Ministry relating to the undertakings concerned, and the work relating to the corporations themselves is not likely to cost much burden on the Ministry.

**Science and Technology**

215. The Study Team has proposed the setting up of a separate Ministry of Science and Technology which will have as its functions (i) the operational responsibilities in respect of Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and a few Surveys like the Survey of India, Geological Survey, Botanical Survey and Zoological Survey; and (ii) nodal responsibilities in matters like scientific policy, planning for scientific man-power, coordination of activities in different scientific sectors and ensuring financial support to the scientific endeavour in the country. The Study Team on Scientific Departments is opposed to this proposal on the grounds that (a) it will give an impression that the areas left outside the scope of the operational responsibilities of the proposed Ministry are not particularly concerned with scientific research and development and therefore do not merit as much care and attention of Government as those within the proposed Ministry and (b) the proposed Ministry will not be able to discharge the responsibilities of inter-ministerial coordination of the activities in matters of scientific research.

216. It is important to observe in this connection that out of the five major scientific organisations of (i) Atomic Energy Commission, (ii) CSIR, (iii) Defence Research and Development Organisation, (iv) Indian Council of Agricultural Research and (v) Indian Council of Medical Research, it is in respect of the CSIR that criticism has repeatedly been levelled for the gap which exists between industrial research and its application by industry. The major factor responsible for this gap is the inappropriate location of CSIR in the Ministry of Education. Since the major responsibility of CSIR is to cater for the needs of industry and its programmes are to be oriented to industrial requirements, there is no much merit in the argument that it should be located in the Ministry of Education on the ground that the Ministry has to deal with general scientific education and research. Again, it is doubtful if the Ministry of Education will be able to devote adequate attention and time to CSIR for the next decade or so which will keep it preoccupied with the problems connected with the implementation of the educational policies recommended by the Education Commission. It is,
therefore, necessary to shift the CSIR from the Ministry of Education and place it in such a position as will ensure a continuous dialogue between CSIR laboratories and their user industries, and thus facilitate an effective link between industrial research and its practical application.

217. In this connection, the Study Team on Scientific Departments has, in its interim report, suggested two alternatives. The first is to set up a separate Ministry of Technology (as distinguished from a Ministry of Science and Technology) with operational responsibilities for CSIR (including the National Research Development Corporation) and the Directorate General of Technical Development (DGTD). This suggestion does not fully answer the problem of coordination between industrial research and its practical application. Further, it involves the separation of the DGTD from the Department of Industrial Development—a course of action which will adversely affect the Department in the discharge of its basic coordinating functions in the field of industrial development. The second suggestion put forward by the Team is that the CSIR should be transferred from the Ministry of Education and located in association with DGTD within the “Ministry of Industrial Development”. This will facilitate a meaningful programming of the research of CSIR and its utilisation by industry. It will also not involve any change in the location of the DGTD. The latter suggestion therefore appears to be the best in the circumstances. However, we do not agree to the proposal that the DGTD and the CSIR should be grouped into a department under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. That may create administrative complications and affect the efficient functioning of both of them. What is needed is the close coordination between the two organisations and not their coalescence into a single department. We, therefore, recommend that the CSIR should be placed in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry without being made part of a separate department comprising the DGTD and the CSIR.

218. Basic research is mostly a function of the universities. A university education is the primary concern of the Ministry of Education, that Ministry will continue to be responsible for education and basic research in science.

219. Another point which deserves consideration in this connection is the provision of a central point in Government for planning of scientific research and overseeing its implementation. Since scientific research is dispersed over several organisations and departments of the Government, the agency which can adequately discharge the overall responsibilities in matters of scientific policy, manpower planning, and coordination and review of sectoral research has to be located at a very high level. Nor is perhaps the Ministry-type of organisation suited to overall planning and coordination of sectoral scientific research. In our view, the Scientific Advisory Committee to the Cabinet, which has recently been reorganised and renamed as-
Committee on Science and Technology, would be an appropriate agency for discharging the nodal functions mentioned above. This Committee includes eminent scientists, technologists and other specialists drawn both from the Government institutions and outside. The Committee is at present serviced by a whole-time scientist as Secretary, who is assisted by a small complement of staff located in the Cabinet Secretariat. We consider it important that the Committee should be given a permanent secretariat which will prepare needed documentation, keep regular liaison with various scientific institutions and follow up the implementation of the decisions of the Committee as accepted by Government.

220. As regards the several survey organisations concerned with the type of work which may be termed scientific, we suggest that they should also be linked to various user Ministries. Thus, the Botanical Survey and the Zoological Survey may be transferred to the Department of Agriculture from the Ministry of Education. The Geological Survey may remain with the Department of Mines and Metals. The Archaeological Survey and the Anthropological Survey may continue to be with the Ministry of Education. As to the Survey of India, though its services are utilised by the Ministry of Defence as well as the Ministries of External Affairs and Home Affairs, over half of its work is done for programme Ministries/Departments like Irrigation and Power, Food and Agriculture, Steel, Mines and Metals, Health and Urban Development. To locate the Survey of India in the Ministry of Defence will not be conducive to the use of its surveys by Ministries other than Defence. Keeping in view various considerations, we recommend that the Survey of India be placed in the Ministry of Irrigation and Power which accounts for about 30 per cent of its work.

Transport, Communications, Parliamentary Affairs and Works

221. Rail, road, sea and air transport are at present distributed in three Ministries (1) Railways, (2) Transport and Shipping, and (3) Tourism and Civil Aviation. Further, a Cabinet Minister looks after both the Department of Parliamentary Affairs and the Department of Communications.

222. The Study Team has recommended a combination of “Transport and Shipping”, “Tourism and Civil Aviation” and “Communications” into a single Ministry of “Transport and Communications”.

223. It is necessary to ensure that the charge of the new Ministry is viable. We would, therefore, recommend that the existing Ministries of “Transport and Shipping” and “Tourism and Civil Aviation” should alone be combined together to form a new Ministry of “Transport and Tourism”. There are common links between “Communications” and “Information and Broadcasting”. These may, therefore, together constitute a Ministry of “Communications, Information and Broadcasting”. The Department of
Parliamentary Affairs should be in the charge of the Cabinet Minister who is the Leader of the House (Lok Sabha).

224. The Study Team has recommended the creation of a special Directorate of Construction in the Ministry of Works, Housing and Supply. It is not feasible to have a separate Ministry dealing with all construction works of the Government of India, as is suggested in some quarters. All the same, it is essential to have a central organisation to deal with key functions like integrated development of the construction industry, research in building methods and techniques, setting of norms for various aspects of construction work, effective utilisation of machinery and materials and other economies in construction, improvement of procedures of contracting and accounting and proper development of civil engineers as between different construction works. In our report on Public Sector Undertakings we had suggested that the Bureau of Public Enterprises should assist the Ministries in controlling expenditure on residential and administrative buildings, townships and ancillary facilities. The other aspects of construction industry mentioned earlier deserve attention at a central point. We have not also proposed any sectoral corporation for construction industry in the Government sector. We, therefore, support the proposal of the Study Team for the establishment of a Directorate of Construction in the Department of Works.

Steel, Mines, Petroleum and Chemicals

225. We have recommended earlier that every subject should be represented in the Cabinet by a Cabinet Minister and further that the total number of Cabinet Ministers should not exceed sixteen. Viewing the problem in this context and considering their mutual affinity, we would recommend that “Petroleum and Chemicals” and “Steel, Mines and Metals” which are at present constituted as two separate Ministries should be combined to form a single Ministry of Metals, Chemicals and Oil.

Regional Planning

226. The Study Team has proposed that there should be a separate department of “Regional Planning, Housing and Local Government” to serve as a focal point for dealing with the complex and difficult administrative problems thrown up by rapid urbanisation and industrialisation, particularly in metropolitan cities, new townships and river valley projects.

227. The subject of urban development was transferred from the Ministry of Works, Housing and Supply to the Ministry of Health and Family Planning in March 1968. The Department of Health and Urban Development in this Ministry now deals with problems of regional urban development like slum clearance, schemes of town and country planning,
matters relating to Calcutta Metropolitan Planning Organisation, schemes of large scale acquisition, development and disposal of land in Delhi, improvement trusts etc. We have already indicated our basic approach to the involvement of the Centre in matters falling within the State List. The contents of any programmes of regional planning would, by and large, belong to this category. While our Five Year Plans have in the past covered some aspects of regional planning, it is still to be accepted as an integral part of the national planning process. Again, we do not have today any regional machinery for the purpose. It will take quite some time for such machinery to come up. In the circumstances we consider that no separate Department of Regional Planning is necessary at this stage. The more important responsibilities in the field can be looked after by the Department of Health and Urban Development, the Department of Works and Housing and the Planning Commission.

Food, Agriculture, Community Development and Cooperation

228. The Study Team has suggested the bifurcation of the present Department of Agriculture into two Departments: (1) Agricultural Production and Processing, and (2) Agricultural Supplies and Services. We are not convinced of the need for having two separate departments, one for production and processing and the other for supplies and services. Effective coordination between production and supplies can take place if both are parts of a single department, as they are at present and we do not, therefore, consider it necessary to bifurcate the present single department.

229. While supporting the existing allocation of major and medium irrigation as a subject to the Ministry of Irrigation and Power and of minor irrigation to the Department of Agriculture the Study Team has underlined the need for integrated attention being paid to problems like ground water survey, water management and maximum utilisation of irrigation potential. It has, in this connection, suggested the creation of a Water Management Division in the Ministry of Irrigation and Power, to be staffed both by agricultural scientists and irrigation engineers. These proposals merit attention and have our support. The Study Team on Agricultural Administration has also taken up a similar approach. It has recommended that the Ministry of Irrigation and Power (and not the Natural Resources Division of the Planning Commission) should be the coordinating body for all work concerning investigation for underground water resources. The exploratory tubewell organisation may be transferred from the Department of Agriculture to the Ministry of Irrigation and Power.

230. The Study Team on Agricultural Administration has pointed out that many of the present responsibilities of the Department of Food have emerged as a result of the policy of state trading in foodgrains. According to this Study Team, the Department of Food at the Centre should be closed.
down and most of its functions for procurement and distribution of food grains should be transferred to the Food Corporation of India, and other functions to the appropriate agencies and the States.

231. There is thus scope for the reduction in size of the Department of Food. However, the Centre cannot give up its basic responsibilities in matters like formulation of overall national policy and programme and mobilising the support of States for their implementation, international agreements for import of food, inter-state distribution, trade, commerce and price control in respect of foodgrains and other foodstuffs including sugar and vanaspati, etc. Relations with States and foreign missions in these matters call for their handling at the highest administrative level. We would, therefore, recommend that the Department should continue to be headed by a Secretary for at least some time to come even after it sheds the non-essential functions.

232. The Study Team on the Machinery of Government of India and its Procedures of Work has proposed the transfer of the present functions concerning sugar and vanaspati from the Department of Food to the proposed Department of Agricultural Production and Processing. Both these are important items of food. The main problems here relate to production in factories, price control and distribution. We, therefore, do not consider that the Department of Agriculture is the proper place for them. An alternative would be to transfer them to the Department of Industrial Development. It is, however, necessary that all food problems are normally dealt with at one central point. We would, therefore, recommend that sugar and vanaspati should continue to remain with the Department of Food.

233. The Study Team on Agricultural Administration finds that the Department of Community Development at the Centre has no justification. Community Development and Panchayati Raj have not substantially contributed to increased agricultural production. On the other hand, these programmes have led to frustration. The Study Team on the Machinery of Government of India favours the dispersal of the work concerning various aspects of community development programme to sectoral Ministries concerned except in the case of agriculture. It does not see any need for a central agency to operate programmes which really belong to other Ministries.

234. We agree that Community Development is not one programme but a composite strand of several programme elements each of which concerns one or the other Central Ministry or Department. Further, the contents of this programme primarily fall within the State List. The establishment of Panchayati Raj institutions has also changed the role of the programme in term of mobilising people's cooperation and self-help in the developmental effort. The programme has not been an unqualified success.
Without going into this controversy we are convinced that the Centre’s involvement in this area needs to be severely restricted. As regards Panchayati Raj institutions, these constitute primarily a form of democratic decentralisation in the field of local government. The Centre’s interest in this field must be limited to serving as clearing house of information and general coordination. It is, therefore, not necessary to have a Department of Community Development with its present form and functions.

235. Cooperation as a subject also falls within the jurisdiction of States. The Study Team recommended in its interim report that the Department of Cooperation should shed its functions to the sectoral Ministries to the maximum extent possible, except for agricultural cooperatives. Under its proposals, consumer cooperatives, for instance, would go to the Ministry of Commerce and industrial cooperatives to the Department of Industrial Development. This Team also felt that with its functions so reduced there would be no need for continuing the Department of Cooperation and that a division in the Department of Agriculture should suffice.

236. The Working Group on Cooperation set up by the Commission has taken a diametrically opposite view. It considers that a distinct cooperative sector as envisaged in the Five Year Plans can emerge only if a unified agency in the form of a Ministry or Department of Cooperation deals with cooperative activities in all sectors. According to the Working Group, there should be no sectoral dispersal at all. Sectoral Ministries have not been able to give adequate attention to the growth of cooperatives and dispersal of responsibility will retard the needed healthy development of cooperatives.

237. The Department of Cooperation was set up towards the end of 1958. The work concerning cooperatives was handled earlier by a division of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture. The Department at present handles matters concerning agricultural indebtedness and credit in the cooperative sector, agricultural cooperatives, consumers cooperatives, national cooperative organisations (including National Cooperative Development Corporation), training of personnel of cooperative departments and organisations, incorporation, regulation and dissolution of cooperatives with inter-State activities. Work concerning cooperation in the industrial sector (excepting the cooperative sugar factories) is distributed between the Department of Industrial Development and the Ministry of Commerce. The latter handles cooperatives in handloom, handicrafts, coir, sericulture and khadi and village industries. Cooperatives in other areas of industrial development are dealt with in the Department of Industrial Development. The Department of Labour and Employment operates its own schemes of special consumer cooperatives for industrial workers, which are financed from different welfare funds. The Ministry of Railways has some similar schemes for railway workers.
238. The development of cooperatives constitutes an integral part of the policy of the present Government regarding the establishment of a socialist pattern of society. The Centre would have to provide a unified approach and concerted leadership in this field to the States. The cooperative sector does require assistance in the form of "pooled knowledge" and finance. We concede the need for a focal point at the Centre for overall planning and direction of the programme of cooperative development. All the same, the role of the Centre should be restricted to encouraging and helping the States to develop the cooperatives. We also feel that cooperatives can be developed meaningfully and placed on a sound footing only if they are handled as a part of the programme to which their activities relate. We would, therefore, recommend that the central agency for cooperatives should, apart from agricultural cooperatives deal with cooperatives only in those areas where there will be a decided advantage in these being handled by it.

239. Weighing the entire problem of the involvement of the Centre in programmes of community development and cooperation, we consider that there should be only one small, combined Department of Community Development and Cooperation. It may consist of three wings only—one for community development and panchayati Raj and two for cooperation.

240. Special attention will have to be paid during the coming years to the problem of increasing food production. The community development programme is primarily meant for rural areas. While the development of cooperatives in all sectors is important, it is all the more so in case of agriculture and rural industries. Keeping these considerations in view, we would recommend that the Ministry which deals with 'food', 'agriculture', 'community development' and 'cooperation' may appropriately be termed as "Ministry of Food and Rural Development".

Social Services

241. The Study Team has recommended the creation of a separate Department of Youth Services in the Ministry of Education so that this subject attracts the attention it deserves today. The team has also observed that the new department need not be headed by a Secretary. We agree that the problems of youth services and welfare, sports, community recreation and the like call for special consideration by Government. But it is an area where the substantive work will lie with the States. The role of the Centre should, in this case, as also in other subjects falling within the State List, be confined to matters listed in para 85 of Chapter IV of the report. We, therefore, consider that a Bureau of Youth Services would suffice. Promotion of youth services and activities will require involvement of the educational institutions and voluntary organisations of the youth. The in-
ternal set-up of the Bureau should be so designed as to meet the require­ments of its special functions.

242. Social welfare is another area which primarily falls within the sphere of the States. We, therefore, support the Study Team's proposal for combining the Departments of Social Welfare and Rehabilitation into a single Department of Social Welfare.

243. In preceding para 192 of this Chapter, we have proposed the amalgamation of the present Ministry of Health, Family Planning and Urban Development, Department of Social Welfare and Ministry of Education to form a new Ministry of Education, Health and Social Welfare. Schemes of social welfare largely relate either to matters of education and training or improvement of environmental conditions and physical capacities of individuals. All these three subjects primarily fall within the State List. We have given some thought to include under one Ministry all the State List subjects in which the Centre may have some interest. We, however, find that this will not be feasible. We have, therefore, attempted to combine them together in as few Ministries as possible.

Law and Justice

244. In its Fourteenth Report on “Reform of Judicial Administration”, the Law Commission of India recommended that all judicial matters for which the Central Government has the responsibility should be dealt with by a single Ministry of Justice. This Commission found that “the allocation of business relating to the administration of justice between the various Ministries of the Government is not such as to make for efficiency...”

245. One of the basic considerations which underlie the above recommendation of the Law Commission is that judicial administration should be handled by a Ministry which is not concerned with political issues and pressures. The Study Team, however, does not see how the Ministry of Law will be less open to political pressures than the Ministry of Home Affairs and it recommends that the existing arrangements may continue.

246. We are inclined to agree with the view that judicial administration is better kept in the charge of a Ministry which is not concerned with politi­cal issues. We accordingly recommend the transfer of the existing responsibility for judicial administration (including appointments) from the Ministry of Home Affairs to the Ministry of Law.

Arrangements for Coordination

247. Coordination of different activities is a difficult and complex pro­blem in any large government organisation with varied and numerous
functions. The present administrative system and practices are hardly adequate for effective coordination. On the one hand, there is manifest trend towards too much cross-references from a Ministry/Department to another; on the other coordination between policies and programmes in different areas of administrative activity has been poor in several cases. Effective coordination has been retarded also by the proliferation of the administrative machinery and personnel in both the secretariat and the field and the desire of the Ministries and the departments to guard their "preserve" jealously. Political and public pressures for quick decisions and scarcity of office accommodation to locate a Ministry or Department compactly in one place have also contributed to the present state of affairs.

248. The scheme of reorganisation proposed by us, which is broadly patterned on the recommendations of the Study Team, contains certain built-in mechanism for promoting coordination at each level of the administrative machinery. The grouping of subjects on the basis of rationality provides for coordinated administration at the base.

249. We have earlier suggested a Policy Advisory Committee in each Ministry or Department with a heavy charge for formulation of policies in an integrated manner. The heads of various substantive work wings and of non-secretariat organisations (which will be amalgamated with the secretariat) will be members of this Committee. Such a Policy Advisory Committee at the departmental level will obviously facilitate intra-departmental coordination. Wherever a Policy Advisory Committee is set up for the entire Ministry, this device will be quite helpful in promoting inter-departmental coordination within that Ministry.

250. The Study Team has also suggested that the responsibility for inter-departmental coordination in a multi-departmental Ministry should be assigned to one of the Departments and its Secretary should act as the coordinator. In a Ministry with a number of Secretaries but no Department, one of the Secretaries can play the coordinating role. The Study Team does not favour the device of having a Principal Secretary or Secretary General as this will not be conducive to high work-motivation at the level of the Secretaries. We support the Study Team's proposal.

251. Again, the regrouping of departments into Ministries and the representation of every subject in the Cabinet by one or other Cabinet Minister has been recommended by us keeping in view fully the need for coordination. For instance, the combination of Commerce and Industry under one Ministry will automatically facilitate coordination in these two fields. The Minister in charge at the top will provide a focal point for coordination within a Ministry.

252. We have also proposed a system of Cabinet Committees, covering between them all the Ministries and Departments. There will also be
a Secretaries' Committee to service each of the Cabinet Committees. Both the Secretaries' Committees and the Cabinet Committees will, in our view, be effective channels for inter-Ministry coordination at the policy level. The Cabinet too will serve as a coordinator of the more important policies and decisions. But, as it is generally too preoccupied with broad policy issues, most of policy coordination will be done at the level of Cabinet Committees.

253. The recent experiment with Agricultural Production Board with the Minister of Food and Agriculture as its Chairman, and the Ministers responsible for Irrigation and Power, Planning and Finance as members, has hardly been a success. We are convinced that under the conditions prevailing today, the institution of the Cabinet Committees is more appropriate for purposes of coordination at the highest level in Government.

Recommendation 18:

We, therefore, recommend as follows:

(1) (A) Ministries and Departments in the Government of India as presently constituted should be reorganised into Ministries and Departments as indicated in para 192 above.

(B) In particular—

(i) As recommended earlier—

(a) A new Department of Personnel should be created under the Prime Minister's charge with functions as indicated in para 182 of Chapter VI of the report.

(b) The Department of Administrative Reforms should be under the charge of the Deputy Prime Minister (vide para 147, Chaptr V).

(ii) The Research and Development organisation of the Ministry of Defence should be located in the main Ministry and not in one of its departments.

(iii) The Department of Revenue and Insurance should be reorganised as Department of Revenue and Expenditure.

(iv) (a) "Insurance" should be transferred to the Department of Economic Affairs.

(b) The present functions of the Department of Statistics in the Cabinet Secretariat should be transferred to the Department of Economic Affairs in the Ministry of Finance.

(c) The Department of Economic Affairs should be responsible for coordination of all activities of Government in the economic field. The Commission for Prices, Cost and
Tariff (the establishment of which has been recommended earlier in the report of Economic Administration) should be administratively related to the Department of Economic Affairs.

(v) The Department of Company Affairs should be shifted from the Ministry of Industrial Development and Company Affairs to the Ministry of Finance.

(vi) External Publicity should be transferred to the Department of Information and Broadcasting (now a Ministry).

(vii) (a) The combined Ministry of Commerce and Industry should have two Departments (a) Department of Commerce, and (b) Department of Industrial Development.

(b) The Council of Scientific and Industrial Research should be placed in the combined Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

(viii) The Advisory Committee to the Cabinet on Science and Technology should serve as the central point for advising the Cabinet on science policy, setting priorities and planning and review of scientific and technological research. It should have a permanent secretariat to service it.

(ix) The Ministry of Transport and Shipping and the Ministry of Tourism and Civil Aviation should be combined into a single Ministry of Transport and Tourism.

(x) “Communications” should be transferred to the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting to form the Ministry of Communications, Information and Broadcasting.

(xi) The charge of the Department of Parliamentary Affairs should be held by a Cabinet Minister who is the Leader of the House (Lok Sabha).

(xii) A Directorate of Construction should be set up in the Department of Works and Housing, charged with functions indicated in para 224 above.

(xiii) The Ministry of Steel, Mines and Metals and the Ministry of Petroleum and Chemicals should be integrated into a single Ministry of Metals, Chemicals and Oil.

(xiv) The Department of Community Development and the Department of Cooperation should be merged together to from the Department of Community Development and Co-operation.

(xv) The Department of Food, the Department of Agriculture and the combined, new Department of Community Deve-
Development and Cooperation should constitute together the Ministry of Food and Rural Development.

(xvi) (a) The Department of Rehabilitation should be merged into the Department of Social Welfare.

(b) The Ministry of Health, Family Planning and Urban Development, Department of Social Welfare and Ministry of Education should be amalgamated to form a new Ministry of Education, Health and Social Welfare.

(xvii) A Bureau of Youth Services should be set up in the Ministry of Education, Health and Social Welfare.

(xviii) The present functions of the Ministry of Home Affairs in judicial administration should be transferred to the Department of Legal Affairs in the Ministry of Law and this Ministry should be redesignated as Ministry of Law and Justice.

(2) Responsibility for overall coordination within a Ministry, which has more than one department/Secretary, should be specifically assigned to one of the departments/Secretaries most appropriate for the purpose.
CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

CHAPTER II—Machinery at Supra-Ministry Levels

1. (1) a) The number of Ministers in the Union Cabinet should be 16, including the Prime Minister.

(b) Each Department/subject should be represented in the Cabinet by one or the other Cabinet Minister. The sixteen Cabinet portfolios may be as indicated in para 15.

(c) The strength of the Council of Ministers should normally be 40. It may be increased in special circumstances but should in no case exceed 45.

(2) The three-tier system in the ministerial set-up, comprising Cabinet Ministers, Ministers of State and Deputy Ministers, may continue. The office of Parliamentary Secretary, which has now fallen into desuetude need not be revived.

(3) The functions and responsibilities of Ministers of State and Deputy Ministers and the powers which they may exercise within a Department or a Ministry should be clearly specified in the appropriate rules or orders.

(4) The Prime Minister should consult the Cabinet Minister concerned before assigning a particular Minister of State or Deputy Minister to his Ministry.

(5) No more than two Ministers should be involved in the decision-making process in any Ministry.

2. (1) The Prime Minister should be given institutional support, in the form of Deputy Prime Minister, for ensuring efficient and effective functioning of the governmental machinery. The Deputy Prime Minister should have the charge, in addition to his own portfolio, of such subjects and ad hoc assignments as the Prime Minister considers appropriate. The office of the Deputy Prime Minister should be recognised in the Transaction of Business Rules.

(2) The Prime Minister should continue to be associated with key appointments. He should periodically, say, once a month, meet, individually or in groups the Secretaries of important Departments.

(3) The Prime Minister should not ordinarily be in charge of a Ministry. His time should mostly be available for guidance, coordination and supervision.
3. (1) The existing Standing Cabinet Committees should be reconstituted as proposed in paras 29-30. The Committees should between them cover all important activities of Government. The membership of each Committee should not normally exceed six and should include all Ministers in charge of subjects covered by the Committee.

(2) Every Standing Committee of Cabinet should be supported by a Committee of Secretaries which will consider in advance all matters to be taken up in the Cabinet Committee.

(3) Ad hoc Committee of Ministers may be set up for investigating (but not deciding) particular issues and reporting to the Cabinet or the appropriate Cabinet Committees, as the case may be.

4. (1) The role of the Cabinet Secretary should not be limited to that of a coordinator. He should also act as the principal staff adviser of the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and the Cabinet Committees on important policy matters.

(2) The Cabinet Secretary should ordinarily have a tenure of three to four years.

CHAPTER III—Relations between Ministers, Civil Servants and Parliament

5. The Prime Minister should meet all Ministers individually or in group every month to discuss progress in implementation of policies and programmes and measures for improving the administrative efficiency. This should help promote a more active interest on the part of individual Ministers in improving the implementation process and the management of their Ministries.

6. (1) In selecting his colleagues, the Prime Minister should give special attention to considerations of political stature, personal integrity, intellectual ability and capacity for taking decisions and sustained application to work.

(2) In assigning a portfolio, due regard should be paid to the aptitude and capabilities of an incumbent.

(3) A Minister should take a holiday of at least two weeks in a year which he should devote to reading, reflection and relaxation.

7. The initial and annual statements of their financial assets and liabilities to be furnished by the Ministers under the Code of Conduct should be made available to the Lokpal. If any Minister fails to furnish such a statement the fact should be mentioned by the Lokpal in his annual report to Parliament. Suitable provision to this effect may be made in the Lokpal Bill which is now before Parliament.
8. (1) All major decisions, with reasons therefor, should be briefly reduced to writing, particularly where the policy of Government is not clear or where some important departure from the policy is involved or where the Minister differs from the Secretary on an important issue.

(2) Ministers should try to develop a climate of fearlessness and fairplay among the senior officers and encourage them to give frank and impartial advice. They should give the Secretaries the necessary guidance in carrying out their policies and orders.

(3) The Prime Minister should, with the assistance of the Cabinet Secretary and the central personnel agency, take special interest to arrest the growth of unhealthy personal affiliations to individual Ministers among civil servants.

(4) Ministers should not intervene in the day-to-day administration except in cases of grave injustice, serious default or maladministration on the part of civil servants. Where a citizen’s request or complaint calls for revision of a rule, procedure or policy, it should be met by effecting such revision, and not by relaxing the rules to accommodate an individual case.

(5) Secretaries and other civil servants need to show greater sensitivity to and a better appreciation of the Minister’s difficulties, and to discriminate between minor adjustments on the one hand, and acts of political and other forms of accommodation compromising basic principles or likely to have substantial or lasting repercussions on efficiency and morale of the services, on the other.

(6) The official relationship of the Secretary to the Minister should be one of loyalty and that the Minister to the Secretary one of confidence.

9. (1) A Minister should be held accountable—(a) when he fails to formulate policy in respect of a major problem or when the policy formulated is found erroneous or suffers from major weaknesses; (b) when he neglects to pay personal attention on important issues other than that of policy where such attention is expected of him or wrongly handles such issues; (c) when there is a general or major mismanagement or maladministration in his Department/Ministry; and (d) when he commits some act of impropriety.

(2) A Minister should not be held accountable for an act of a civil servant which is (a) in express violation of a directive or order issued by him; or (b) by implication prohibited by policies already approved by him; or (c) is mala fide.

(3) For reinforcing the principle of collective responsibility, it is essential that (a) the Cabinet should be agreed on fundamentals and all important issues are discussed and settled by the Cabinet; (b) a Minister does not announce a new policy or a major departure from current policy
with the approval of the Cabinet; and (c) a Minister should not ordi-

narily speak or make announcements on matters not within his portfolio. However, if the circumstances so require of him, he must get himself properly briefed by the Minister concerned.

(4) Standing Committees of Parliament may be set up for reviewing the work of Departments grouped in five sectors, namely, Social Services, Economic Administration, Defence and Foreign Affairs, Food and Rural Development and Transport. These Committees should function on the lines of the Committee on Public Undertakings and without taking over the functions of the Public Accounts Committee. To begin with only two of the Committees need be set up. As the Estimates Committee is now doing for each Department the type of review which is proposed for the sectoral committees, it will be necessary to remove from the purview of the Estimates Committee the Departments which fall within the jurisdiction of the sectoral committee. Where a Parliamentary Committee for a Department exists, it should not be necessary to have an Informal Consultative Committee.

(5) A balanced view should be taken of the working of a Government Department. Stray cases of bona fide default or shortcomings should be viewed against the background of overall achievements.

CHAPTER IV—Ministries and Departments

10. The role of the Central Ministries and Departments in subjects falling within the State List should be confined to matters listed in para 85. An analysis should be made in the light of these criteria of the items of work now handled by the Central agencies and such items as do not fulfill the criteria should be transferred to the States.

11. (1) Non-secretariat organisations engaged primarily in planning, implementation, coordination and review of a single development programme or several allied programmes, covering a substantial area of the activities of the Ministry and having a direct bearing on policy-making should be integrated with the Secretariat of the concerned Ministry. Such amalgamation, subject to criteria laid down in para 96, is especially significant in the case of activities of scientific and technical character and activities which call for a high degree of functional specialisation.

(2) The heads of non-secretariat organisations which are integrated with the Secretariat should function as the principal advisers to the Government in the respective areas and should enjoy a status appropriate to the nature of their duties and responsibilities. They may retain their present designations. It is not necessary to confer on them a formal ex-officio Secretariat status.
(3) In all other cases the present distinction between policy-making and executive organisations may be continued. Such distinction is vital for protecting the operational autonomy of the regulatory executive agencies and such developmental executive organisations as are mostly engaged in promotional activities, provision of a service or production and supply of a commodity.

(4) Executive functions at present performed by an administrative Ministry or Department which do not have a close bearing on policy-making (in terms of the criteria enunciated in para 96) should be transferred to an appropriate, existing non-secretariat agency or to a new executive organisation specially created for the purpose, provided that the volume of the work justifies its creation.

(5) Policy position in Departments and Ministries dealing with scientific and technical matters or with functions of highly specialised character should include persons having relevant specialised experience or expertise.

12. (1) In non-staff Ministries other than those with board-type of top management, there should be set up three “staff” offices, namely, (i) an office of planning and policy; (ii) a chief personnel office; and (iii) a chief finance office. An administrative Department with a heavy charge or with functions which have no close affinity with the work of other department(s) may have a separate planning and policy office.

(2) The office of planning and policy should include the planning cell recommended in the ARC report on Machinery for Planning. This office should continuously be engaged in formulating long-term policies, carrying out policy studies and evolving a series of well-articulated policy statements. It should also deal with the parliamentary work of the Department/Ministry.

(3) The chief personnel office in a Ministry should serve as a focal point for the formulation and coordination of overall personnel policies, initiating measures for promoting personnel development and matters concerning discipline, appears, memorials and service rules of cadres administered by the Ministry. It may also look after office management, O. & M., and general administration.

(4) Each of the three “staff” offices should be manned by staff having specialised knowledge and experience. The head of each “staff” office should generally be of the rank of a Joint Secretary though in some cases he may even be a Deputy Secretary or an Additional Secretary depending on the quantum of work.

(5) In addition to the three staff offices, each Ministry should have a public relations office or unit.

(6) The heads of the “substantive work” wings may deal directly with the chiefs of the three “staff” offices, as also with the Secretary and Minister
on matters of technical or operational policy. Proposals having a bearing on long-term policy should, however, be processed through planning and policy office.

13. (1) Distribution of work between the wings of a Ministry/ Administrative Department and within the divisions of a Secretariat wing should be based on considerations of rationality, manageability of change and unity of command.

(2) Each secretariat wing should have its separate identity and its budget should appear as a distinct unit in the budget of the Ministry. Its head should enjoy adequate administrative and financial powers.

(3) The head of the wing should have the primary responsibility for good administration within the wing, effective supervision and control of staff and maintenance of high standards of discipline and conduct.

(4) The head of the wing should have considerable say in formulation of the wing budget, creation of posts, subject to budget provision, spending of budgeted funds and appointment of personnel to the wing and their transfer therefrom. He should also have the necessary powers for effective day-to-day personnel management in the wing, e.g., powers to sponsor staff for training, to grant honorarium, to impose minor penalties, and to fill short-term leave vacancies.

14. (1) (a) There should be only two levels of consideration below the Minister, namely, (i) Under Secretary/Deputy Secretary, and (ii) Joint Secretary/Additional Secretary/Secretary. Work should be assigned to each of these two levels on the lines of “desk officer” system. Each level should be required and empowered to dispose of a substantial amount of work on its own and will be given the necessary staff assistance.

(b) The staffing pattern within a wing may be flexible to facilitate the employment of officers of various grades.

(c) The duties and requirements of various jobs in the Secretariat at each of the two levels should be defined clearly and in detail on the basis of scientific analysis of work content.

(2) For smooth and effective working of the proposed “desk officer” system, the following measures will be necessary:

(a) introduction of a functional of a file index;

(b) maintenance of guard files or card indices which will contain all important precedents;

(c) adequate provision for “leave” reserve;

(d) adequate stenographic and clerical aids.

(3) (a) There should be set up in each Ministry or major administrative Department a Policy Advisory Committee to consider all important
issues of long-term policy and to inject thinking inputs from different areas of specialisation into problem solving. The Committee should be headed by the Secretary of the Ministry and should include the heads of the three staff offices (of planning and policy, finance and personnel) and heads of important substantive work wings (including those of the non-secretariat organisations integrated with the Ministry/Administrative Department). As and when necessary the heads of the governing bodies of important research and training institutions and boards and corporations outside the Government may be co-opted as members of the Policy Advisory Committee for such items of work as are of interest to them.

(b) Self-contained papers or memoranda, setting out problems, their various alternative solutions, merits and demerits of each alternative, etc. should be prepared for consideration by the Committee, and the decision arrived at should be duly recorded in minutes.

CHAPTER V—Administrative Reforms—Formulation, and Implementation

15. (1) The Department of Administrative Reforms should confine itself mainly to: (a) studies on administrative reforms of a foundational character, (b) building up O. & M. expertise in Ministries/Departments and training the personnel of their O. & M. units in modern techniques of management, and (c) advice and guidance to these O. & M. units in effecting administrative improvements and reforms.

(2) The existing O. & M. units in different Ministries/Departments should be reactivated.

(3) A special cell on 'perspective reforms' should be set up in the central reforms agency.

(4) In its methods of work, staffing pattern and organisational structure the central reforms agency should be 'research-oriented'.

(5) The Department of Administrative Reforms should be placed directly under the Deputy Prime Minister.

(6) It is necessary to develop strong, autonomous professional institutions which will promote original thinking on administrative reforms and innovations. Studies on administrative reforms and improvements of the types mentioned in para 149 can be entrusted, with advantage, to autonomous professional institutions like the Indian Institute of Public Administration, Institute of Applied Manpower Research, Administrative Staff College (Hyderabad), and Institutes of Management at Calcutta and Ahmedabad and selected Universities.

(7) There should be set up a council on administrative reforms to advise the central reforms agency on the planning of its programme of work, to review progress, to help induct fresh thinking into its working, and to
coordinate the activities of the different professional organisations engaged in research on problems of public management. The Council should consist of eight members, drawn from Members of Parliament, experienced administrators and eminent scholars interested in public administration. It may be presided over by the Deputy Prime Minister.

16. (1) The responsibility for overseeing the implementation of the recommendations of the Administrative Reforms Commission should rest with the Deputy Prime Minister.

(2) Before the Cabinet takes up a report of the Commission, it should be considered by the Cabinet Committee on Administration.

(3) (a) A Special Cell should be set up in the Cabinet Secretariat under the over-all charge of the Deputy Prime Minister and the general supervision of the Cabinet Secretary, to process the Commission's reports. It should also assist the Deputy Prime Minister in overseeing the implementation of the accepted recommendations.

(b) After the Ministry/Ministries have communicated their views, the Special Cell in the Cabinet Secretariat should, under the direction of the Deputy Prime Minister, prepare the necessary papers for the Cabinet Committee on Administration.

(c) Within a Ministry/Department the Commission's recommendations should be dealt with at a high level.

(4) Within three months of the receipt of a report of the Commission, Government should place before Parliament a White Paper indicating their decisions on the basic recommendations contained in that report.

(5) There should be set up an all-party parliamentary committee of both Houses whose functions will be to see that the recommendations accepted by the Government are implemented expeditiously.

CHAPTER VI—A Central Personnel Agency

17. (1) A separate Department of Personnel should be set up, with a full Secretary in charge who should work under the general guidance of the Cabinet Secretary.

(2) This Department should have the following functions and responsibilities:

(a) formulation of personnel policies on all matters common to the Central and All-India Services, and inspection and review of their implementation;

(b) talent hunting, development of personnel for "senior management" and processing of appointments to senior posts;

(c) manpower planning training and career development;
(d) foreign assistance programme in personnel administration;
(e) research in personnel administration;
(f) discipline and welfare of staff and machinery for redress of their grievances;
(g) liaison with the Union Public Service Commission, State Governments, Professional Institutions, etc.; and
(h) staffing of the middle-level positions in the Central Secretariat (of Under Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries) with the assistance of and on the advice of the Establishment Board.

(3) (a) The Department of Personnel should not itself administer any service cadre. The administrative control of different service cadres should vest with individual Ministries and Departments concerned.

(b) The administration of the IAS, IPS and the centralised aspects of the Central Secretariat Service should be the responsibility of the Ministry of Home Affairs.

(c) The management of the Indian Economic Service and of the Indian Statistical Service should be transferred to the Department of Economic Affairs.

(4) The Cabinet Secretary should, by convention, be regarded as Secretary-General of the new Department of Personnel, without being formally so designated. He should be actively involved in the development of and selection for “senior management” but not in appointments below that level.

(5) The new Department of Personnel should be placed directly under the Prime Minister.

(6) An Advisory Council on Personnel Administration may be set up to act as a feederline of new ideas and thinking on personnel administration. It should be composed of official and non-official experts in different aspects of personnel management, drawn from all over the country.

(7) The Establishment Board should be located in the new Department of Personnel and the Secretary of this Department should be its Chairman. The Board should deal with appointments only upto and including Deputy Secretaries.

Chapter VII—Grouping of Subjects

18. (1) (A) Ministries and Departments in the Government of India as presently constituted should be reorganised into Ministries and Departments as indicated in para 192.
(B) In particular—

(i) As recommended earlier—

(b) A new Department of Personnel should be created under the Prime Minister's charge with functions as indicated in para 182 of Chapter VI of this report.

(b) The Department of Administrative Reforms should be under the charge of the Deputy Prime Minister (vide para 147, Chapter V).

(ii) The Research and Development organisation of the Ministry of Defence should be located in the main Ministry and not in one of its Departments.

(iii) The Department of Revenue and Insurance should be reorganised as the Department of Revenue and Expenditure.

(iv) (a) "Insurance" should be transferred to the Department of Economic Affairs.

(b) The present functions of the Department of Statistics in the Cabinet Secretariat should be transferred to the Department of Economic Affairs in the Ministry of Finance.

(c) The Department of Economic Affairs should be responsible for coordination of all activities of Government in the economic field. The Commission for Prices, Cost and Tariff (the establishment of which has been recommended earlier in the report on Economic Administration) should be administratively related to the Department of Economic Affairs.

(v) The Department of Company Affairs should be shifted from the Ministry of Industrial Development and Company Affairs to the Ministry of Finance.

(vi) External Publicity should be transferred to the Department of Information and Broadcasting (now a Ministry).

(vii) (a) The combined Ministry of Commerce and Industry should have two Departments (a) Department of Commerce and (b) Department of Industrial Development.

(b) The Council of Scientific and Industrial Research should be placed in the combined Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

(viii) The Advisory Committee to the Cabinet on Science and Technology should serve as the central point for advising the Cabinet
on science policy, setting priorities and planning and review of scientific and technological research. It should have a permanent secretariat to service it.

(ix) The Ministry of Transport and shipping and the Ministry of Tourism and Civil Aviation should be combined into a single Ministry of Transport and Tourism.

(x) "Communications" should be transferred to the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting to form the Ministry of Communications, Information and Broadcasting.

(xi) The charge of the Department of Parliamentary Affairs should be held by a Cabinet Minister who is the Leader of the House (Lok Sabha).

(xii) A Directorate of Construction should be set up in the Department of Works and Housing, charged with functions indicated in para 224.

(xiii) The Ministry of Steel, Mines and Metals and the Ministry of Petroleum and Chemicals should be integrated into a single Ministry of Metals, Chemicals and Oil.

(xiv) The Department of Community Development and the Department of Cooperation should be merged together to form the Department of Community Development and Cooperation.

(xv) The Department of Food, the Department of Agriculture and the combined, new Department of Community Development and Cooperation should constitute together the Ministry of Food and Rural Development.

(xvi) (a) The Department of Rehabilitation should be merged into the Department of Social Welfare.

(b) The Ministry of Health, Family Planning and Urban Development, Department of Social Welfare and Ministry of Education should be amalgamated to form a new Ministry of Education, Health and Social Welfare.

(xvii) A Bureau of Youth Services should be set-up in the Ministry of Education, Health and Social Welfare.

(xviii) The present functions of the Ministry of Home Affairs in judicial administration should be transferred to the Department of Legal Affairs in the Ministry of Law and this Ministry should be redesignated as Ministry of Law and Justice.
(2) Responsibility for overall coordination within a Ministry which has more than one Department/Secretary, should be specifically assigned to one of the Departments/Secretaries most appropriate for this purpose.

(Sd.) K. Hanumanthalya, Chairman.

(Sd.) H. V. Kamath* Member.

(Sd.) Debabrata Mookerjee, Member.

(Sd.) V Shankar, Member.

(Sd.) V. V. Chari, Secretary.

New Delhi;
September 14, 1968.

*Subject to a note of dissent.
NOTE OF DISSERT

By

SHRI H. V. KAMATH

Chapter II contains recommendations regarding the size of the Cabinet and Council of Ministers as well as the groupings of departments in Ministries. I am of the view that so far as subjects in the State List of the Constitution are concerned, the work in these areas primarily belongs to the States and it will, therefore, be their responsibility. Over the years the Union Government has so grown that it has been exercising not only the supervising and coordinating functions in these areas, but has also tended to appropriate some of the executive authority as well. This is tantamount to encroaching, albeit in no great measure, on the bounds of jurisdiction and responsibility of the State Governments; and this kind of over-government by the Union should be avoided particularly in view of the fast changing political landscape in the States and at the Centre. There must however be coordination at the Central, all-India level. It follows, therefore, that Ministries dealing with these subjects should confine themselves to the role of supervisors and coordinators, and at best provide some kind of leadership. The executive responsibility would surely be not that of Central Ministries.

2. I accordingly suggest that in place of two Ministries—one of Food, Agriculture, Community Development and Cooperation, and the other of Irrigation and Power—there should be a single Ministry of “Food and Rural Development”, the latter subject comprising those which have been referred to above. Eighty per cent of India’s population live in the villages, and the appellation “Rural Development” would in the fitness of things be most appropriate.

3. In the modern world Science and Technology are assuming profound importance in all sectors of national life, and particularly in a fast developing country like ours, Science and Technology will play an increasingly vital role in the coming years. It is, therefore, desirable and necessary that there should be a separate Ministry of Science and Technology. The subject of “Power” may be transferred to this Ministry, if necessary. Further, “Science” should include both Nuclear Science and Space Science: the microcosm as well as the macrocosm, in short. In this connection, it would be pertinent to cite the fact that the first Prime Minister of India, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, had a passionate interest in
Science and Technology, and a National Science Policy Resolution spelling out the broad guidelines on Science activity was adopted by Parliament in 1959. It was largely due to his initiative and drive that fairly competent infra-structure for the development of Science and Technology was built up during the first decade after independence. His daughter, the present Prime Minister, in her address to the Silver Jubilee Celebrations of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research last month observed that “Science and Technology in India tended to develop without adequate and deliberate correlation between research expenditure on the one hand and priorities and programmes in planned development on the other.”

4. In my view the haphazard development of Science and Technology in our country has been mainly due to the failure of the Government in setting up a strong and effective organisation and machinery for directing and coordinating all activity in this field. I am convinced, on the basis of the talks I had with the late Shri Jawaharlal Nehru in 1962-63, that, but for the Chinese invasion which shattered him physically and mentally, he would have created a separate Ministry for Science. I believe, therefore, that the creation of the new Ministry of Science and Technology will also thus be, in small measure, a living homage to his memory. This proposal, if accepted, will necessitate consequential changes in Chapter VII.

5. I venture to assert that the placement of Science and Technology in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry would be well-nigh comparable to the position of a cherubic child among a pack of wolves.

6. It would not be out of place in this context to point out that the British Cabinet has a Minister for Technology as well as a Secretary of State for Education and Science. I understand that France too has had for some years a Ministry of “Scientific Research, Atomic and Space Affairs”. Here in our country it will perhaps be more advantageous and helpful to combine both Science and Technology in a single Ministry; and in the task of coordination, cooperation and communication between the new Ministry and other Ministries, the newly constituted Advisory Committee on Science and Technology may render valuable assistance to the Cabinet Committee and Secretariat.

7. The Finance Minister has been assigned an important role in the field of economic administration. He is responsible for collecting revenue, mobilising resources, controlling the pattern of investment, and conducting watch-dog operations in the Public Sector. There is hardly any area in the industrial and commercial field of activity, which, in some way or other, is not affected by the activities of the Finance Ministry. While the need for ensuring economy and propriety in expenditure will continue to be among the responsibilities of the Finance, its overall role should be of
a positive and constructive character, that is to say, one of ensuring that the national economy is improving in the required direction and at the desired pace. Economy after all is a means to an end, viz., effective utilisation of resources for rapid economic development. Consequently, failure to utilise resources should cause the Finance Ministry as much concern as the uneconomic use of resources leading to extravagance or imprudence. The Department of Economic Affairs, which is a part of the Finance Ministry, is to-day looked upon more as a regulatory department dealing with foreign exchange in a manner the primary object of which is to save it, rather than earn as much as we can. But the Department as its name suggests, should concern itself much more than it does at present with economic development in general.

8. In order, therefore, that this aspect of the Finance Ministry’s functions should receive the importance it deserves, I suggest that the Ministry be redesignated as the “Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs”. I should, however, make it clear that the two Departments, being inextricably linked with each other, should continue to be under one and the same Ministry. No kind of splitting of the Ministry is even remotely intended, and I would like to affirm that any such splitting would be detrimental to Administration, and will not work.

9. My colleagues hold the view, and have accordingly recommended that “the Prime Minister should not ordinarily be incharge of a Ministry”. I regret I cannot agree, because I feel that the Prime Minister should be left free to have his own choice in the matter: to hold or not to hold a portfolio should be left entirely to his own discretion and judgment. If, as has been the practice, the Prime Minister holds at least one of the portfolios, listed in Chapter II and in this my note, the number of Cabinet Ministers including the Prime Minister would be reduced to 15, which, being an odd number, has also an incidental advantage in the not so remote or improbable contingency of the Cabinet being sharply divided on a major issue, thereby making a decision by majority inevitable. It is indubitable that the smaller and more compact the Cabinet is, the more effective its working will be; and it is desirable, therefore, that prime importance be given to administrative requirements, while political compulsion in the formation of the Cabinet, are kept to the minimum. I am well aware that the latter cannot be totally avoided or eliminated.

10. The portfolio of Parliamentary Affairs should normally be assigned to the Leader of the House of the People (Lok Sabha). The Prime Minister, unless he is not a member of the House, is expected to assume the leadership of the House; but even so, he may if he so chooses, transfer the portfolio of Parliamentary Affairs to a senior Minister of his Cabinet.
11. In Chapter III, a new function has been assigned to the Lokpal, whose creation was recommended in our First Report in 1966, and in pursuance of which a Bill is now on the Table of Parliament. I agree that it will be helpful to a certain extent, if Ministers are required to send statements of their assists and liabilities to the Lokpal, besides the Prime Minister. However, the main objective underlying the Bill which I had moved in Parliament in December 1963 and to which a reference has been made in this chapter was to ensure that Parliament should be fully seized of the matter, and I therefore sought to provide that Ministers should lay such statements before Parliament. My colleagues have attempted to devise a via media, but I am afraid it will not have the desired effect unless and until the Lokpal is invested with the power to bring to the notice of Parliament not only the failure of a Minister to send him such a statement, but also those cases where he is satisfied that the statement before him is not quite correct or adequate. It must be noted further that all Ministers including the Prime Minister would be obliged to furnish such statements to the Lokpal.

12. In Chapter III, it has been recommended that "all communications addressed by Members of Parliament to a Minister should be replied to by the Minister himself, but where, however, this is not convenient or practicable, or the reply called for is of a routine nature, the reply may be sent under the signature of a senior officer, preferably the Secretary." I am afraid the latitude afforded by exception is likely to be exploited, and I would, therefore, urge that only the acknowledgement of communications and other routine replies may be sent under the signature of a senior officer, preferably the Secretary. There can be no question of any inconvenience or impracticability disabling a Minister from replying to communications by Members of Parliament. Shri Jawaharlal Nehru was, as far as I know, an exemplar in this respect, though the same cannot be said of his successors.

13. In the same Chapter III it is stated that "while the convention of civil service anonymity has been generally observed, there have been quite a few instances in the recent past, where officers were mentioned by name in Parliament in contravention of the rules framed in that behalf". It should be noted, however, that the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha provide that "no allegation of a defamatory or incriminatory nature shall be made by a Member against any person unless the Member has given previous intimation to the Speaker and also to the Minister concerned so that the Minister may be able to make an investigation into the matter for the purpose of a reply". I believe Rajya Sabha too has a similar rule. I think that this is an adequate safeguard against mala-fide assault on "civil services anonymity" and I now, to my personal knowledge, the Speaker has taken prompt action, whenever the rule was sought to be violated. Moreover, one should not be so squeamish as to
make a fetish of "civil service anonymity". It is derived, may be indirectly, from the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, which has been well spelt out in Chapter III. Ministers should take all the praise and all the blame for what their departments do. Their civil servants owe them total obedience, and they should not be named in Parliament, where their political masters alone are answerable. Civil servants have a right to remain anonymous, and even if they have given bad advice, their Ministers should protect them. This is the theory, but, in practice, ministerial responsibility is, to some extent, fictional. The functions of Government are now so vast that it is humanly impossible for Ministers to know what is being decided daily in their name.

14. The Fulton Committee on the Civil Service in the United Kingdom has, in its recent Report, observed that "the traditional anonymity of civil servants is already being eroded by Parliament and to a more limited extent by the Press, Radio and Television; the process will continue and we see no reason to seek to reverse it. . . . The Minister cannot know all that is going on in his Department, nor can he nowadays be present at every forum where legitimate questions are raised about its activities". In any case, anonymity cannot be a shield against wrong-doing.

15. Lastly, in Chapter III, it is stated that "disproportionate attention to stray cases of administrative shortcomings" is sometimes paid in Parliament. I do not agree. I am definitely of the view that even where there are positive achievements to the credit of a department, its shortcomings and misdoings, whatever they may be, should be fully and ruthlessly exposed in the interest of administrative efficiency and integrity, while complimenting the Department for its good deeds.

16. In Chapter V, it has been recommended that Government's decisions on our recommendations should be laid before Parliament. But it is imperative that, to ensure the supremacy of Parliament in our democratic set-up, it must be clearly and categorically provided that all decisions of Government in this regard are subject to approval, disapproval or modification by Parliament. I have talked to several Members of Parliament about this matter, and they are all insistent that every one of our Reports should be fully discussed in Parliament, and Government's decisions thereon should be subject to ratification or otherwise by Parliament. Further, I trust that, with a view to reinforcing the vigilance exercised by the proposed Parliamentary Committee, a non-official, non-partisan people's committee or citizens' committee would be set up in every State and Union Territory so as to awaken and strengthen public opinion in this regard.

17. In Chapter VI, a new Department of Personnel is proposed to be set up with a Secretary in charge, and it will work under the general
guidance of the Cabinet Secretary. It is further proposed that this new Department should be placed directly under the Prime Minister. I however agree with the Study Team, which has recommended that the location of the Department should be in the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Study Team has considered in detail the pros and cons of the matter, and has given cogent reasons for coming to the conclusion that the Department should be placed in the Home Ministry. I would only like to state briefly here that the functions, which would develop on the proposed Department of Personnel (which will be only an organisational and administrative form and pattern for the Central Personnel Agency, which we have proposed), would be even more than those assigned at present to the Services Wing of the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Establishment Division of the Ministry of Finance. These duties and functions, so multifarious and complex, have been set forth in Chapter VI. Moreover, we have in our earlier Reports on Planning and Economic Administration recommended that the Prime Minister must hold overall charge of Planning and have assigned to him some other nodal functions as well, besides his general responsibility for coordination and supervision as head of the Cabinet. It is also likely that, as has been the practice so far, the Prime Minister may decide to take up a portfolio himself. In the circumstances, therefore, it would not be fair to impose on him an additional burden such as would inevitably flow from the Department of Personnel being placed in his charge. Further, in our country with its federal democratic set-up, the Home Minister has to play a key role in so far as Centre-State relationships, and the millions of personnel employed at the Centre and in the states are concerned. The assignment of the Department of Personnel to the portfolio of the Prime Minister will probably weaken the position of the Home Minister without, in any way, adding to the strength of the Prime Minister's. Moreover, the placement of the Department, with a separate Secretary, in the Home Ministry rather than under the Prime Minister, will also obviate the possibility of any inroad into the position of the Cabinet Secretary as the head of the Civil Service. As the Study Team says, "the present arrangement under which the Cabinet Secretary has an important place in the matter of making any key postings should continue, with a Secretary in charge of the Department of Personnel instead of the Establishment Officer, feeding the Cabinet Secretary". The Study Team has also outlined the manner in which the Home Secretary's position would be preserved. This is a salutary recommendation and should be generally acceptable.

18. I accordingly propose that the Department of Personnel should be placed under the Ministry of Home Affairs, but it should be clearly understood that the Prime Minister should be closely associated with personnel matters concerning senior management levels. This will call for consequential changes in Chapter VII.
19. Lastly, turning to Chapter VII, the work of Rehabilitation should not, I think be allocated to the Department of Social Welfare, and I suggest that, in view of its importance, it may continue to be looked after by the Ministry of Labour and Employment.

20. I am also of the view that the cartography-oriented Survey of India should continue to be with the Education Ministry. The Ministry of Irrigation and Power cannot be a congenial habitat or milieu for its efficient functioning. Moreover, I have suggested earlier that Irrigation and Power be included in the Ministry of Food and Rural Development.

Sd./- H. V. KAMATH,
Member